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When major contamination emergencies involving chemical, biological, and 
radiological hazards occur, decisions about actions to protect public health are often 
needed very quickly. However, there is very little guidance for leaders about how to 
make these decisions, which may be very consequential. The goal of this research is to 
learn from disparate disciplines that deal with crisis decision making and risk-based 
decision making in order to understand the elements that are important for successful 
decision making in contamination emergencies, and translate those findings into a 
framework that can help guide risk assessors and decision makers through the process in 
future contamination emergencies. 
 This research was conducted in three parts. First, a case study on biological threat 
characterization was conducted using a modified Delphi approach to gather subject-
matter expert opinion on the process of characterizing contaminants and conducting 
human-health risk assessment prior to an emergency. Second, an integrative literature 
review was conducted to bring together relevant findings from different types of literature 
from the fields of risk-based and crisis decision making. Finally, building on the findings 
of the literature review, semi-structured interviews with subject matter experts were held 
to discuss the important elements, information needs, and processes that can support a 
political-level decision maker such as a mayor or governor, who may be in the position of 
making these difficult decisions. 
 Findings from the Delphi case study revealed the importance of characterizing 
potential hazards before an emergency occurs, so that data about a contaminant and 
iii 
information about risk to human health can be used to make more-accurate decisions to 
protect the public’s health. The literature review uncovered a number of key findings 
regarding cognitive factors affecting decisions, key sources and topics to incorporate into 
decisions, and decision-making processes and supporting structures that can improve the 
quality of decision making in a time-pressured and uncertain environment. Interviews 
with subject matter experts helped to further explore and validate the themes derived 
from the literature review, which were then condensed into a decision-making 
framework. This framework is intended to inform future development of guidance for 
mayors and governors. 
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Public health emergencies involving environmental contamination require a rapid 
response from leaders and health officials, and risk-based decision making, to help ensure 
that public health is adequately protected. Yet, in such emergencies evidence about 
human health risks is often limited, making risk-based decisions difficult. Further 
compounding this difficulty is the fact that every decision has not only public health 
implications, but also economic, ethical, social, political, legal and, in many cases, 
environmental implications that must be considered.1  
In contamination emergencies, decision makers are often thrust into a chaotic 
situation involving very high stakes.2 Many times this happens without preparation or 
warning; in fact, decision makers are typically not equipped with the training or 
knowledge to make risk-based decisions. We know that, in these emergencies, decision 
makers often neglect to consider the multifaceted nature of every decision, sometimes 
making decisions that are politically motivated and not risk-based, or else making 
decisions based on science without regard to stakeholders and real world issues.3  
Large contamination emergencies are not infrequent in the United States: in the 
last 16 years alone, major examples of public health emergencies involving chemical, 
biological or radiological contaminants include the anthrax letter attacks in October, 
2001;4 Hurricane Katrina in 2005;5 the Deep Water Horizon (BP) oil spill in 2010;6 the 
West Virginia Elk River chemical spill in 2014;7 and the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa, which resulted in cases imported to the United States and elsewhere in the world 
and decontamination efforts aimed at reducing further spread.8 These incidents have 
 





involved a range of contaminants, circumstances, and affected populations. Yet, despite 
the heterogeneous nature of these events, there are also commonalities that can be 
considered when planning for future events.  
Pre-Event Characterization of Risks 
Decision making in contamination emergencies can be improved with access to 
better risk information.2 However, data about the risks to human health posed by a 
contaminant may be limited or absent in an emergency because an agent has never been 
or has been incompletely characterized.9,10 With a multitude of potential chemical, 
biological and radiological threats and scenarios to worry about, it is unrealistic to expect 
that human health risk data can be collected for all of them. Currently, there are tens of 
thousands of toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) and materials (TIMs) in use,11 and 
potentially scores of biological contaminants, which would require risk assessment to 
understand the health effects related to contamination – many of which have not been 
characterized.12 Radiological materials are better understood due to decades of work on 
nuclear defense, medicine, and power, but they are still incompletely characterized with 
regard to human health effects.13  
Resources to conduct human health risk assessment on each chemical, biological 
or radiological (CBR) contaminant of concern are severely limited.14 There is not enough 
time, political will, or funding at the local, state or federal government levels, or in 
academia, to characterize every CBR contaminant. Furthermore, industry often has a 
disincentive to produce and publicize high-quality risk assessment data on the CBR 
materials they use in business and rely on for economic viability.15  
 





Yet, despite the size and difficulty of this challenge, it is not unreasonable to 
expect governmental and nongovernmental entities to make strategic investments toward 
improving CBR risk data to reduce uncertainty, and ultimately improve decision making 
in an emergency. Targeted investment in research to characterize a subset of CBR risks, 
including research on mechanisms of action (toxicology or pathology), dose-response, 
and health effects, can improve the odds of effective response when a disaster occurs.  
Within the federal government, there are programs dedicated to improving data 
for CBR human health risk assessment and emergency response. Some federal programs 
conduct research focused generally on human health risks of contaminants regardless of 
their origin; namely, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Some–the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Defense (DoD)–focus more on 
intentional use of CBR agents and accidental releases.  
Prioritization of federal resources for risk assessment and agent characterization is 
complicated. It is impossible to predict with certainty which contaminants will be 
involved in future disasters, and many other political, economic, and bureaucratic factors 
influence risk assessment priorities and timelines. However, each federal program aimed 
at reducing uncertainty regarding risks to human health from CBR contaminants has the 
need to prioritize research due to limited time and resource availability. There are many 
possible ways to accomplish this prioritization and many possible downstream 
consequences of every prioritization scheme. 
Decision Making in the Midst of a Crisis 
In every emergent environmental contamination event that threatens the health of 
the public, risk assessors must work quickly to understand and address the risks to public 
 





health via risk assessment, and then apply the findings of risk assessment to the 
emergency response through risk management and risk communication. However, even 
in the best of circumstances, risk assessment results alone often do not provide definitive 
answers to the complex questions in these emergencies. So, decision makers must be able 
to balance uncertain and incomplete scientific findings, ethics, and political and social 
realities in their decision making. In nonemergency periods, conduct of risk assessment in 
response to environmental contamination can be a deliberate and thorough process. In the 
setting of an emergency, the response must be rapid and yet still be accurate and 
appropriately protective of health. 
Risk management does not lead to zero risk. So, it is up to leaders and residents of 
affected communities to take what is known about risk and use that knowledge to 
undertake risk tradeoff analyses regarding what levels of risk are acceptable and what 
tradeoffs need to be made in order to achieve acceptable risk.16 The process of achieving 
acceptable risk in a community is greatly influenced by the handling of the response by 
public officials and decision makers. 
Ideally, risk-based decisions would be made by risk managers who are familiar 
with the risk assessment process and have in-depth knowledge about the related scientific 
data and the circumstances of the contamination. In reality, and particularly in 
emergencies, risk management is often implemented by high-level political decision 
makers who are somewhat removed from the risk assessment process.16 In an emergency, 
where stakes are high and media attention is intense, decisions in the United States tend 
to be made by a top public health official or emergency manager, or by a local, state or 
federal political leader such as a mayor, governor, or the president.  
 





To improve the response to contamination emergencies, two important steps 
should be taken: 1) make an effort to reduce scientific uncertainty by collecting and 
improving risk data for contaminants that might be involved in emergencies, and 2) equip 
leaders with a framework that can guide decision making during such highly stressful and 
uncertain events. Currently, there is relatively little time or funding allocated to risk 
assessment for many CBR agents, and no such guidance on risk-based decisions in public 
health emergencies exists.  
RESEARCH GOAL 
The purpose of this research is to gain an understanding of common issues and 
information needs that arise during contamination emergencies, regardless of the 
contaminants involved, in order to; 1) inform investments into pre-crisis risk 
characterization; and 2) build a decision framework that can serve as a guide for leaders 
as they make decisions during the early phases of response to these emergencies.  
STUDY AIMS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The specific aims of this research study included the following:  
Specific Aim 1 – Explore approaches to improving risk information and availability of 
that information in contamination emergencies through pre-crisis characterization efforts 
 Research Question 1.1 - What do experts in biosecurity and biodefense think is 
important in characterizing biological threat agents? 
 Research Question 1.2 - How can the findings be implemented so that public 
health officials are better informed by risk data in future events, and can be 
 





incorporated into the broader decision-making process along with other ethical, 
socioeconomic and political considerations? 
Specific Aim 2 – Describe the process of making risk-based crisis decisions from the 
literature and from open source reports about real contamination emergencies. 
 Research Question 2.1 – What decision frameworks from the fields of risk 
analysis, risk management, risk-based and crises decision making, and other 
applicable fields have been used? 
 Research Question 2.2 – How do the identified decision-making frameworks 
balance science/evidence, uncertainty, and social, political, legal and fiscal 
realities?  
 Research Question 2.3 – What decision-making elements were included or 
excluded from real world events, and how did those elements shape the outcome 
of those events? 
Specific Aim 3 – Elicit information from experts about approaches to risk-based decision 
making, and develop a decision-making framework to guide political level leaders. 
 Research Question 3.1 – What is the process of decision making in real world 
contamination events? 
 Research Question 3.2 – How are risk assessments carried out during a 
contamination emergency? 
 Research Question 3.3 – What are the most important decision elements that 
should be considered in every contamination emergency that threatens public 
health? 
 





 Research Question 3.4 – What format would decision makers find most useful to 
deliver guidance on risk-based decision making? 
BACKGROUND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The body of literature pertaining to risk-based decision making in emergency 
contamination events, including biological, chemical, and radiological events, is very 
limited. However, there are separate topic areas that do have distinct bodies of literature, 
which can be taken together to understand the full scope of the problem from the 
beginning of the emergency, through risk assessment and decision making.  
In environmental health policy making, there has been a tendency to separate the 
science of risk analysis from the inherently political process of risk management and 
decision making.17 Reasoning for this separation is understandable in that scientific fact 
should not be altered by outside factors such as political climate or social dynamics. 
However, as noted in Science and Decisions: Advancing Risk Assessment (known as the 
“Silver Book”), risk analysis does not exist in a vacuum and is often fraught with 
uncertainty.18 It is important that risk assessors understand the other factors that influence 
decision makers when they incorporate risk information into their risk management 
decisions.18 The Silver Book discusses and provides a framework for how risk assessors 
can make risk assessments maximally useful for decision makers. This framework 
includes three phases of the risk assessment process: planning and scoping of the risk 
assessment to ensure that it is answering the right questions; conduct of the assessment 
based on the plan, including hazard identification, dose-response assessment, exposure 
assessment, and risk characterization; and confirmation of utility to review whether the 
 





assessment has addressed the relevant questions, is scientifically sound, and provides 
enough information to inform risk management options. The framework also emphasizes 
pre-risk assessment problem formulation discussions, dialogue with risk assessment 
stakeholders throughout the process, and discussions with risk managers and 
communicators when decisions are made.18 
Once a risk has been assessed, characterized, and translated into risk management 
options, decision makers use this information to make complex decisions that involve 
many considerations beyond the risk-based health information.18 As part of its agency 
level decision-making process, the EPA has identified factors – in addition to risk 
assessment and characterization information – that play roles in decision making, 
including laws and regulatory requirements, economic analyses, sustainability, technical 
feasibility and impact, political considerations, and public and social considerations.19 
Other experts have detailed some of the sociopolitical considerations in decision making 
such as risk perception by experts and the general public, political climate and budget 
constraints, and cultural differences among affected populations.20 While these factors are 
all separate from the scientific risk assessment process, they cannot be separated from the 
decision-making process in almost any context. Risk-based decisions are made in the real 
world and thus benefit from or are hampered by real-world conditions. Results of the risk 
assessment process are often not clear-cut, and scientific uncertainties can make decisions 
very difficult. So, while risk can and should inform decision making, it is rarely the only 









Human Health Risk Assessment in Emergencies 
The literature base focused on conducting human health risk assessments in 
emergencies is small. Most of the literature covered in this review does not apply 
specifically to emergency situations, although a few examples could be found in the 
realm of radiological emergency risk assessment.  
First, the term “emergency risk assessment” has been used in contexts other than 
scientific human health risk assessment. In particular, the emergency management/first 
responder community uses emergency risk assessment to mean: 1) a community 
preparedness planning assessment of the threats, hazards, and risks that a community 
might face in the future;21, 22 and 2) a process for first responders to quickly assess the 
hazards and risks associated with responding to an emergency situation (e.g., structural 
integrity of a building on fire).23 In both cases, the “risk assessment” process is high-
level, is mainly qualitative and not quantitative, and is often not specifically or explicitly 
health-focused. This body of literature is not directly applicable to this research and will 
not be explored further. 
There is a wealth of guidance by the EPA, the National Academy of Sciences 
(NAS), and other environmental agencies and organizations, about conducting routine 
human health risk analyses during nonemergency periods. These analyses are routinely 
conducted by the EPA and state agencies for the purpose of setting environmental 
standards for acceptable contamination levels in air and water, and to remediate 
hazardous waste sites to make them safe for human habitation. The most helpful guidance 
for routine risk analysis is Science and Decisions: Advancing Risk Assessment (known as 
the “Silver Book”) from the NAS Committee on Improving Risk Analysis Approaches 
 





Used by the US EPA.18 This guidance builds upon the 1983 NAS “Red Book” titled Risk 
Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process, and reviews and 
recommends updates to risk analysis approaches in use at the EPA.17 The Silver Book 
concludes with a chapter on “Improving the Utility of Risk Assessment,” which provides 
a framework to ensure that “risk assessment is maximally useful for decision making.”18 
The framework proposed in this chapter provides an excellent guide for risk assessors 
and managers addressing all phases of the risk analysis process including problem 
formulation and scoping prior to the initiation of a risk assessment; planning and conduct 
of the risk assessment itself; and risk management and communication.  
Recommendations by the NAS Committee in the Silver Book have since been 
taken into consideration by the EPA, which released updated guidance based on this 
proposed framework. The EPA Framework for Human Health Risk Assessment to Inform 
Decision Making, published in April 2014, puts into EPA practice those NAS 
recommendations for improving the utility of human health risk assessment. 19Also in 
2014, an article published in Environmental Health Perspectives titled “A Framework for 
the Next Generation of Risk Science,” details some updated approaches to risk 
assessment discussed in the context of the EPA’s NexGen project, which builds upon the 
Silver Book recommendations and is intended to make risk assessments “faster, less 
expensive, and more scientifically robust.”20 
In addition to the EPA and NAS guidance on conducting risk assessment, there 
are some hazard-based guides to conducting risk assessment specifically for biological, 
chemical or radiological materials. For biological agents, in 2012 the EPA issued 
Guidelines for Microbial Risk Assessment focused on food and water,24 and there is a 
 





second edition text on all aspects of Quantitative Microbial Risk Assessment.25 For 
chemical hazards, there are a number of resources on risk assessment on the EPA website 
including the Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS).26 Also, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) provides a WHO Human Health Risk Assessment Toolkit for 
Chemical Hazards.27 Finally, the EPA’s risk assessment program provides radiological 
models and tools to calculate risk from radiological materials.28 
The above publications are all important for establishing the scientific process of 
risk assessment, but they do not explicitly address how risk assessment should be 
undertaken during emergencies when time is of the essence and uncertainty is great. In 
each emergency contamination event, risk-minded public health and environmental 
health officials should conduct a rapid risk analysis to understand the human health risks 
and inform leaders about protection decisions. However, the process of conducting and 
implementing human health risk assessments in an emergency has largely not been 
captured in the literature with a few exceptions.   
Only one article, published in 2012, could be found that discusses the general 
process of scientific human health risk assessment following a disaster. 29This publication 
is focused on the exposure assessment step of risk assessment, and provides some high 
level recommendations for conducting exposure assessment during different phases of a 
disaster from “rescue to re-habitation.”29 
 More has been written on the process of human health risk assessment in response 
to radiological and nuclear emergencies because of the world’s experience with nuclear 
power, nuclear weapons, and nuclear and radiological disasters including Chernobyl, 
Three Mile Island, and Fukushima. One article, published in 2010 in Health Physics, 
 





discusses a proposed framework for radiation dose assessment for radiological public 
health emergencies (either accidental or intentional).30 Other articles model the risks from 
radiological events including radiological dispersal device (RDD) and improvised nuclear 
device (IND) detonation and accidental releases.31 Also, in 2013, the WHO published a 
health risk assessment of the Fukushima nuclear accident following the 2011 Great East 
Japan Earthquake and Tsunami.32 
 Generally, there is very little literature specifically focused on conducting 
emergency risk assessments following chemical accidents or attacks, or on conducting 
microbial risk assessments for natural, accidental, or intentional contamination events. 
Nonemergency Risk Management Literature 
The available literature on risk management is largely focused on nonemergency 
processes. This body of literature is important to understanding risk management, but it 
does not specifically provide guidance for emergency settings. However, the literature 
and guidance surrounding risk assessment for nonemergency periods is important to 
consider in the context of characterizing CBR contaminants to enable better decision 
making in an emergency. In this area, the Silver Book and EPA human health risk 
assessment guidance provide the most robust direction on risk management, specifically 
focused on characterizing risks for risk managers.18,19  
One article on Risk management frameworks for human health and environmental 
risks provides some useful guiding ethical principles for risk management including: 
“beneficence and non-maleficence, justice, equity, utility, honesty, acceptability of risk, 
precaution, autonomy, flexibility, and practicality.”33 Taken together these principles are 
important points for risk managers and decision makers to consider alongside other 
 





factors identified in the literature, including legal and economic analysis, sociological, 
cultural and political contexts, and risk perception in the affected community.20,33 
Risk Management in Emergencies 
The available literature on risk management in emergencies is limited. Many of 
the risk management articles or reports in this area are “after-action” reports or articles 
that review the response to real disasters. In this literature it is common to find 
information about the general response to the disaster, but limited information about the 
decision processes that led to the response. So, while this literature is very useful for this 
research, it needs to be augmented by literature in the areas of risk-based and crisis 
decision making. The literature on risk management in contamination emergencies is 
largely focused on chemical releases, oil spills, and radiological/nuclear disasters, with 
the majority focused on radiological/nuclear disasters. 
For major chemical emergencies, one important source of risk management 
information is Learning from Disaster: Risk Management after Bhopal. This text details 
the risk management process as it played out following the accident at the Union Carbide 
pesticide factory in Bhopal, India in 1984.34 There are also articles focused on the 
response to more recent chemical spill emergencies, including for the Elk River chemical 
Spill in West Virginia n 2014,35 and the Metam Sodium spill in the Sacramento River in 
California in 1991.36 Each of these articles provides a retrospective critique of the risk 
management response, and some extract “lessons learned” from these responses. 
However, they do not provide a framework for decision making and risk management for 
future emergencies.  
 





For oil spills, there are a number of recent after-action discussions about risk 
management. The most recent and most relevant to public health is the literature on the 
BP oil spill in 2010. Articles focused on the BP disaster primarily discuss the mistakes 
that BP made in managing the risks of system failure prior to the explosion and spill in 
2010, and the mistakes the company made in managing the disaster itself.37,38 The 
literature on oil spills does not tend to focus on the risks to the public’s health; instead it 
focuses more on risks to the environment and ecosystem, and economic risks to industries 
and businesses in areas affected by oil spills. 
There are a number of after-action reports and articles that discuss risk 
management following radiological emergencies, particularly following major nuclear 
power plant accidents. One article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist highlights and 
compares risk management following three nuclear power plant emergencies: Three Mile 
Island, Chernobyl, and the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear disasters. 39There are also a 
number of after-action reports specifically on the Fukushima disaster, which is the most 
recent of the nuclear power plant disasters mentioned above. The major report on risk 
management for Fukushima is The Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Crisis Management 
book, published by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation in 2012.40 This review assesses the 
Japan-USA response to Fukushima, including the risk management response, and the 
decision-making process that occurred.   
Historical accidents, attacks, or natural disasters involving biological hazards do 
not appear to have the same volume of literature that captures the risk assessment and 
management processes in those events. The exception to this is the after action review of 
the “Amerithrax” anthrax letter attacks that occurred in October 2001. The US 
 





Government Accountability Office (then the General Accounting Office) (GAO) 
reviewed the EPA cleanup response to the Anthrax attacks, in 2003.41 This review mainly 
focused on the funds and contracts used by the EPA to do the cleanup, but does not 
specifically analyze the decisions that led to the cleanup itself. In 2005, The National 
Research Council Committee on Standards and Policies for Decontaminating Public 
Facilities Affected by Exposure to Harmful Biological Agents published a book on 
Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision-Making Framework.42 
This publication examines the question of “how clean is safe” for re-occupying a building 
with biological contamination. In this analysis, re-occupation decisions are discussed, and 
this document provides a good decision-making guide specific for biological 
contamination.42 
Separately, in response to the threat of bioterrorism, the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) issued guidance for recovery from a bioterrorism incident, which 
provides planners with “Key Planning Factors” that they should consider in preparation 
for an event.43 This guidance is not intended for real-time use by decision makers in the 
midst of a crisis, but is useful for preparedness planning. 
Cognitive Basis of Crisis Decision Making 
 There is a large body of research dedicated to the biological and psychological 
factors in human decision making. Much of this literature is outside the scope of this 
research, including neurobiological studies of decision making that focus mainly on areas 
of the brain involved in decision making and neurological diseases that affect decision 
making. However, there is some relevant literature that describes the cognitive factors 
that influence judgment in stressful decision-making situations.44,45 One interesting 
 





example of this research is the work by Daniel Kahneman, a social psychologist who won 
the Nobel Prize for economics in 2002. The work by Dr. Kahneman, and his collaborator 
Amos Tversky, focuses on the psychology underlying human judgment and decision 
making in times of uncertainty.46 This literature is relevant because it helps define the 
factors that influence decision makers in a crisis. Understanding the psychological 
processes that affect a decision maker will aid in understanding what tools and processes 
can be put in place to improve decisions made in a crisis. 
Risk-Based Decision Making 
There is a substantial body of literature that focuses on risk-based decision 
making, much of which deals with financial risk or clinical risk-based decisions, which 
are generally outside of the scope of this dissertation research. There is a limited body of 
reports/studies on corporate or financial decision making following product 
contamination and recall events.47  
The body of literature on decisions pertaining to human/population health risk 
assessment is smaller and mainly focused on decision making in nonemergency periods; 
for example, for superfund sites and urban hazardous waste remediation.48,49 No literature 
was found that specifically focused on risk-based decision making during contamination 
emergencies. 
The literature that focuses on risk-based decisions for nonemergencies includes 
the Silver Book and the EPA Framework for Human Health Risk Assessment to Inform 
Decision Making, already cited above.18,19 Another foundational article in this area comes 
from the first volume of the journal of Risk Analysis in an article titled “Risk Analysis: 
Understanding ‘How Safe is Safe Enough.’”50 This article provides a definition of 
 





acceptable risk as “the risk associated with the best available alternatives.”50 The article 
goes on to discuss the evaluation of risk management alternatives and identifies other 
“complicating” technical social, political and ethical elements of the decision-making 
process for achieving acceptable risk.50 
Crisis Decision Making in Public Health Emergencies 
 The topic of crisis decision making in public health emergencies does have a 
small established body of literature. Articles in this topic area focus not on scientific risk 
information as a basis for decision making, but on general approaches to decision making 
and on ethical decision making in public health emergencies.  
One tool, published by the RAND Corporation in 2009, proposes measures of 
good crisis decisions in public health emergencies. According to RAND, elements of 
successful crisis decision making include the following processes: developing a common 
operating picture (situational awareness); deciding on actions that will mitigate human 
health effects (“action planning”); and management of the decision-making process 
(process control).2 
Publications on ethical frameworks for decision making in public health crises 
include articles on the topics of pandemic influenza,51 and on SARS.52 These articles 
provide ethical frameworks to consider in future public health emergencies based on what 
occurred during those natural events. 
  
 







Previous Conceptual Models 
 There is currently no one conceptual model or framework that encapsulates the 
topic of this dissertation: Risk-based decision making during public health emergencies 
involving environmental contamination. However, there are a number of conceptual 
models that capture parts of this problem and can be used to build a new conceptual 
framework for this research. 
Conceptual frameworks from human health risk assessment, risk management, 
and risk-based and crisis decision making influenced the creation of this new conceptual 
model. Each of these pre-existing frameworks addresses a part of the problem identified 
in this research. The human health risk assessment framework from the Silver Book and 
the EPA Framework for Human Health Risk Assessment to Inform Decision Making 
provide guidance to make risk assessment information useable by decision makers.18,19 
Risk management literature for emergency responses is also influential, providing 
information about the various considerations that go into formulating risk management 
options. Finally, the crisis and risk-based decision-making literature that identifies public 
health actions following an emergency is important. 
New Conceptual Model for Emergency Response to Contamination Events 
 As was addressed in the background literature review section of this dissertation, 
there is currently no unified approach to making risk-based decisions in a public health 
 





emergency involving environmental contamination (i.e., chemical, biological or 
radiological contamination via natural, accidental, or intentional means). 
The conceptual model presented below attempts to capture the processes and 
information necessary to risk-based decision making in a contamination emergency that 
threatens public health. This conceptual model incorporates both pre-crisis risk 
assessment steps aimed at improving risk data for use in an emergency, as well as the 
components that contribute to risk-based decision making in the initial stages of a 
contamination emergency. The decision-making components in this framework include 
an initial assessment of the situation and identification of advisors to provide information 
and support for the decision maker; definition of the goals, objectives, and desired 
outcomes for the response; refinement of the situation assessment, gathering of data and 
evidence, and quick turn risk analysis; development of risk management options and 
deliberation of those options, informed by consultation with advisors and consideration of 
political realities, ethical boundaries, social and economic factors, and legal and fiscal 
constraints; and the decision that come from this deliberation. Included in this framework 
is the John Boyd concept of the cyclical process of decision making, which is 
characterized by observation, orientation, decision, and action (OODA), looping back to 
observation.53 Following the decision, but outside the scope of this research, 
communication and implementation of the risk-based decision is essential. All of these 
steps must be applied rapidly but with enough fidelity that acceptable risk can be 










The purpose of Aim 1 is to conduct an in-depth case study of one program that is 
aimed at reducing scientific uncertainty and improving availability of risk data in advance 
of an emergency – the Biological Threat Characterization Program (BTCP) at the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  
Aim 1 Data Collection  
A modified Delphi technique was employed to elicit judgments of national 
security, biosecurity, and biosafety experts, in order to understand their perception of the 
biological weapons threat and their opinions about biological threat characterization 
research conducted to address these threats. Experts were invited to participate in this 
study based on their responsibilities for shaping public policy in life science and national 
security, their expertise and knowledge in the field, or recommendations of other 
participants (using a snowball sampling methodology).  
The Delphi survey instrument was developed through a series of subject matter 
expert interviews (a subset of those who participated in the Delphi survey) conducted 
during an earlier phase of the study. The Delphi survey was designed and administered 
online through SurveyMonkey®, and included questions with both quantitative and 
qualitative components. Question formats included percentage likelihood questions (0-
100%), rating scale questions using a 1-10 scale (1 being low and 10 being high), binary 
questions (yes/no), and questions that required participants to choose one answer from a 
set of possible answers. Each question included a qualitative component where 
participants were required in round one and asked in round two to explain their answers. 
This is an important part of the process because, by giving participants in subsequent 
 





rounds insight into why other participants selected a given response, it allows 
respondents to calibrate their own estimates and minimize misperceptions about the 
nature of the questions and underlying assumptions.54 The Delphi survey instrument was 
piloted by three subject matter experts and the project team, and was revised after the 
pilot to improve understandability of the questions, shorten the survey, and make the 
questions as useful as possible.  
Once the survey instrument was piloted and revised, the survey was fielded to the 
62 participants who agreed to take part in the study. Participants’ names were removed to 
protect their identities and participants were assigned identification numbers. For the first 
round of the survey, Delphi participants were asked to respond to all questions and 
provide reasoning for each of their responses. Participants were given approximately one 
month to complete the first round of the Delphi survey. Once the first round was 
completed, the authors processed the data by producing frequency histograms and 
summary statistics for each question and sub-question, and providing all data and 
justifications in a readable, de-identified format for participants to review. This 
information was sent to participants along with a link to the round two survey instrument, 
which was unchanged except for some minor clarifying language. 
In round two of the survey, participants were asked to review one another’s 
answers, either amend or maintain their answers after reflecting on others’ opinions, and 
respond to the survey again. Data and justifications from round two were again collected, 
processed, and analyzed.  
Finally, the survey results for the two rounds were compared to determine “group 
stability” or response consistency between rounds. The Delphi process for this study was 
 





terminated when, for successive rounds, the mean response did not change more than 1 
standard deviation (SD) across all questions, which occurred after two rounds. 
Aim 1 Analysis 
The final results (round two) of the study were analyzed using STATA statistical 
package 11.2. Data were first characterized using summary statistics (mean, median, 
mode, range, SD) and histograms. The data for each question were then analyzed for 
normality through a visual check of the data via histogram and then using the Shapiro-
Wilk test as a statistical test of normality.55 Many of the questions and sub-questions 
were non-normally distributed based on these analyses, which signaled the need for 
nonparametric tests in further analysis. 
The Delphi data were analyzed by comparing the distributions of answers by 
subgroup (e.g., gender, age group, training or affiliation) and by comparing distributions 
of multiple sub-questions. For comparison of questions by subgroup, the Wilcoxon rank-
sum test was used as a nonparametric hypothesis test to compare distributions.56 The null-
hypothesis of equal variance was rejected at the p<0.05 level. 
Many of the questions in the Delphi survey included sub-questions, where 
participants rated each from 1-10. The authors analyzed these questions by comparing the 
distributions of all sub-questions using the Friedman test, a nonparametric test used for 
one-way repeated measures analysis of variance by ranks. When the null hypothesis of 
equal variance for the group of sub-questions was rejected at the p<0.05 level, post-hoc 
analyses were conducted comparing pairs of sub-questions using the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, which is a nonparametric test used for repeated variables.57 
 





In order to reduce the likelihood of Type I error in comparing sub-questions 
(incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis and reporting a significant finding falsely), we 
accounted for the problem of multiple comparisons, by applying a Bonferroni correction 
to each instance where multiple comparisons are made. The Bonferroni correction was 
applied by dividing the significance level of p=0.05 by the number of sub-questions 
being compared.58 
Qualitative justifications provided by the participants were instrumental to the 
Delphi process. Participants were asked to use the qualitative justifications to shape the 
group’s responses in the second round of the study. In addition to their use during the 
survey process, qualitative answers were used in the final analysis of the Delphi data, to 
help interpret the statistical findings from the quantitative component of the study. 
Following the statistical analysis, we reviewed the qualitative responses for each question 
to find reasoning for the different ratings seen in the data. The most relevant comments 
are reported to help explain each significant finding. 
This research was submitted to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the 
University of Maryland and was granted exempt status (Appendix 1). 
Aim 2 
The purpose of research Aim 2 is: 1) to identify and analyze the literature with the 
goal of understanding different decision-making frameworks from the fields of risk 
analysis, risk management, risk-based and crises decision making, and other applicable 
fields; and 2) to understand the decision-making process through examination of publicly 
available information on recent real-world events including after-action reports that 
discuss decision processes 
 





Aim 2 Data Collection 
The integrative literature review format was chosen for this analysis because it is 
designed specifically for synthesis of literature “in an integrated way such that new 
frameworks and perspectives on the topic are generated.”59 Because there is currently no 
body of literature focused specifically on risk-based decision making in public health 
crises involving contamination, and much of the knowledge on this topic resides outside 
of traditional academic settings, this integrative method made it possible to analyze 
pertinent perspectives from multiple fields and types of literature and bring them together 
in a new framework. The literature review focused on two major categories: crisis 
decision making and risk-based decision making. These categories were chosen because 
they represent theoretical and operational viewpoints, as well as both the time-sensitive 
nature of crisis decisions and need for integration of data and other information to make 
informed decisions. 
To conduct the search, the author chose three databases: PubMed to capture 
public health literature, Web of Science (all databases) to cover other scholarly 
publications on non-public health-related decision and risk assessment science, and 
OAIster to gather relevant grey literature and other open-access materials. The initial 
search was broadly inclusive to help ensure that no major literature was missed relating to 
the main topics of crisis and risk-based decision making and contamination emergency 
decision making. A number of key words and phrases were used to conduct the search. 
These were applied consistently to each of the three database searches (Table 7).  
The initial search, conducted in February 2016, generated a total of 1895 pieces of 
literature for review. Of that total, 1303 were related to crisis decision making and 592 
 





were related to risk-based decision making; and 522 were from PubMed, 897 were from 
Web of Science, and 476 came from OAIster. These results were then screened for 
relevance through review of titles, abstracts, and duplicate checking. A piece of literature 
was excluded in this first round of review if it was a duplicate, if it had no focus on 
decision making, if it had no focus on or relevance to public health or emergencies, if its 
focus was on personal decision making (e.g., personal medical decisions) without 
relevance to broader population-level decision contexts, or if it was a non-English 
language publication. This first level of review resulted in the inclusion of a total of 428 
pieces of literature, including 265 related to crisis decision making and 163 related to 
risk-based decision making. 
The author then implemented a second round of review to narrow down the time 
period for article inclusion and also to continue more in-depth review for relevancy. 
During this stage, literature inclusion was restricted to publication after the year 2000. 
This date was chosen because it was inclusive of a number of major contamination events 
in the US and around the world beginning with the anthrax letter attacks in 2001, and 
ensured that the literature would be relevant to modern decision-making contexts. 
Theories that are influential in the areas of risk-based and crisis decision making have 
been built upon over decades and still largely underpin current decision-making 
approaches. Thus, they should be adequately represented in this review in spite of the 
temporal restriction.  
The second review round was conducted by reading abstracts and the full text of 
each included piece of literature. Exclusions were made based on the following criteria: 
publication prior to the year 2000; non-applicability to the short crisis decision-making 
 





time period that is the focus of this review; focus on environmental regulation and not on 
response to contamination events; and a focus on mathematical models and technological 
tools to aid in decision making that are not developed for use in emergencies. In this 
second round of review, a total of 370 articles were excluded. Fifty-one were included for 
final review and analysis, with 24 pieces of literature under the topic of crisis decision 
making and 27 under risk-based decision making. 
Aim 2 Analysis 
Once the second review round was completed, the author reread the 51 final 
articles and highlighted and organized findings using open coding and constant 
comparative methods of qualitative analysis. These methods were used rather than 
quantitative coding because they are meant to generate theoretical ideas and hypotheses 
from disparate types of evidence, and to refine them throughout the review process in 
order to develop a new theory or framework.60 As part of this approach, each piece of 
literature was reviewed for relevant points under the initial categories of crisis and risk-
based decision making. Relevant points were highlighted and notes about each piece of 
literature were recorded in an outline organized by category and theme as they emerged 
from the review. All reviewed literature was also recorded in a literature concept review 
matrix, which identifies conceptual frameworks employed, major findings, types of 
literature, strengths and weaknesses, and concept focus for each reference (Tables 8 and 
9).61 Findings from the final review stage were then summarized by category and topic 










The purpose of this research aim is to obtain knowledge from experts in risk 
analysis, risk management, public health emergency response, and other related fields 
about the decision elements that are needed for effective risk-based decision-making in 
contamination emergencies. 
Aim 3 Interview Guide Development 
We first developed a semi-structured interview guide, based on findings from an 
integrative literature review, which identified major themes and decision elements that 
are important for contamination emergency decision making. Key domains for the 
interview guide included structures supporting decision making, decision-making 
process, and key considerations for decisions. 
The interview guide was reviewed by multiple risk assessment, emergency 
management, and public health preparedness and response experts prior to its fielding, 
and was revised based on expert feedback. The guide was then piloted with an emergency 
management official with experience in contamination emergency response, and was 
subsequently revised based on feedback from that pilot interview. 
Aim 3 Selection and Recruitment of Participants 
Interview subjects were identified first from an integrative literature review, 
which led to both researchers who are prominent thinkers in the areas of crisis and risk-
based decision-making, and practitioners with significant experience with public health 
emergency and contamination emergency responses. Additional interviewees were 
identified through snowball sampling via suggestions from other interview participants. 
In particular, interviewees were sought who had relevant expertise or experience with 
 





decision making by political leaders in major contamination emergencies. Potential 
interviewees were excluded if they had no expertise or experience with decision making 
in crises, or no knowledge or experience that could be applied to contamination 
emergencies.  
Aim 3 Data Collection 
Semi-structured interviews with selected participants were conducted over the 
phone and via Skype from September 2016-January 2017. Interviews were recorded with 
permission of participants and were transcribed verbatim to ensure maximal accuracy. 
Interviews were not-for-attribution. During the interviews, key observations and points 
were recorded to capture immediate impressions and important points.  
Aim 3 Analysis 
Themes were derived from the interviews using a combination of inductive and 
deductive approaches. A priori themes were identified first from the previously 
conducted integrative literature review, and based on the interview guide. Further themes 
were identified and added as the transcripts were coded (Table 10). Interview transcripts 
were coded based on identified themes using QSR NVivo for Mac v10.3.2.62 Peer 
debriefing with an impartial party who had expertise in the topic was conducted during 
the data analysis phase to aid in identifying themes, analyzing coded findings, and 
developing the draft framework.63 
A Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Institutional Review Board 
determined this study was not human subjects research and was therefore exempt 
(Appendix 2). 
 












Expert Views on Biological Threat Characterization for the U.S. Government: A 
Delphi Study1 
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Study. Risk Anal. 2017. doi: 10.1111/risa.12787 [Epub ahead of print]. 
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Background: This aim provides a specific case study of one federal program 
aimed at reducing scientific uncertainty and improving the availability of human health 
risk information, which can be used for decision making in response to contamination 
emergencies. This case study is focused on the Biological Threat Characterization 
Program (BTCP) in the US Department of Homeland Security. The BTCP conducts 
laboratory research to better understand the characteristics of and risks posed by 
biological agents as weapons. BTC research is conducted to inform planning and 
preparedness in anticipation of an attack, and to inform emergency response and crisis 
decision making if and when an event occurs.  
Objective: BTC is important for improving risk assessment and resource 
prioritization for biological defense. However, there are also risks involved in BTC work, 
including the potential for misuse of the research results or accidental release of a 
pathogen. Given the benefits and risks of BTC research, and resource limitations for 
conducting this work, it is important that there be guiding principles for prioritizing BTC 
research, and safeguards in place to ensure that it is done safely and securely. This 
analysis looks at what those principles and safeguards should be. 
Methods: The research team conducted a modified Delphi study to gather 
opinions from experts in biosecurity and biodefense about what mechanisms and 
processes should be in place for U.S. Government BTC research. The Delphi process 
went through two rounds and included responses from 59 experts. Participants were 
asked to give their considered opinions about the need for BTC research in the USG; the 
dangers that might arise from conducting this research; the rules or guidelines that should 
 





be in place to ensure that the work is safe and effective; components of an effective 
review and prioritization process; rules for when characterization of a pathogen can be 
considered complete; and recommendations about who in the USG should be responsible 
for BTC prioritization decisions. 
Findings and Discussion: While there were some disagreements and 
generational differences in participant responses throughout the Delphi process, expert 
participants generally agreed on the importance of BTC research, that BTC is a necessary 
function of the USG, and that it should be conducted with a focus on informing 
preparedness and response decisions, particularly related to medical countermeasures 
development. The biggest worries about BTC research were that it might increase the 
potential for insider threat from a laboratory, and that the research could be viewed as a 
violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).  
In response to the need for BTC research and its accompanying risks, experts 
weighed in on the rules and guidelines that should be in place for the research. First and 
foremost, experts agreed that BTC work should never violate the BWC. They also agreed 
that intelligence information used as an impetus for BTC research should be deemed 
plausible and valid first, and that any research done for threat characterization purposes 
should inform biodefense decisions and should not be done just for the sake of knowing 
more about a pathogen. Experts agreed that a review process should be in place for BTC 
work, which prioritizes scientific review of planned experiments. Finally, experts agreed 
that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should continue to lead in making 
prioritization decisions for threat characterization research.  
 





Conclusions: This study represents the first time that questions about BTC 
research have been posed systematically to a group of experts. The findings from this 
study reinforce the need for BTC research at the federal level as well as a need for 
continued review and oversight of this research to ensure it is conducted safely and 
effectively. Findings from this study can also be applied more broadly to other federal 
programs aimed at information gathering and risk assessment prior to contamination 
emergencies. It may be useful for tother federal programs, focused on different types of 
potential contaminants, to ask similar questions about how those programs prioritize their 
work, are structured, and are executed. 
Introduction 
A scientific understanding of the threat posed by biological weapons is critical to 
determine biodefense priorities, set preparedness and response policies, and implement 
prevention and mitigation measures. The U.S. is committed to upholding the Biological 
and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)64 and 18 U.S. Code 175,65 which make it a crime 
to knowingly possess a biological agent, toxin or delivery system for use as a weapon or 
if the material is not intended for peaceful purposes. For the purposes of defense, the U.S. 
government has deemed it necessary to conduct risk assessments and characterize the 
threat posed by biological weapons use to the U.S. homeland. Yet, the data required to 
develop risk assessments is largely insufficient; there are large gaps in our knowledge 
and understanding regarding biological weapons.66 We often have limited data on the 
biology of many potential biological threat agents (e.g., their dose-response profile, 
behavior under different conditions, and environmental persistence), and rather limited 
understanding of the intentions of adversaries who possess or seek to possess biological 
 





weapons. This uncertainty about both the biology of a threat agent as well as its 
likelihood of use makes effective decision-making about biodefense resource 
prioritization difficult. 
As with other risk assessment problems, in order to best manage bioweapons 
risks, it is critical (to the extent possible and within the bounds of prudence and reason) to 
fill knowledge gaps so as to better enable decision making and a more effective response. 
Risk assessment always involves a characterization component: an assessment of the 
“nature and presence or absence of risks, along with information about how the risk was 
assessed, where assumptions and uncertainties still exist, and where policy choices will 
need to be made.”67 In human health risk assessment, this characterization step includes 
hazard identification (to understand the potential health problems caused by the 
hazard/threat), dose-response assessment (to understand how health problems caused by 
the hazard change at different levels of exposure), and exposure assessment (to 
understand how people might be exposed to the hazard/threat).67 The characterization of 
intentional threats, including bioterrorism and state use of biological weapons, involves 
an additional component which is not considered in traditional human health risk 
assessments: the capabilities and intent of a thinking adversary.68  
Countering biological threats requires long time horizons and sustained 
investment.69 For example, medical countermeasures development (particularly vaccines) 
may take up to a decade from initial R&D through advanced development, regulatory 
approval, and manufacturing.70 Thus, early prioritization decisions based on threat 
characterization and risk assessment can have long-term implications. The prioritization 
decisions are also consequential: making evidence-based decisions to improve defenses 
 





against biological weapons is a potential life-saving endeavor, while poor decision-
making or misallocation of resources could ultimately harm national security and public 
health.   
With stakes this high, threat characterization, risk assessment, and decision-
making processes should be robust, and periodically re-examined to ensure that 
biological threats are being well-considered. To that end, this analysis focuses on how the 
US government conducts Biological Threat Characterization (BTC) – an area of scientific 
inquiry directed at improving knowledge regarding potential biological threats for the 
purposes of defending against them.  
BTC research for civilian biodefense in the U.S. is primarily the responsibility of 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Science and Technology Directorate 
(S&T), Chemical and Biological Defense Division (CBD). This work is directed under 
the DHS Biological Threat Characterization Program (BTCP), and is carried out 
primarily at the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), a 
laboratory located in Frederick, MD.71  
The BTCP is specifically charged with directing laboratory research to better 
understand the nation’s vulnerability to biological threats. The program generates 
knowledge and data from laboratory research on specific biological threat agents, which 
then are meant to inform the government’s key risk assessment tool for bioterrorism – the 
Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA), run by DHS S&T; and to guide intelligence 
assessment, preparedness planning, development of medical countermeasures, detectors, 
decontamination technologies, and other mechanisms to blunt the effect of a biological 
attack on civilians. The work conducted through the BTCP is often not published or 
 





publically available because information produced is inherently dual-use, and may be 
prone to misuse by adversaries with malicious intent.  Moreover, if the research and its 
results are sufficiently sensitive and might compromise national security, they may be 
protected by classification. Additionally, the NBACC has implemented biosecurity 
measures, including a personnel reliability program, which limits the risk of insider threat 
or outside access to pathogens or classified data.72 Finally, the laboratory is certified at 
the highest biosafety levels.73 BTC research includes scientific analysis of agent 
characteristics, such as environmental stability, infectivity, and dose response 
relationship, which then can inform estimates of the consequences that would follow 
from attack. BTC work also supports validation of intelligence information. 
Biological threat characterization, when it was first proposed, was a source of 
controversy within the biodefense community. In 2005, biodefense experts Drs. Jonathan 
Tucker, James “Ben” Petro, and Seth Carus exchanged commentaries debating the 
establishment of NBACC and the resulting potential benefits and risks of establishing 
such a research facility. In that exchange, Drs. Carus and Petro argued in favor of 
NBACC and BTC, stating that threat characterization was needed to address “technical 
gaps that currently exist in intelligence threat assessments.”74 Dr. Tucker opposed 
NBACC and threat characterization for several reasons. He thought that it would not be 
useful for its intended purpose, stating that such a research agenda would be “dangerous 
and counterproductive,” and would be a poor basis for countermeasures development. He 
thought that it would be profoundly destabilizing to international nonproliferation efforts, 
particularly the norms against biological weapons development established by the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), which bars the development and use 
 





of biological weapons. Tucker also worried about criminal misconduct in the generation 
of this research, i.e. that it would increase the possibility of “leakage” of a novel pathogen 
or associated information, which could be acquired by a rogue state or terrorist 
organization.75 These concerns were countered by Carus and Petro with proposals for 
how these problems could be ameliorated, including a detailed compliance review 
process incorporating information from the Fink Report, which recommends practices to 
prevent “destructive application of biotechnology research” while still allowing 
legitimate research to continue; 76 limitations on size, scope, and types of experiments to 
be performed; a scientific review process; and detailed documentation of the decision-
making process.77  
Subsequent to this exchange, Congress authorized and funded NBACC and 
BTCP, and DHS and NBACC have implemented a number of the recommended steps 
and processes proposed in the exchange between Tucker, Carus, and Petro. Subsequent to 
this exchange, Congress authorized and funded NBACC and BTCP, and DHS and 
NBACC have implemented a number of the recommended steps and processes proposed 
in the exchange between Tucker, Carus, and Petro, that would address Tucker’s concerns.  
DHS has since developed a management directive regarding compliance with the BWC 
and other international arms control agreements.78 The Compliance Assurance Program 
(CAP) at DHS provides a legal review of proposed BTCP projects to examine whether a 
project is clearly for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes; whether the 
types and quantities of biological agents or toxins are consistent with and justified for the 
intended prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purpose; and whether the project 
includes any weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use agents or toxins 
 





for hostile purposes or armed conflict. The CAP office also reviews projects for 
compliance with U.S. regulatory requirements, including Select Agent Rules, human and 
animal subject rules, and biosafety.79 
The goal of the current BTC program is to maximize the benefits for biodefense 
and to minimize the risks of potential harm that could result from research in this area. 
However, experts still debate the safety and security, dual-use implications, and needed 
regulation and oversight of the technical work the BTCP undertakes. Given the 
potentially risky nature of BTC work and the need for prioritization of government 
resources available for this work, BTCP has a continued need to make careful and wise 
decisions regarding what threat characterization studies it should support. The principles 
and criteria that inform these decisions are of great importance, but are generally not well 
understood or widely publicized.  
Pursuing threat characterization studies that do not meet the right criteria would 
risk negative consequences as envisioned in the earlier debate between Tucker, Petro, and 
Carus, such as the wasting of limited resources more appropriately applied to other 
biological threats; misperceptions regarding the legitimate defensive nature of the work; 
and/or the potential to produce new knowledge that could deliberately or accidentally 
increase dangers from new biological threats.  
This study examines the continued need for BTC research for U.S. biodefense, 
and the boundaries and oversight mechanisms that might guide this research. The aim of 
this analysis is to provide findings, based on expert judgment, which inform DHS and 
other policy efforts regarding how to conduct BTC work in a manner that minimizes the 
risks and maximizes efficient usage of resources. 
 






Research Leading to the Delphi Study 
The University of Maryland National Consortium on the Study of Terrorism and 
Response to Terrorism (START) Center of Excellence and the UPMC Center for Health 
Security performed this research through a contract with the DHS Science and 
Technology Directorate (S&T), Chemical and Biological Defense Division (CBD). The 
purpose of the research was to provide the DHS Biological Threat Characterization 
Program (BTCP) with information to help inform the decisions of program leaders as 
they consider funding experimental work to characterize biological threats; provide 
principles, criteria, and decision-making processes for evaluating such possible projects; 
and recommend how the BTCP might determine appropriate endpoints for threat 
characterization studies.   
Within this research, the project team performed a number of activities. First, we 
conducted a review of the peer-reviewed and grey literature to gather policy analyses on 
threat characterization and dual-use research of concern. This literature review was used 
to provide background information about BTC research, and to gain a better 
understanding of past and current policy and opinions surrounding this topic. For the 
review, the project team relied on sources that were neither classified nor for official use 
only (FOUO), and included web, periodical, and newspaper archive searches, as well as 
publicly available materials from NBACC and BTCP. Themes from the literature were 
identified, categorized, and utilized as a basis for development of an interview guide for a 
series of semi-structured interviews with experts.  
 





The project team conducted 45 telephone and in-person interviews with experts to 
gather their knowledge and opinions about biological threats, biological threat 
characterization, the BTC Program specifically, and the process and policy for biological 
threat characterization for the USG generally. Experts were identified through the 
literature review, professional contacts, and a snowball sampling methodology of 
recommendations from other subject matter experts. Interviewees included SMEs in the 
fields of biological science, biodefense policy, intelligence collection, international 
relations, and other fields that touch on biological threat characterization.  
Interview results were analyzed for themes and were used to build a straw man 
Framework for Threat Characterization Research for discussion at a working group 
meeting involving a subset of experts interviewed in the first project phase. This meeting 
was organized into five discussion sections: 
1. National strategic direction for biological threat characterization 
2. DHS S&T biological threat characterization 
3. Decision-making framework components 
4. How a decision-making framework should be implemented 
5. Planning for unexpected disclosure of threat characterization information 
Following the meeting, the discussion was summarized and the Framework for 
Threat Characterization was amended to reflect the working group meeting. The results 
of this process were reported to DHS. Following the working group meeting, the project 
team used the framework information gleaned from discussion with experts to design a 
modified Delphi study aimed at producing more fine-grained insights about perceptions 
 





of biological threats and the BTC process, the results of which would be made publicly 
available. 
The focus of this paper is on the results of the modified Delphi study and will 
examine the data points specifically related to biological threat characterization. Results 
of the Delphi study pertaining to judgments about the biological threat will not be 
examined here, but have recently been published in Science Policy Forum.80 In that 
publication, major findings included the observation that experts are not in agreement 
about the likelihood of a biological attack or about what agents are most likely to be used 
and by what potential actors. They were in agreement, however, that intelligence 
information will likely not provide actionable warning before a biological attack occurs. 
They also agreed that there is a “red line” for types of BTC research that should never be 
conducted, but were unable to reach consensus about what constitutes the “red line.”80 
Modified Delphi Method  
The Delphi method, developed by the RAND Corporation in the 1950s and 60s, is 
a structured method for gathering, refining and aggregating judgments from groups of 
experts. 81 Designed to minimize the bias created by “groupthink,” the process usually 
consists of experts completing several rounds of a structured survey, with iterated 
response and feedback across rounds and statistical aggregation of responses. After each 
survey round, the results are returned to the group and respondents are asked to review 
the anonymized answers from other experts and to consider revising their original 
responses for the next round based on others’ judgments.  
For this study, a modified Delphi technique was employed to elicit the judgments 
of U.S. national security, biosecurity, and biosafety experts, in order to understand their 
 





perception of the biological weapons threat and their opinions about BTC research 
conducted to address these threats. Experts were invited to participate in this study based 
on their responsibilities for shaping public policy in life science and national security, 
based on their expertise and knowledge in the field, or based on recommendations of 
other participants (using a snowball sampling methodology). All results were de-
identified during this process so that no answer could be attributed to any participant. 
The Delphi survey instrument was developed through a series of subject matter 
expert interviews (a subset of those who participated in the Delphi survey) conducted 
during an earlier phase of the study. The Delphi survey was designed and administered 
online through SurveyMonkey®, and included questions with both quantitative and 
qualitative components. The Delphi survey included 15 questions about the threat of 
biological weapons use and about biological threat characterization. This analysis 
addresses only the questions focused on BTC (numbers 7-8, 10, 12-15). Question formats 
included yes/no questions, probability estimates (0-100%), rating questions (1-10), and 
multiple-choice (choose one) questions. One question was excluded from this analysis 
because several participants found its wording confusing.  
Each question included a qualitative component where participants explained the 
reasoning behind their answers; this was required in round one of the Delphi study and 
requested in round two. This is an important part of the process because it allows 
respondents to calibrate their own estimates and minimize misperceptions about the 
nature of the questions and underlying assumptions.54 The Delphi survey instrument was 
piloted by three subject matter experts and the project team, and was revised after the 
 





pilot to improve understandability of the questions, shorten the survey, and make the 
questions as useful as possible.  
Once the survey instrument was piloted and revised, the survey was fielded to the 
62 participants who agreed to take part in the study. Participants’ names were removed to 
protect their identities and participants were assigned ID numbers. For the first round of 
the survey, Delphi participants were asked to respond to all questions and provide 
reasoning for each of their responses. Once the first round was completed, the authors 
processed the data by producing frequency histograms and summary statistics for each 
question and sub-question, and providing all data and justifications in a readable, de-
identified format for participants to review. This information was sent to participants 
along with the link for them to take the round two survey instrument, which was 
unchanged except for some minor clarifying language. In round two of the survey, 
participants were asked to review one another’s answers, either amend or maintain their 
answers after reflecting on others’ opinions, and respond to the survey again. Data and 
justifications from round two were again collected, processed, and analyzed. 
Finally, the survey results for the two rounds were compared to determine “group 
stability” or response consistency between rounds. The Delphi process for this study was 
terminated when, for successive rounds, the mean response did not change more than one 
standard deviation (SD) across all questions, which occurred after two rounds.  
Statistical Analysis 
The final results (round 2) of the study were analyzed using STATA statistical 
package 11.2. Data were first characterized using summary statistics (mean, median, 
mode, range, SD) and histograms. The data for each question were then analyzed for 
 





normality through a visual check of the data via histogram and then using the Shapiro-
Wilk test as a statistical test of normality.55 Many of the questions and sub-questions 
were non-normally distributed based on these analyses, which signaled the need for 
nonparametric tests in further analysis. 
The Delphi data were analyzed by comparing the distributions of answers by 
subgroup (e.g., gender, age group, training or affiliation) and by comparing distributions 
of multiple sub-questions. For comparison of questions by subgroup, the Wilcoxon rank-
sum test was used as a nonparametric hypothesis test to compare distributions.56 The null-
hypothesis of equal variance was rejected at the p<0.05 level. Many of the questions in 
the Delphi survey included sub-questions, where participants rated each sub-question 
from 1-10. These questions were analyzed by comparing the distributions of all sub-
questions using the Friedman test, a nonparametric test used for one-way repeated 
measures analysis of variance by ranks. When the null hypothesis of equal variance for 
the group of sub-questions was rejected at the p<0.05 level, the project team then 
conducted post-hoc analyses comparing pairs of sub-questions using the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, which is a nonparametric test used for repeated variables.57 
In order to reduce the likelihood of Type I error in comparing sub-questions 
(incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis and reporting a significant finding falsely), we 
accounted for the problem of multiple comparisons, by applying a Bonferroni correction 
to each instance where multiple comparisons are made. The Bonferroni correction was 










Qualitative justifications provided by the participants were instrumental to the 
Delphi process. Participants were asked to use the qualitative justifications to shape the 
group’s responses in the second round of the study. In addition to their use during the 
survey process, qualitative answers were used in the final analysis of the Delphi data, to 
help interpret the statistical findings from the quantitative component of the study. 
Following the statistical analysis, we reviewed the qualitative responses for each question 
to find reasoning for the different ratings seen in the data. The most relevant comments 
are reported to help explain each significant finding. 
This research was submitted to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the 
University of Maryland and was granted exempt status (Appendix 1). 
Results: 
Demographic Data 
Of the 63 experts originally approached to participate in the study, 62 completed 
the first round of the Delphi survey, with one person declining to participate due to time 
limitations. Of the 62 round one participants, 59 completed the second round (of 2 total 
rounds) for a response rate of 94%. Individuals who dropped from the study following 
round one, also said that they did not have time to continue to participate (Table 1). 
Gender: of the 59 participants in round two of this Delphi study, 41 (69.5%) were 
male, and 18 (30.5%) were female. 
Age: Ages of the participants were binned by generation in order to assess 
potential differences in opinion among a variety of career levels. Participants who were 
 





aged approximately 21-33 were captured in the Millennial Generation, participants aged 
34-49 were in Generation X, participants aged 50-69 were in the Baby Boomer 
Generation, and participants who were aged 69-86 were in the Silent Generation.82 For 
the purposes of statistical analysis, these generations were also placed into 2 larger bins: 
earlier generations (aged 50+), and later generations (aged 21-49). 
Training: Participants were associated with an area of “primary training,” 
defined as the area they focused on in their graduate training or the primary area of focus 
for their careers. Of the 59 participants, 2 (3.4%) were trained in political science, 1 
(1.7%) in foreign policy/international affairs, 3 (5.1%) in national security, 3 (5.1%) in 
public health, 7 (11.9%) in medicine, 32 (54.2%) in biological science, 2 (3.4%) in 
chemistry, 2 (3.4%) in physical science, 2 (3.4%) in veterinary medicine, and 5 (8.5%) in 
other areas (including economics, history and law). 
Training was also binned and analyzed in a number of ways: By biological 
scientist (33) vs. not a biological scientist (26); by scientist (48) vs. non-scientist (11); 
and by terrorism expert (6) vs. not a terrorism expert (53). 
Affiliation:  Participants’ professional affiliations (at the time the survey was 
conducted) were identified as follows: 14 participants (23.7%) worked for 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 7 (11.9%) worked in academia, 12 (20.3%) 
worked in the private sector/industry, 23 (39.0%) worked in government for the public 
sector, and 3 (5.1%) were former government but were retired at the time of the survey. 
Affiliation was binned and analyzed by current and retired government (26) vs. non-
government (33).   
 





The Delphi survey included 15 questions about the threat of biological weapons 
use and about biological threat characterization. This analysis includes only the questions 
focused on BTC (numbers 7-8, 10, 12-15). Question formats included dichotomous 
yes/no questions, probability estimates (0-100%), rating questions (1-10), and multiple 
choice (choose one) questions. Eight of the 15 total questions posed in the survey dealt 
with BTC, and 7 of those 8 are addressed in this analysis. One question was excluded 
because participants found it confusing. 
Results by Question and Sub-Question 
 
The overwhelming majority, 55 of 59 participants (93.2%) in round two of the 
Delphi process, responded “Yes” the nation does need programs for biological threat 
characterization. Of the 4 participants who didn’t answer “Yes” in round two of the 
study, 2 (3.4%) answered “No” and 2 answered “I don’t know.” Support for BTC was 
similar in round 1 of the Delphi study, with 53 (85%) of the 62 participants answering 
“Yes,” 3 (4.8%) answering “No,” and 6 (9.7%) answering “I don’t know.” Between 
rounds one and two, one of the participants who answered “No” changed to “Yes.” Of the 
participants who answered “I don’t know” in round one, 2 did not change their answers in 
the second round, 2 dropped out of the study, and 2 changed their answers to “Yes.”  
Question 7: Does the Nation (the United States) need biological threat 
characterization? 
 






When the mean scores for the final round of these six sub-questions were 
compared (Table 2), question 8_2–to prioritize funding for medical countermeasures, 
scored highest with a mean score of 7.44, while question 8_3–to inform the DHS 
Bioterrorism Risk Assessment, scored lowest with a mean score of 5.26. 
When participant responses were compared for all six sub-questions, both through 
a visual appraisal of the data using box plots (Figure 2) and statistical tests comparing the 
Question 8: We will now turn to the reasons that you would give to 
explain/justify the need for biological threat characterization programs in the US 
government.  
The survey provided 6 reasons (sub-questions) and participants were asked to score 
each reason on a scale from 1 (very unimportant) to 10 (very important). 
 Question 8_1: To enhance our understanding of the biological weapons threat 
by addressing technical gaps in the information provided by the intelligence 
community. 
 Question 8_2: To prioritize funding for medical countermeasures (e.g., a 
smallpox vaccine vs. an antibiotic). 
 Question 8_3: To inform the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA) – a probabilistic risk assessment which 
is required under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10 that helps the 
country prioritize biological threats. 
 Question 8_4: To prepare for biological weapons that are a strategic 
possibility based upon the current trajectories in scientific research (for 
example, threat characterization research may be directed in response to a 
published scientific paper that appears to be dual use research of concern, and 
which could be exploited by an adversary. In this scenario, there is no 
intelligence indication that the research is currently being misused). 
 Question 8_5: To acquire information that could help attribute an attack. For 
example, what does the nature of the attack suggest about which off-the-shelf 
equipment was used? 
 Question 8_6: To provide useful information to help in detection of and 
response to an attack (e.g., could urban animals like squirrels, rats, or pets, 
serve as sentinels of an attack on a city; How long does an area need to be 
avoided after an aerosol attack?) 
 





distributions (Friedman test and post-hoc Wilcoxon signed-rank tests), we found that 
some reasons for the USG to conduct BTC work were rated significantly higher than 
others at the p<0.008 level (Bonferroni correction of p<0.05/6). 
Sub-questions 8_2–to prioritize funding for medical countermeasures, 8_6–to 
provide useful information to help in detection of and response to an attack, and 8_1–to 
enhance our understanding of the biological weapons threat by addressing technical 
gaps in the information provided by the intelligence community, all scored significantly 
higher at the p<0.007 level, than the other three reasons for supporting BTC research 
(Table 2). Many participants who rated 8_1, 8_2, and 8_6 higher than the others provided 
similar justification for this prioritization: namely that biological threat characterization 
should be focused on informing government efforts to prepare for and respond to an 
attack in order to better protect the public. Participants felt that these three reasons 
encompassed that focus, and the other reasons were not as important because they did 
less to contribute to preparedness and response. 
Notably, when responses to question 8_1 were compared (using the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test) by age group (later vs. earlier generations), the earlier generations (Baby 
Boomers and Silent Generation) rated question 8_1 significantly higher (z=-3.191, 
p=0.0014) than the later generations (Millennials and Gen X).  
Of the three sub-questions that were rated significantly lower, question 8_5 (to 
acquire information to help attribute an attack) was rated highest. Some participants felt 
strongly that research to improve attribution of a biological attack is among the most 
important reasons for BTC research: 
 





“Attribution is critical for multiple reasons including increasing the odds of 
stopping follow-on events.” 
 
However, a majority of participants rated attribution lower than the other reasons 
for conducting BTC research, with justifications including: 
“Attribution research is worthwhile but not near the priority of protecting 
people.”  
 
“I see little possible progress in attribution so I would not recommend wasting a 
lot of money on it.” 
 
Sub-question 8_4 (To prepare for biological weapons that are a strategic 
possibility based upon the current trajectories in scientific research) was rated second 
lowest of the six reasons for BTC work. While some participants felt that BTC research 
should try to characterize novel threats that may come out of the “era of genetic 
engineering,” more participants rated this reason lower than other reasons. These 
participants tended to question whether this type of BTC research would be worth the 
risk: 
“Testing out BW that is "a strategic possibility" based on S&T trends, absent 
some indication of interest by others in misusing them, will tend to waste large 
amounts of money pursuing a large number of leads, AND it will tend to persuade 
others (either due to knowledge of what we are doing, or due to our secrecy) that 
we in fact have an offensive program.” 
 
“…the strategically possible space is enormous and will require significant 
thought about a systematic or prioritized approach to that research. Otherwise, 
the program could frankly flail about without doing much real useful work.” 
 
The reason for BTC research that participants rated the lowest was question 8_3 (to 
inform the DHS Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA)). Delphi participants who gave a 
low rating of 5 or less to this question and who commented about this rating either felt 
 





that the BTRA could not or should not be improved through additional BTC research, or 
felt that improvement of the BTRA itself is not an end that justifies BTC work. 
“…the largest sources of uncertainty in the DHS BTRA are not technical but 
behavioral: how many terrorist groups want to acquire and use biological 
weapons? What kind of agents do they find most appealing? What types of targets 
and effects are they most interested in? None of these questions can be answered 
in the lab.” 
 
“The BTRA, for all its weaknesses, is an important policy product and it should 
benefit from, though not serve as the justification for, biological threat 
characterization.” 
 
When the responses to this sub-question were compared by age (later vs. earlier 
generations), the earlier generations rated question 8_3 significantly higher than the later 
generations at the p<0.05 level, when compared using the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-
sum test (z=-2.212, p=0.0270). 
 
 






When the mean scores for the final round of these seven sub-questions were 
compared (Table 3), question 10_2 (it may increase the potential for insider threats), 
scored highest with a mean score of 5.95, while question 10_4 (threat characterization 
will not provide actionable information), scored lowest with a mean score of 3.86. The 
mean responses for all sub-questions were fairly low – with none above a mean of 6.0. 
When participant responses were compared for all seven sub-questions, using box 
plots (Figure 3) and statistical tests comparing the distributions, we found that rankings 
for two of the seven sub-questions differed significantly from the others. Scores for 
question 10_4 (Laboratory threat characterization work will not provide actionable 
Question 10:  What, in your opinion, are the biggest dangers or shortcomings 
that might result from a US government program directing laboratory 
characterization of biological threats?  
The survey provided seven possible dangers/shortcomings (sub-questions) and 
participants were asked to score each danger/shortcoming on a scale from 1 (very 
unimportant) to 10 (very important).  
 Question 10_1: It may be destabilizing to international regimes such as the 
Biological Weapons Convention, as other nations may believe that the US has 
an offensive biological weapons program. 
 Question 10_2: It may increase the potential for insider threats, as more 
people would have access to select agent pathogens and technical skills to 
manipulate them. 
 Question 10_3: It may increase the probability of an accidental release of a 
select agent from a laboratory. 
 Question 10_4: Laboratory threat characterization work will not provide 
actionable information for policymakers. 
 Question 10_5: Money spent on laboratory threat characterization could be 
used more effectively in other areas of biodefense. 
 Question 10_6: If the results of the laboratory experiments were unexpectedly 
released, it could help an adversary. 
 Question 10_7: If the results of the laboratory experiments were unexpectedly 
released, it would result in public controversy. 
 





information for policy makers) were rated significantly lower than all other questions 
except for 10_5. Question 10_5 (Money spent on laboratory threat characterization 
could be used more effectively in other areas of biodefense) was rated significantly lower 
than all sub-questions except for 10_4 and 10_7, when compared using the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test with a significance level of p<0.007 (Bonferroni correction of p<0.05/7).  
Reasons that were given for the lower rating of these two sub-questions included: 
“Lab threat characterization results have already provided actionable 
information for policymakers.” 
 
“The lack of actionable info and how we spend biodefense money go hand in 
hand but the argument could be made that spending money on other biodefense 
programs is a waste of money.”  
 
“The cost of experiments to better prioritize other investments is relatively small, 
with the threat characterization projects measured in single digit $M and less, but 
countermeasure projects in 10s and 100s of $M.”  
 
All of the other sub-question distributions were rated similarly and did not differ 
significantly from one another. A majority of the participants discussed the BWC in long-
form answers to this question, and sub-question 10_1 (It may be destabilizing to 
international regimes such as the BWC) was rated second highest in concern with a mean 
response of 5.814, but the distribution for this sub-question did not differ significantly 
from the other sub-questions except when compared to questions 10_4 and 10_5. 
There were some significant differences in distributions at the p<0.05 level when 
sub-questions were analyzed by age using the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
Sub-questions 10_2 - It may increase the potential for insider threats (z=2.203, 
p=0.0276), 10_3 - It may increase the probability of an accidental release (z=2.603, 
 





p=0.0092), 10_4 – BTC will not provide actionable information (z=3.350, p=0.0008), and 
10_5 - money spent on BTC could be used more effectively elsewhere (z=3.171, 
p=0.0015) were rated significantly higher at the p<0.05 level (as bigger dangers or 
shortcomings) by the later generations than by the earlier generations. 
 
 
Question 12:  In your opinion, what rules or guidelines for threat 
characterization should be in place to ensure that these programs are safe and 
effective? 
The survey provided seven possible rules/guidelines (sub-questions) and participants 
were asked to score each rule/guideline on a scale from 1 (very unimportant) to 10 
(very important).  
 Question 12_1: The USG should not conduct an experiment if it violates the 
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 
 Question 12_2: The USG should not conduct an experiment in which a 
pathogen is changed/mutated/altered unless the change/mutation/alteration has 
already occurred in nature (for example, antibiotic resistant anthrax has been 
seen in nature, so it would be acceptable to characterize it for biodefense 
purposes). 
 Question 12_3: The USG should not conduct any experiment unless there is 
some intelligence information about a particular biological threat that supports 
the need for that experiment. 
 Question 12_4: The USG should not conduct an experiment based on 
intelligence information unless the threat is determined to be scientifically 
plausible. 
 Question 12_5: The USG should not conduct an experiment unless the result 
of the experiment has the potential to affect policy, funding, or prioritization of 
biological threats. 
 Question 12_6: The USG should not conduct an experiment to assess a threat 
unless there is something that can be done to combat or respond to that threat 
(e.g., there is reason to believe that a countermeasure to the threat is 
scientifically plausible or is likely to be funded). 
 Question 12_7: The USG should not conduct an experiment unless there is 
reason to believe that the experiment has been done before (e.g., in published 
scientific research, in classified studies, previous offensive work, or in a 
clandestine laboratory that there is intelligence about). 
 





When the mean scores for the final round of these seven sub-questions were 
compared (Table 4), question 12_1 (The USG should not conduct an experiment if it 
violates the BWC) scored highest with a mean score of 8.29, while question 12_7 (The 
USG should not conduct an experiment unless there is a reason to believe that the 
experiment has been done before) scored lowest with a mean score of 3.41. 
When participant responses were compared for all seven sub-questions, both 
through a visual appraisal of the data using box plots (Figure 4) and statistical tests 
comparing the distributions, we found that the distributions of a number of sub-questions 
differed significantly at the p<0.007 level (Bonferroni correction of p<0.05/7). 
Sub-question 12_1 (The USG should not conduct an experiment if it violates the 
BWC) was rated significantly higher than then next highest ranked sub-question (sub-
question 12_4) (z=3.695, p=0.0002), and significantly higher than all of the other sub-
questions. Reasoning by the participants for this high rating included: 
“Compliance with the BWC is a sine qua non for all threat characterization 
work.” 
 
“Clearly, the United States should not violate the BWC, or applicable US law 
(which is even more restrictive than the BWC). However, the BWC does not 
prohibit defensive related research, so it is a relatively low barrier.” 
 
“Above all, the USG should not be conducting any experiments that violate or 
could be perceived as violating the BWC.” 
 
“Experiments should always be for defensive purposes and not involve the 
exploratory optimization of parameters of weaponization.” 
 
For those few participants who did not rate this sub-question highly, reasoning included: 
 “I believe that the necessary research can be done without violating the BWC 
through the use of the full range of model systems. Should the situation arise 
 





where no alternative was possible and the need were deemed urgent then I would 
conduct the study openly with international representation and justification. All 
this is situationally-specific and the BWC conflict problem is somewhat over 
exaggerated.” 
 
“I think we need to weigh our international obligations against our strategic 
interests which is why I gave this a 5.” 
 
“It specifically allows for defensive research, and if that means studying offensive 
concept is necessary for defense then it's still defensive research.” 
 
Sub-question 12_4 (The USG should not conduct an experiment based on 
intelligence information unless the threat is determined to be scientifically plausible) was 
rated significantly higher than any of the other sub-questions with the exception of 
question 12_1 and 12_5 (Table 4). Reasons for this prioritization emphasized a common-
sense approach to BTC research: 
“…intelligence driven decisions without scientific plausibility would create 
frantic research efforts without strategic guidance and would rarely provide 
useful information for the intelligence and responder communities to react 
accordingly.” 
 
“Efforts should be made to not perform research that is totally implausible. 
However, care must be taken not to discard concepts that simply don't match our 
understanding.” 
 
“Threat characterization should be focused on determining the boundaries of the 
scientifically plausible and should not be driven by intelligence.” 
 
“Limiting research to items deemed scientifically plausible seems to be a first 
basis for any kind of experiment. If we think something is scientifically 
implausible, it makes no sense to undertake the research.” 
 
Question 12_5 (The USG should not conduct an experiment unless the result of 
the experiment has the potential to affect policy, funding, or prioritization of biological 
threats) was the next highest rated sub-question, and was rated significantly higher than 
 





all other sub-questions (with the exceptions of 12_1 and 12_4), including the next lowest 
rated sub-question 12_3 (z=-2.802, p=0.0051). Participants’ reasons for rating this highly 
included: 
“if there is no rationale to gain information of value to defensive policy or 
practice, then there is no basis for that kind of effort being funded by the USG.” 
 
“Development of good tools and methods rests on basic research, which (a) is 
rarely targeted at its eventual use, (b) can take years or decades to become 
“relevant,” and (c) contributes to a broad discussion among researchers, 
practitioners, and users.  That said, I think a different standard may apply to 
threat characterization work because most such work will qualify as Dual Use 
Research of Concern.  In this case, such work should in most cases be plausibly 
linked (if perhaps not strictly limited) to policy, funding or prioritization 
decisions.” 
 
“Experiments should be done for scientifically valid reasons, and with a clear 
reason of why the experiment is needed (to inform funding, policy, MCM 
development decisions.)” 
 
Question 12_7 (The USG should not conduct an experiment unless there is reason 
to believe that the experiment has been done before) was rated statistically significantly 
lower than any of the other 12 sub-questions. Reasoning for this low rating included: 
“Because the main role of threat characterization is to define the boundaries of 
plausibility, and because techniques and instruments are evolving continuously, it 
does not make sense to limit studies to cases in which countermeasures already 
exist or are envisioned or to experiments that have been done before.” 
 
“If an experiment has been done before, past research should be used especially 
if the science is reproducible, high quality, and well-constructed and conducted.” 
 
“I do think that there are reasons to conduct experiments that have not be 
conducted before - that is going to often be the most important work to be done.  I 
am not, however, comfortable doing gain-of-function experiments that have not 
been done before or do not exist in nature.” 
 
“if it's been done before...why re-do it?  I know, to validate results...but it would 
seem to me if it's never been done and it's a plausible threat, you'd want 
 







When question 12 was analyzed by comparing sub-question distributions by 
gender, two of the seven comparisons had statistically significant findings: by age, one of 
the seven had significant findings; and by government vs. non-government employment, 
one of the seven had significant findings at the p<0.05 level when compared using the 
nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. 
Statistically significant differences by gender: Question 12_2 (The USG should 
not conduct an experiment in which a pathogen is changed/mutated/altered unless the 
change/mutation/alteration has already occurred in nature), and question 12_3 (The 
USG should not conduct any experiment unless there is some intelligence information 
about a particular biological threat that supports the need for that experiment) were both 
rated significantly higher by women than by men (both sub-questions had the same z 
score and associated probability (z=-2.370, p=0.0178)). 
Statistical significance by age: Question 12_2 was rated significantly higher by 
the later generations than by the earlier generations (z=2.316, p=0.0206). Statistical 
significance by government expertise: Question 12_1 (The US should not conduct an 
experiment if it violates the BWC) was rated statistically significantly higher by experts in 
government than by non-government experts (z=-2.079, p=0.0376). 
  
 






QUESTION 13: What do you think are the most important components of an 
effective review process for this kind of threat characterization research, which is 
often dual-use research of concern and highly sensitive? 
The survey provided 13 possible components of an effective review process (sub-
questions) and participants were asked to score each review components on a scale 
from 1 (very unimportant) to 10 (very important). 
 Question 13_1: Projects are reviewed to ensure compliance with applicable 
laws and treaties, such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). 
 Question 13_2: Research protocols are reviewed by technical experts inside 
government for scientific soundness. 
 Question 13_3: Research protocols are reviewed by technical experts outside 
of government for scientific soundness. 
 Question 13_4: A technical advisory committee/group helps with the strategic 
prioritization of work with limited resources. 
 Question 13_5: A technical advisory committee/group reviews and is able to 
vouch for the compliance of the work in the event of a data breach. 
 Question 13_6: Decisions about why and how threats were prioritized are 
documented for the program. 
 Question 13_7: Decisions about why an experiment was undertaken are 
documented (for example, intelligence, strategic possibility, gaps in the 
BTRA, countermeasures development, maintenance of capabilities). 
 Question 13_8: The risks in not doing the experiment are identified and 
documented (e.g., lack of preparedness). 
 Question 13_9: The potential national security benefits to performing the 
experiment are identified and documented. 
 Question 13_10: The consequences of a laboratory accident during the course 
of performing the project are considered and documented. 
 Question 13_11: The consequences of a data breach in the course of this 
project are considered and documented. 
 Question 13_12: A process is undertaken to determine how technically 
difficult this experiment is, and what it indicates about a potential adversary. 
 Question 13_13: Alternatives to an experiment, such as the use of simulants 
or computer models, are considered and documented. 
 





When the mean scores for the final round of these 13 sub-questions were 
compared (Table 5), question 13_2 (Research protocols are reviewed by technical 
experts inside government for scientific soundness) scored highest with a mean score of 
8.80, while question 13_12 (A process is undertaken to determine how technically 
difficult this experiment is, and what it indicates about a potential adversary) scored 
lowest with a mean score of 7.76. 
When participant responses were compared for all 13 sub-questions, both through 
a visual appraisal of the data using box plots (Figure 5) and statistical tests comparing the 
distributions, we found that the distributions of only a few of the sub-questions differed 
significantly at the at the p<0.004 level (Bonferroni correction of p<0.05/13). The 13 
components of an effective review were rated similarly for this question, and most people 
felt that many of these components should be considered for BTC programs in the USG, 
with some caution that they be applied in a smart way that does not hinder the research 
process. 
“These are all important components of an effective review system that will 
minimize risks and ensure that researchers properly balance the benefits and 
costs of experiments.” 
 
“All of these seem reasonable and very important with regard to the scientific 
validity, use of resources, and maintaining public trust.” 
 
“All of these ideas are good practices to determining what should be done. 
However, if all of these were to be undertaken, this process would be very 
cumbersome. So, the cost/benefit of each of these steps should be considered.” 
 
While most of the sub-questions (components of an effective review process) 
were rated similarly, sub-question 13_7 (Decisions about why an experiment was 
 





undertaken are documented) was rated significantly higher at a p<0.004 level than 
questions 13_4, 13_5, and 13_12. Reasons for rating the component highly included: 
“Justification, while a pain, is a fact of life for government programs. Given the 
challenges the BTCP is likely to face, clear consideration and demonstration of 
the benefits of doing the work (and the risks of NOT doing the work) is critical.” 
 
“Documentation of what and why things are done is essential.” 
 
Sub-question 13_12 (A process is undertaken to determine how technically 
difficult this experiment is, and what it indicates about a potential adversary) was rated 
significantly lower at p<0.004 level than questions 13_1, 13_2, 13_7, and 13_10. Only 
one participant commented specifically about why this was rated lower than the other 
components:  
“Not sure we want to do a lot of work to determine how technically difficult a 
project might be - that could entail doing the project.” 
 
Finally, when questions were compared by subgroups (age, gender, expertise, 
etc.) using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, we found that question 13_2 (Research protocols 
reviewed by experts inside government for scientific soundness) was rated significantly 
higher at the p<0.05 level by experts in government than by non-government experts (z=-
2.373, p=0.0176)  
 
 






When the mean scores for the final round of these seven sub-questions were 
compared (Table 6), question 14_1 (When we have successfully created a medical 
countermeasure to combat an agent) scored highest with a mean score of 6.88, while 
question 14_6 (Biological agents have already been characterized enough) scored lowest 
with a mean score of 2.73. 
When participant responses were compared for all seven sub-questions, both 
through a visual appraisal of the data using box plots (Figure 6) and statistical tests 
comparing the distributions, we found that the distributions of one sub-question in 
particular differed significantly at the at the p<0.007 level (Bonferroni correction of 
p<0.05/7).  
Question 14:  In your opinion, when is a biological threat “adequately 
characterized?” In other words, when can you stop doing laboratory research on 
a biological agent and move on to other important, pressing problems when 
resources are constrained? 
The survey provided seven possible scenarios (sub-questions) and participants were 
asked to score each scenario on a scale from 1 (very unimportant) to 10 (very 
important).  
 Question 14_1: When we have successfully created a medical countermeasure 
to combat an agent. 
 Question 14_2: When we know how an agent behaves in the environment, 
including how long it persists and the risks to public health posed by 
environmental contamination. 
 Question 14_3: When we can estimate the dose response relationship in 
humans for an agent. 
 Question 14_4: When we understand how an agent could be manipulated to 
defeat our defenses (e.g., antibiotic resistance). 
 Question 14_5: When we know the basic characteristics of an agent and can 
estimate a range of possible consequences. 
 Question 14_6: Biological agents have already been characterized enough. 
Any additional work is of diminishing returns for decision-makers. 
 





Sub-question 14_6 (Biological agents have already been characterized enough) 
was rated significantly lower at the p<0.007 level than any of the other 
scenarios/reasoning for when a biological agent has been “characterized enough” through 
the BTC process. Participant comments that explained this low rating focused on the need 
for continued characterization due to the ever-changing threat environment. 
“I am skeptical that we can know enough to stop paying attention to any 
particular threat. We don't stop paying attention to naturally occurring bugs just 
because we have an effective treatment.” 
 
“Basic characteristics are not enough. As weapons presumably evolve and as 
scientific knowledge becomes more dispersed and better, threat characterization 
will always be needed to some extent.” 
 
“Characterization of an agent should continue as long as that work generates 
actionable information that will improve our ability to prevent or defend against 
use of that agent.” 
 
“Infectious agents evolve and host responses evolve. Given the dynamic nature of 
this interaction, one is probably never "done" with biological threat 
characterization. The challenge here is how to set priorities.” 
 
“It's hard to rank when a biological threat is adequately characterized.  Because 
we are dealing with living and evolving organisms, until we understand the full 
environmental interactions, we will never fully understand how the organism 
acts.” 
 
Sub-question 14_3 (When we can estimate the dose response relationship in 
humans for an agent) was rated significantly lower than sub-question 14_1. Few 
participants provided reasons for this low rating specifically, but reasoning does include 
the following statement: 
“much of that [dose-response estimation] can now be addressed/investigated with 
sophisticated modeling and simulation - that same approach that DTRA is now 
taking with advanced chemical threat agents - this minimized the number of 
laboratory experiments that need to be performed and shortens the timeline to 
understanding the threat.” 
 
 





Participants also rated question 14_7 (Characterization of agents should continue 
indefinitely because there is always more we can know that will help us prepare for and 
respond to an attack) statistically significantly lower than the highest rated sub-question 
(14_1). So, while participants generally disagreed with the statement that “biological 
agents have been characterized enough,” some felt that characterization should have 
some boundaries.  
“The notion that characterization should continue indefinitely violates the basic 
economic law of diminishing returns. Yes, you can always learn more and secure 
more benefit--but the cost per unit of gain will tend to rise sharply after a certain 
point.” 
 
It should be noted that the range of answers for this sub-question was large, 
indicating a lack of consensus on this issue. In addition, when sub-question 14_7 was 
analyzed by subgroups using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, we found that earlier 
generations rated question 14_7 significantly higher at the p<0.05 level than the later 
generations (z=-3.333, p=0.0009). 
Participants rated questions 14_1, 14_2, 14_5, and 14_4 higher than the other sub-
questions, but the difference in distributions for these answers was not distinguishable or 
significant at the p<0.007 level. Reasoning for this lack of prioritization included a 
number of comments like the one below: 
“I don't think you can take any of the first five thresholds in isolation. The first 
three are the most important - once we have a good countermeasure and know 
how long the agent persists in the environment and the dose-response 
relationship, we've got the bulk of what we need to know about the threat agent.” 
 






Of the 59 Delphi participants in round two of the study, 21 participants (35.5%) 
answered that DHS should continue to have primary responsibility for determining BTC 
priorities for the U.S. Another 16 participants (27.1%) said that the White House (EOP) 
should have the lead, followed by 12 participants (20.3%) who said that HHS should take 
the lead, 5 participants (8.5%) who voted for the IC, 3 participants (5.1%) who voted for 
DoD, and finally 2 participants (3.4%) who feel that BTC should not be a government 
function at all. There were 0 participants who felt that the Department of State should 
lead prioritization for biological threat characterization. 
When this question was analyzed by subgroups using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, 
we found that there was a significant difference at the p<0.05 level in how preferred 
agency responsibility was ranked between earlier and later generations (z=2.784, 
p=0.0054). Earlier generations preferred to leave responsibility for BTC priority setting 
with the Department of Homeland Security, with 16 of 28 (57.1%) of earlier generation 
participants voting for DHS. In the later generations, only 5 of the 31 participants 
(16.1%) voted for DHS, while 10 of these participants (32.3%) preferred HHS and 10 
others preferred that the EOP take the lead.  
 
Question 15: In your opinion, who in the US government should have the 
primary responsibility for determining priorities for biological threat 
characterization as a Nation?  
The survey provided a choice of one of the following government agencies or offices 
and space to explain that reasoning: Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 
Executive Office of the President (EOP), The Intelligence Community (IC), The 
Department of State (State), or Not a government function. 
 






The Need for Biological Threat Characterization  
Findings from this study indicate that the U.S. biosecurity experts who 
participated in this Delphi exercise believe in the importance of implementing and 
maintaining a BTC capability in the USG. An overwhelming majority of Delphi 
participants support BTC work, with only two participants who thought that BTC work 
was counterproductive. These dissenting participants cited concerns about the appearance 
of violating the BWC, about the potential for an increased insider threat as more 
scientists work in this area, about the danger posed by an accidental laboratory release, 
and about the prioritization of research into bioterrorism threats when naturally occurring 
outbreaks are higher in likelihood. Other participants also expressed these concerns to 
varying degrees, but the large majority felt that BTC research performed by the USG was 
still warranted despite the risks, or perhaps they felt that appropriate policies ameliorated 
or could ameliorate those risks. 
When the large majority of experts who supported BTC research in the Delphi 
study were asked why it is necessary, they emphasized its application to preparedness and 
response for biological weapons attacks. Experts showed in their ratings and justifications 
that they support BTC research that informs prioritization and development of medical 
countermeasures (MCMs), provides information to aid in detection of and response to an 
attack, and improves our understanding of information generated by the intelligence 
community in order to more effectively prevent or interdict an attack.  
Experts favored less those reasons that were not directly related to prevention, 
preparedness, or response – particularly information gathering in order to assess more 
 





distant future threats, efforts to attribute future attacks, and data collection for the express 
purpose of informing the Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA). Participants were less 
favorable toward these reasons generally because they were less likely to inform 
decision-making or contribute to immediate risk reduction.  
Importantly, this finding demonstrates that to these experts, the value of BTC is in 
experimental research that is connected to the USG ability to prepare for and respond to 
biological threats. Other goals of the program are not perceived to be as valuable or 
yielding as many benefits.  
Interestingly, the earlier generations of experts who participated in the study were 
significantly more favorable toward BTC work for the purpose of understanding 
intelligence information and to inform the BTRA, than were the later two generations. 
This may indicate that the experts in earlier generations (over 50 years of age) are more 
steeped in, reliant on, and less skeptical of these government efforts than the experts from 
later generations. This finding may be indicative of a need for DHS and the IC to provide 
more education to younger stakeholders about the utility of intelligence and risk 
assessment, and about the threats that are assessed by these efforts. 
The Biggest Dangers/Shortcomings that Might Arise from BTC Work 
As a group, experts who participated in this study weighted the potential risks of 
BTC research very similarly, with the highest rated concern being that the research might 
increase the potential for insider threat, followed by the concern that the research could 
be destabilizing to international regimes including the BWC. None of the proposed 
dangers were rated especially highly, with the mean for the top-rated danger only 6 out of 
 





10. This might indicate that experts are not overly concerned with the risks of BTCP 
work, a finding that might differ considerably if non-experts were to be queried instead. 
Different generations did vary in their responses to this question. Later 
generations of experts rated concerns about an increased probability of an accidental 
release significantly higher than did earlier generations. This finding may indicate there is 
a rising worry about biosafety in the current biosecurity/biodefense workforce. DHS 
should be aware of these concerns and should emphasize the measures being taken to 
address biosafety at NBACC. In addition, later generations worried significantly more 
about BTC work not providing useful information to policy makers and about the need to 
prioritize funding and resources away from BTCP and toward other areas of biodefense. 
Many of the experts in the later generations are currently in positions of decision making 
in the government, and perhaps have not seen the utility of BTC research for their own 
work. It would benefit the BTCP to engage these experts further to see how threat 
characterization information could be more useful to them. 
Rules or Guidelines for Threat Characterization to Ensure that BTC is Safe and 
Effective 
Above all other current or proposed rules or guidelines for BTC work, experts felt 
most strongly that DHS should steadfastly not violate the BWC. Government experts 
were most adamant about this and rated compliance with the BWC most highly, possibly 
due to a more intimate involvement with international diplomatic work. While this 
finding seems intuitive, it is an important validation of the work DHS has done to build 
its compliance review process, and it supports continued efforts to maintain a rigorous 
approach to compliance assurance. 
 





Experts also gave significant weight to the need for the BTCP to conduct 
experimental work based on intelligence information only if the threat is judged to be 
scientifically plausible, and to make sure that every BTC experiment has the potential to 
affect policy or resource prioritization decisions. This is reflective of the earlier group 
responses that prioritize BTC work to inform prevention, preparedness and response to 
biological threats. 
Despite this preference toward research with a tangible impact and away from 
experiments to investigate implausible threats, experts did not feel that BTC work should 
only be limited to research on established or traditional threats. This is an indication that, 
while experts feel research should be practical, it should not be limited only to the realm 
of the known.  
In regards to BTC work to address possible future threats, experts did not draw a 
hard red line that would proscribe BTCP from conducting work in which a pathogen is 
altered in some way that has not previously been seen in nature. Such a rule or guideline 
was not rated highly by the group as a whole. However, experts did comment that BTC 
work in this area should proceed with caution to avoid experiments that may result in the 
creation of novel pathogens, more virulent agents, or agents that can defeat our 
biodefenses. Notably, both women and later generations of experts rated prohibition of 
this type of work significantly higher than did men and earlier generations, which may 
mean that women and younger experts want to see more concrete, empirical information 
on threat before they are willing to countenance extensive BTC work. This speaks to a 
continued need to address and allay these concerns.  
 
 





Important Components of an Effective Review Process  
The proposed components of an effective review process for ensuring that BTCP 
work has maximized utility and minimized risk were all rated highly by experts, with the 
mean for each component rated above 7.5 out of 10. Delphi participants were most 
supportive of a technical review process in which experts inside government review 
experiments for scientific soundness. Government experts felt particularly strongly about 
the need for this component, likely due to their past experience in this area and the 
perceived need to review the data in a classified environment, which is most easily done 
inside government. 
In addition, experts felt strongly that documentation of the decision-making 
process and reasoning for each experiment was significantly important. This kind of 
documentation was felt to be critical for ensuring the rigor of the work, its defensibility, 
and continued justification and demonstration of the benefits of BTCP. 
Overall, these findings indicate that these review processes should be 
implemented in support of the threat characterization, but implemented in a reasonable 
way, which would aid and not hamstring the important scientific work being done in the 
program. 
Recommended Stopping Points for BTC Research 
The question of stopping points for threat characterization research – when 
enough research has been done on a pathogen – is a difficult one. Additional information 
to reduce uncertainty can almost always be obtained through continued research, but this 
research comes with diminishing returns and resource tradeoffs. Our Delphi experts did 
not reach consensus on specific stopping points for BTC research, and while they rated 
 





development of a medical countermeasure to combat an agent the highest among 
proposed stopping points, it was not a statistically significant frontrunner.  
The group did agree on one thing: BTCP research should continue and biological 
threat agents have not been “characterized enough.” However, the group as a whole also 
did not think that threat characterization for each biological agent should continue 
indefinitely, and concurred that there should be some stopping points/boundaries on the 
amount of resources invested. However, government experts were more apt to support 
indefinite research than were non-government experts. 
These findings indicate that stopping points for BTC research will likely need to 
be addressed on a case-by-case basis; that is, in a methodical way that can be documented 
and defended. 
Responsibility for Determining BTC Priorities for the USG 
Determination of BTC priorities for government is an important responsibility, 
one that should be considered carefully. Currently, this responsibility lies at the program 
level with BTCP within DHS S&T. However, some experts argue that prioritization 
decisions might be better made either at a higher level or in a different agency. Because it 
is such a pivotal decision point, with many downstream implications for biodefense 
resource prioritization, the project team asked the Delphi group who they think should 
have the primary responsibility for this; that is, whether it should continue to reside at 
DHS, be elevated to the White House level, or transferred to another agency in the 
federal government. Alternate government bodies/agencies proposed to participants 
included HHS (because of its role in leading the Public Health Emergency 
Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE) process for the government); DoD (because of 
 





its role in leading defense of the country); State (because of its role as the lead for 
international security and nonproliferation); or the IC (because of their knowledge of the 
threat from adversaries intending to use biological agents as weapons). 
Experts generally felt that DHS should continue to hold the responsibility for 
BTC research prioritization, with more support for this position from earlier generations 
of experts than from later generations, who more strongly supported the White House 
EOP or HHS to take the lead for determining priorities. 
This finding is important because, while the group did support DHS to continue in 
this role, there was not complete agreement. DHS should continue to work with its 
partners in the White House and the interagency community to communicate about how 
prioritization decisions are made and to coordinate priority setting with other elements of 
the USG biodefense enterprise. 
Conclusions 
This Delphi study is important because it is the first time that questions about 
BTC research have been posed systematically to a collective of biodefense experts. Most 
importantly, this research indicates that experts view BTC research as a necessary USG 
function and that despite the risks inherent in this kind of research it should go forward 
under the leadership of the Department of Homeland Security. Additionally, we found 
that the risks of most concern to participants, namely the risk of insider threat and the risk 
of violating or appearing to violate the BWC, are currently being addressed by DHS in its 
Biological Threat Characterization Program, which is encouraging. Further 
communication to biodefense stakeholders about the safeguards already in place at 
NBACC will be important to reassure those experts who have ongoing concerns. 
 





The results of this study show that experts are in favor of implementing a review 
process for BTC research that includes the components proposed in the Delphi survey. 
However, it is also clear that this process should not be overly burdensome and thus 
hamper the important characterization work that is needed for biodefense. While not all 
experts agreed on all points related to BTC work, findings often did not differ by type of 
expertise, training, or gender. Responses did often differ by generation, however, with 
earlier generations tending to be more comfortable with and confident in existing 
government processes, and less concerned about the risks of BTC research; and later 
generations less confident in existing approaches and infrastructure and more concerned 
about risks of research. This generational divide may speak to the need for further 
engagement of current and rising government leaders; to understand their concerns, to 
communicate with them about the benefits and risks of BTC research, and to socialize the 
steps that are being taken to make sure that this research is safe and effective. 
This study did not illuminate any hard and fast rules for BTC research that crosses 
a “red line” and should not be undertaken, with the exception of the rules that the 
research should never violate the BWC or involve human subjects research. But, experts 
did indicate that research with the potential for creating novel pathogens or pathogens 
with novel mechanisms that could defeat vaccines, drugs, or diagnostics, should be 
reviewed very carefully prior to the work being done. There should be strong justification 
for this type of research, and each such experiment should be reviewed and considered 
individually. 
Finally, this research shows that there is no agreement about when biological 
agent characterization can be stopped. Experts felt that there ought to be some stopping 
 





point, but once again it will need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. This finding 
does indicate that research on “traditional” select agent pathogens should be continued 
along with research on emerging or future threats.  
The research team recommends that biological threat characterization research 
programs in the USG and internationally review these findings with an eye toward 
evaluating program processes and stakeholder engagement approaches, and refine 
programs accordingly in order to maximize the benefits, minimize risks, and cultivate 
support for BTC work.  
Findings from this Delphi study can be extrapolated to other security-related 
threat characterization programs, and similar efforts should be applied more broadly to 
other federal programs that are working to prioritize research for CBR agents prior to the 
next contamination emergency. 
Acknowledgements 
Funding for this research was provided in full through contract number 
HSHQDC13CB0047 to the University of Maryland National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), by the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T). DHS S&T reviewed and 
approved the manuscript for publication.  DHS S&T had no additional roles in the study 
design, data collection, analysis or preparation of the manuscript.   
 












Applying Crisis and Risk-Based Decision Making Frameworks to Public Health 
Emergencies Involving Contamination: An Integrative Literature Review 
  
 






 Objective:  Response to major contamination emergencies often requires that 
decisions about protective actions are made rapidly in order to protect the health of the 
public. However, under considerable time pressure and uncertainty, decision making that 
balances risk-based information with other important considerations can be difficult. This 
review examines the literature for ways that decision making in contamination 
emergencies can be improved. 
 Methods: An integrative literature review was conducted in February 2016 using 
three databases and a set of key words and terms. Fifty-one pieces of literature were 
included for final review and analysis. Themes were identified using open coding and 
constant comparative methods of qualitative analysis, and summarized by category and 
topic area. 
 Findings and Discussion:  Relatively little has been published on the topic of 
risk-based decision making in contamination emergencies. As a result, this review 
analyzed separate bodies of literature on risk-based decision making in non-emergency 
periods, crisis decision making, and real world events to identify properties of successful 
decision making in those contexts. Key themes identified from the literature include 
cognitive factors in decision making, decision process and structure, risk assessment, 
addressing uncertainty, formulating and weighing options, and decision support tools.  
 Conclusions: Findings from this review show that multiple relevant frameworks 
exist that could be beneficial to future decision makers responding to contamination 
emergencies. Future research should focus on tools that can enable leaders faced with 
 





contamination emergencies to make protective decisions that are timely, transparent, 
based on evidence and sensitive to other important considerations. 
Introduction 
Emergencies involving an accidental or intentional release of a contaminant, be it 
chemical, biological, or radiological, can significantly impact public health. 
Contamination events occur with relative frequency around the world, with some of these 
events affecting public health over the long term, and some rising to the level of 
emergency where urgent action is required to mitigate acute impacts on the health of 
those affected. In these acute contamination emergencies, early analysis and decision 
making will have a large impact on how the event unfolds. In fact, research suggests that 
decisions such as evacuation or sheltering, made during the earliest phases of a response, 
can have a significant impact on outcomes. This impact could be positive or negative 
depending upon the quality and timeliness of those decisions 83 
Often in major contamination emergencies such as large chemical spills, decision 
making is pushed up to the political level because of the serious and public nature of the 
event. In these emergencies, therefore, decisions are often made not by risk assessors or 
scientists who analyze available data, but by political leaders such as mayors, or 
governors, who may have had little experience in scientific analysis or response to 
emergencies, but will need to make decisions rapidly nontheless.1 
Emergency response to contamination emergencies may require decisions to be 
made within the first hours of recognition of an event. Ideally, this response will be well 
informed, risk-based, and will provide maximal protection to the population at risk. 
However, with significant pressure to take action, comes a high degree of uncertainty and 
 





stress, making optimized decisions very difficult.84 Compounding this difficulty is the 
complex nature of these emergencies, which often requires consideration not only of 
scientific evidence about risk to public health, but also political, social, economic, legal, 
ethical and other considerations that inevitably influence the decisions and outcomes. It is 
important for decision makers in these crises to address the complexity and uncertainty of 
the situation by considering these inputs as well as public values and risk perception.84 
Ideally, it would be best to gather data to inform risk assessment and create and 
exercise plans prior to an emergency.85,86 Crisis management does not come naturally, 
and so it may be important for governors or other leaders at the state or local level to gain 
training in crisis management and to also train their staffs.83,87 Yet, in reality, most 
decision makers at the political level are not formally trained in crisis response or risk 
assessment and management, and contamination events are unexpected and difficult to 
plan for and are characterized by deep uncertainty. Therefore, political leaders are usually 
thrown into a decision-making role without warning or time to prepare when a crisis 
occurs. As such, the US Institute of Medicine (now the National Academy of Medicine) 
Forum on Medical and Public Health Preparedness for Catastrophic Events has called for 
the US to “prepare governors to be ready to take extraordinary, unprecedented action” for 
public health emergencies.83(p187) 
Response to contamination emergencies will require decision makers to make 
both risk-based and rapid crisis decisions that mitigate the consequences of a 
contamination event. Training in emergency management is available, and can be 
conducted with decision makers prior to an emergency. But these trainings are mainly 
focused on structure; for example the incident command structure (ICS), and are rarely 
 





focused on the actual process of decision making itself.88 Moreover, while training in risk 
assessment is available for public health officials and scientists for non-emergency 
events, risk-based decision making is not taught to decision makers directly, and is rarely 
focused on the emergency context. As a result, there is currently no established body of 
literature or guidance that addresses the process of risk-based decision making during the 
initial response to contamination emergencies.  
Within the literature, the area that is least well understood or reported is the actual 
process of decision making. Most of the literature and after-action analyses from real 
emergencies or exercises are focused on the outcomes of decision making, but not on the 
process itself, which leaves a large knowledge gap about how decisions are actually made 
during contamination emergencies.88 The purpose of this integrative literature review is 
to bring together literature from the fields of crisis decision making and risk-based 
decision making, to synthesize knowledge into a cohesive framework that will inform 
risk-based decision making in major public health crises involving chemical, biological, 
or radiological contaminants. 
Methods 
The integrative literature review format was chosen for this analysis because it is 
designed specifically for synthesis of literature “in an integrated way such that new 
frameworks and perspectives on the topic are generated.”59 Because there is currently no 
body of literature focused specifically on risk-based decision making in public health 
crises involving contamination, and much of the knowledge on this topic resides outside 
of traditional academic settings, this integrative method made it possible to analyze 
pertinent perspectives from multiple fields and types of literature and bring them together 
 





in a new framework. The literature review focused on two major categories: crisis 
decision making and risk-based decision making. These categories were chosen because 
they represent theoretical and operational viewpoints, as well as both the time-sensitive 
nature of crisis decisions and need for integration of data and other information to make 
informed decisions. 
To conduct the search, the author chose three databases: PubMed to capture 
public health literature, Web of Science (all databases) to cover other scholarly 
publications on non-public health-related decision and risk assessment science, and 
OAIster to gather relevant grey literature and other open-access materials. The initial 
search was broadly inclusive to help ensure that no major literature was missed relating to 
the main topics of crisis and risk-based decision making and contamination emergency 
decision making. A number of key words and phrases were used to conduct the search. 
These were applied consistently to each of the three database searches (Table 7).  
The initial search, conducted in February 2016, generated a total of 1895 pieces of 
literature for review. Of that total, 1303 were related to crisis decision making and 592 
were related to risk-based decision making; and 522 were from PubMed, 897 were from 
Web of Science, and 476 came from OAIster. These results were then screened for 
relevance through review of titles, abstracts, and duplicate checking. A piece of literature 
was excluded in this first round of review if it was a duplicate, if it had no focus on 
decision making, if it had no focus on or relevance to public health or emergencies, if its 
focus was on personal decision making (e.g., personal medical decisions) without 
relevance to broader population-level decision contexts, or if it was a non-English 
language publication. This first level of review resulted in the inclusion of a total of 428 
 





pieces of literature, including 265 related to crisis decision making and 163 related to 
risk-based decision making. 
The author then implemented a second round of review to narrow down the time 
period for article inclusion and also to continue more in-depth review for relevancy. 
During this stage, literature inclusion was restricted to publication after the year 2000. 
This date was chosen because it was inclusive of a number of major contamination events 
in the US and around the world beginning with the anthrax letter attacks in 2001, and 
ensured that the literature would be relevant to modern decision-making contexts. 
Theories that are influential in the areas of risk-based and crisis decision making have 
been built upon over decades and still largely underpin current decision-making 
approaches. Thus, they should be adequately represented in this review in spite of the 
temporal restriction.  
The second review round was conducted by reading abstracts and the full text of 
each included piece of literature. Exclusions were made based on the following criteria: 
publication prior to the year 2000; non-applicability to the short crisis decision-making 
time period that is the focus of this review; focus on environmental regulation and not on 
response to contamination events; and a focus on mathematical models and technological 
tools to aid in decision making that are not developed for use in emergencies. In this 
second round of review, a total of 370 articles were excluded. Fifty-one were included for 
final review and analysis, with 24 pieces of literature under the topic of crisis decision 
making and 27 under risk-based decision making.  
Once the second review round was completed, the author re-read the 51 final 
articles and highlighted and organized findings using open coding and constant 
 





comparative methods of qualitative analysis. These methods were used rather than 
quantitative coding because they are meant to generate theoretical ideas and hypotheses 
from disparate types of evidence, and refine them throughout the review process in order 
to develop a new theory or framework.60 As part of this approach, each piece of literature 
was reviewed for relevant points under the initial categories of crisis and risk-based 
decision making. Relevant points were highlighted and notes about each piece of 
literature were recorded in an outline organized by category and theme as they emerged 
from the review. All reviewed literature was also recorded in a literature concept review 
matrix, which identifies conceptual frameworks employed, major findings, types of 
literature, strengths and weaknesses, and concept focus for each reference (Table 8 and 
9).61 Findings from the final review stage were then summarized by category and topic 
area and are reflected in the discussion section of this review. 
Discussion 
Crisis Decision Making 
Literature in this section of the review is focused on how decisions are made 
during a crisis period, where “a primary distinction between a ‘problem’ and a ‘crisis’ is 
the pressure of time involved.”88(p.4) Crisis decision making has been studied in a number 
of contexts including political, environmental, financial, and public health crises. Because 
contamination emergencies that impact public health require rapid decisions with 
uncertain or limited information,89,90 this literature review method captured a body of 
literature applicable to crises that require action and decisions within hours to days, and 
applicable to population-level contexts. Literature on crisis decision making is organized 
 





into three categories: cognitive factors affecting crisis decisions; decision process; and 
leadership and structure for crisis decision making. 
Cognitive Factors Affecting Decisions in a Crisis 
A large focus of the crisis decision making literature is on the cognitive processes 
that influence how a person makes decisions in a crisis. Research in this area primarily 
discusses two types of decision making: 1) intuitive and 2) rational or analytical decision 
making. Nobel Prize-winning social psychologist Daniel Kahneman describes these 
processes as System 1 (intuitive) and System 2 (analytical) or the dual process model.46  
Broadly, intuitive or system 1 decision making involves quick recognition of a 
situation and near-immediate decision making about courses of action. Richard Gasaway, 
a veteran of fire-EMS service, describes intuition as “a pre-conscious (or subconscious) 
process of logical reasoning that has manifested its effects in conscious, systemic form.” 
He notes that, “The subconscious intuitive mind can think logically and make decisions 
without registering any processes in the conscious mind, and with superior speed.” 91Paul 
Slovic, et al. recognize this intuitive process as “Affect,” and describe it as a “faint 
whisper of emotion,” or the “specific quality of goodness or badness” that is associated 
either consciously or unconsciously with a stimulus.92 Reliance on these feelings for 
decision making is termed the “affect heuristic” and it is a quicker and easier way to 
make decisions, particularly in a crisis. Slovic suggests that affect might be used as an 
“orienting mechanism” to help decision makers think quickly about a problem when time 
is short.92  
There are examples where intuitive decision making in crises is very important 
and reliable. Gasaway and others have studied fire-fighting decision making and have 
 





concluded that fire ground commanders rely mostly on intuition to make decisions, 
particularly when in extremely time-compressed and stressful situations. In these 
situations, commanders have time only for intuition or “gut feelings” because decisions 
must be made in minutes or even seconds. Often, when the commander is very 
experienced, these decisions tend to be relatively sound.91 Gassaway notes that a majority 
of the research on crisis decision making favors a rational decision process and trends 
toward checklists, automation, and decision-support tools. However, at least in the fire 
emergency decision context, he emphasizes the importance of accounting for and using 
intuition.91 Both Gasaway and Slovic recognize that intuitive decision making is not 
appropriate for every context, and it should not be relied upon completely especially by 
inexperienced decision-makers, but it is an important and unavoidable human component 
of decisions, and should be acknowledged, accounted for and used to the extent 
appropriate depending on the context.91,92 
Kahneman, Kayman, and others are more skeptical of reliance on intuition, and 
stress it can be relied upon only if it has been developed through repetitive action and 
lengthy experience.46,93 They find that decision makers are often over confident about 
their intuitive decisions. They find that in order for a decision maker’s intuition to be 
reliable, the environment needs to be relatively familiar with regularities and without too 
much complexity and the decision maker needs to be very experienced in order to have 
enough basis for their intuition. A number of studies have shown that computer 
simulations often outperform the intuition of decision makers who are not truly experts, 
who often choose correctly less than 50% of the time.46,94 Greater experience can enhance 
accuracy based on intuition when situational cues are consistent with what has been seen 
 





before. However, even for experts, if cues deviate from past experience, it can undercut 
the value of intuition.95 
Kayman and others advocate for a more rational approach to decision making 
because they find that intuitive processes are subject to error due to a number of 
“cognitive, moral, and emotional ‘traps’ and biases,” which can have a negative effect on 
judgment.46,94(p.167) These cognitive traps and biases include altered perspectives, where 
framing, compelling stories, and recent events can cause decision makers to frame a 
situation only one way and not consider different possible situations or solutions; 
optimistic bias, where excessive optimism and overconfidence can result in inaction by a 
decision maker; appeal to authority, where decision makers look up to higher levels of 
authority or expertise and delay decision making waiting for someone else to provide 
guidance; escalating commitment, where decision-makers throw “good money after bad” 
and neglect to consider new approaches; anchoring, where a pre-identified solution 
prevents consideration of a full range of options; and loss aversion, which can cause 
decision makers to delay decisions.93,96  
Kayman finds that moral considerations, guided by personal moral development 
can also unconsciously affect decision making and should be considered and discussed. 94 
Furthermore, risk-seeking attitudes at the individual and institutional levels can also 
influence intuitive decision making.95 Even when decision makers are expert and can rely 
on intuition to a greater extent for decision making, their expertise can also cause them to 
be subject to status quo bias, where new alternatives are not considered because past 
approaches are relied upon.95 
 





In addition, information pathologies can delay and influence decision making. In 
particular, information bias, or continually demanding more information, can delay 
response. 93 This is particularly true in a crisis when decisions need to be made very 
quickly with limited, even negligible information. What you see is all there is 
(WYSIATI), or considering only the information immediately available can result in 
decisions made on bad information, and failure to communicate important or 
contradictory information among a team; for a decision maker this can result in poor 
decisions based on incomplete information.46,93,94 Cognitive overload/strain can also 
affect decisions when the large amount of information, which is complex and dynamic in 
a crisis, overwhelms a decision maker.97  
According to Higgins and Freedman, inappropriate approaches to crisis decision 
making include a “lack of a systematic decision-making process, the application of 
intuitive decision making to non-intuitive problems and the application of cognitive 
decision-making techniques that are ill-suited to the situation.”93 Critical thinking is very 
important in crisis decision making. This involves asking difficult questions, gathering 
and evaluating data and information, and testing the logic of proposed decisions.93  
In a crisis like a contamination emergency, where time is a factor but not so 
urgent that critical thinking is impossible, pushing decision making to be more deliberate 
and conscious may improve the quality and reliability of decisions. Decision makers who 
first rely on System 1 (rapid automatic and intuitive judgments) to reach an initial 
decision, and then interrogate that decision using System 2 (slow, conscious, and 
controlled) are shown by Kahneman and Kayman to be more successful than either alone. 
46,94 Both lines of thinking come together in the literature to show that intuitive and 
 





analytical approaches are not at odds. The two systems operate in tandem and the 
analytical approach depends on the intuitive analysis for input.46,98 Slovic concludes that 
good risk management will capitalize on the advantages of both intuitive and rational 
processes and mitigate the limitations of both systems.98 
Decision Processes and Approaches 
A second major focus of the crisis decision-making literature is on decision-
making processes, including the types and timing of decisions that need to be made, how 
decision making can be organized, and approaches to ensuring that crisis decisions are as 
good as they can be despite significant time pressure. All of the processes evaluated in 
this review have been developed through, or applied extensively to real world crisis 
decision making. 
Early in a contamination emergency, the first decisions that are often needed are 
protective action recommendations (PARs), or decisions to help limit exposure and 
reduce further harm to the affected population.99 PARs are often implemented in the face 
of significant uncertainty, but if PARs are delayed there may be significant consequences 
from not protecting the public early enough.96 Lindel emphasizes that “minimizing the 
chance of unnecessary exposures requires taking action as early as possible, but this 
increases the likelihood of unnecessary protective action.”96 There are many factors that 
must be considered in making initial PARs, including the type, amount, and geographic 
distribution of the hazard; population dynamics of who is most and least at risk; and 
feasibility of implementing protective actions.96 
According to Lindell, who discusses PARs in the context of radiological 
contamination emergencies, “irreducible uncertainties in the chains of events for the 
 





release and population response create the potential for two types of decision errors.”96 
These errors are false positive response, where protective action decisions are made but 
are not needed or appropriate; and false negative response, where protective actions are 
not implemented, but are needed. Protective action decisions can have significant 
consequences that either significantly reduce or increase the risk to public health. The 
potentially negative impact of early protective action decisions was demonstrated in one 
federal bioterrorism exercise in 2001, when decision-makers made the PAR to have 
residents shelter in place for an extended period of time to avoid exposure, but gave no 
thought to the secondary effects of depriving people of food or medical care. In that 
exercise, the chosen protective action would actually have done more harm than good.100 
There are a number of decision models and theories that emphasize a deliberative 
evaluation of protective action options to reduce or eliminate the cognitive biases, traps, 
and heuristics identified in the section above. These models include the recognition-
primed decision model, the disruption management model, the observe, orient, decide, act 
(OODA) loop model coupled with the sense-making framework, the medical decision 
model, and core processes in public health emergency response. All of these process 
models have in common a loop of information gathering, deliberation of the situation at 
hand, and development and verification of possible response options, but they differ 
somewhat in their approach and degree of information gathering and deliberation.  
The recognition-primed decision model accounts for both intuitive and rational 
decision making and breaks decision making into two fundamental components: 
evaluation of the current situation and evaluation of a course of action. In recognition-
primed decision making, Dunn describes three possible scenarios: 1) a simple match 
 





where a decision maker recognizes a situation as “typical of others dealt with in the past,” 
and matches that situation to a relevant action; 2) diagnosis, where a decision maker is 
“unable to recognize a situation as typical,” and so enters into a “data-acquisition loop” 
where new information is acquired and applied to the situation; and 3) evaluation, where 
the situation is not ambiguous, but there is uncertainty with regards to the best course of 
action.101 In the first scenario, intuition is a primary guide to decision making, while in 
the other two scenarios, analytical processes are used to understand the situation and to 
evaluate options for action. Dunn, et al., find that successful acquisition and application 
of data in complex crises, where both the situation and courses of action are very 
uncertain, is highly reliant on effective communication between a decision maker and a 
decision-making team.101 
As with scenario two in recognition-primed decision making, the disruption 
management model focuses on a loop of information gathering, assessment of impact, 
formation of options, and actions, then back to information gathering.102 This model calls 
for crisis management teams to seek information inputs from thoughtful people, but only 
to the extent that time allows, because in a crisis, careful consideration of evidence and 
options must be balanced with timeliness. Information overload can occur when a 
decision maker or team demands more and more evidence, seeking perfect 
information.2,102 According to McAlister, “a timely, carefully-planned decision is far 
more likely to be fit for purpose and to withstand scrutiny at a later date” than an 
intuition-driven process.102 However, McAlister also suggests that decision makers need 
to remain focused on the fact that the “need to act quickly is more important than the 
search for flawless information.”102  
 





Possibly the best-known and most widely applied model for crisis decision 
making is the OODA loop model, which also focuses on a cyclical process looping back 
to observation.93 OODA was developed by US Air Force Colonel John Boyd to help 
fighter pilots make rapid and accurate decisions in dog fights with enemy planes. This 
model, in combination with the Cynefin Sensemaking Framework, described by Higgins 
and Freedman in their research on improving crisis decision making, provides a 
situationally-nuanced way for leaders to approach decision making in a crisis.93  
The OODA loop provides the process for investigating, analyzing, and deciding 
in a crisis, and the Sensemaking framework applies this loop to different crises of varying 
complexity. Sensemaking is aimed at reducing ambiguity in the decision-making process 
by encouraging decision makers to first have a collective understanding of the situation, 
which will then translate to evaluating options for action.90 As with the recognition-
primed decision model, the Sensemaking Framework defines different levels of event 
complexity: simple (ordered), complicated (ordered), complex (un-ordered), and chaos 
(un-ordered). Ordered situations might include small to medium-sized contamination 
events with a known contaminant and a largely homogeneous population, for example.  
According to Higgins, complicated situations are those that can be explained by 
cause and effect and can be understood through collection and analysis of data and expert 
knowledge, mostly involving “known unknowns.” The approach to complicated 
situations is to follow the OODA loop of sensing, analyzing, and responding. Decision 
making in radiological events can potentially be categorized in this level of complexity 
because the characteristics of radiological contaminants and their effects on human health 
 





are well understood, and acceptable levels of exposure have already been pre-
determined.83(p.78)  
In contrast, complex situations cannot be fully understood because they involve 
complex adaptive systems and “unknown unknowns.” An example of a complex situation 
might include a chemical spill in which the chemical has not been studied, and human 
health effects are unknown. In complex situations, a decision maker enters the OODA 
loop at the act phase by trying something and seeing what happens in order to better 
understand and stabilize the situation. According to Higgins and Freedman, intuitive 
decisions are dangerous in complex situations because these situations are not linear or 
well-understood, and so in these situations intuition should be reviewed and amended 
through careful thought. Finally, the Sensemaking Framework defines chaotic situations 
as beyond comprehension that have never been experienced before, with “unknowable 
unknowns.” In chaos, decision makers also enter the OODA loop at the act phase, and 
proceed through the loop many times, rapidly, with the goal of stabilizing the situation 
and eventually understanding it. Chaotic situations may involve compound exposures to 
multiple types of contaminants or novel contaminants that have never before been dealt 
with. An example of chaos is the contamination events resulting from the terrorist attacks 
on September 11, 2001 in New York City.93 Most of the time, contamination events will 
fit into the complicated or complex levels, but they may also fit into chaotic.93 Higgins 
and Freedman find that in complicated, complex, or chaotic situations that call for 
analytic (system 2) decision making, the more solutions that are carefully examined, the 
more likely that a good/best solution will emerge, but they are also careful to emphasize 
 





that “a good decision ‘in time’ is much better than a ‘perfect decision’ made and executed 
too late.”93  
Kayman and Logar apply the OODA loop model in creation of a Framework for 
Training Public Health Practitioners in Crisis Decision Making. The Kayman and Logar 
framework is aimed at promoting System 2 (analytical) thinking, taking advantage of 
System 1 (intuition), and avoiding some of the pitfalls of heuristics, biases, and traps, 
which were discussed in the previous section of this review. This framework presents a 
deliberative decision model that is primarily rational, but also accepts and incorporates 
intuitive and less-rational cognitive and emotional inputs, recognizing and accounting for 
the role they play in decision making. Kayman and Logar’s framework provides a 
stepwise approach to decision and action in public health crises (but not specifically in 
contamination events), advising decision makers to quickly identify up to three 
alternatives or choices for action using intuition, or a combination of intuition and 
deliberation (depending on the urgency to act). In both urgent and nonurgent decision 
contexts, they emphasize that decision makers need to consider and weigh ethical, legal, 
political, and logistical concerns along with scientific data as part of their choice, asking 
themselves how each alternative does under legal, political, ethical, and logistical 
scrutiny. They also specifically recommend acknowledging and dealing with emotions 
directly instead of repressing them. The authors note that people handle stress in different 
ways, and even experienced leaders can have decisions be derailed by emotional 
reaction.94 Kayman and Logar suggest that failure to consider any of the above categories 
can have serious consequences for the success of the response, and they propose that their 
framework can help decision makers to consider them. 94 Finally, Kayman and Logar 
 





emphasize that documenting how decisions are made as the response unfolds can help 
improve awareness and clarity of thought during a response, and justification afterwards 
if decisions are questioned.94  
Rebera et. al. also discuss the importance of considering legal, political, logistical, 
socioeconomic and especially ethical concerns, in crisis decision making. The authors 
suggest that a crisis decision-making approach should provide a “workable heuristic for 
comparing competing courses of action,” and should include rational justification of any 
decisions.103 With regard specifically to ethical considerations, they acknowledge that in 
a crisis, traditional approaches to weighing ethical principles and values are likely too 
complex and time consuming, and so they propose a simplified approach for use in a 
crisis. They first discuss a consequentialist approach, comparing consequences of courses 
of action and choosing the one that saves the most lives.103 However, Rebera reminds us 
that saving lives is very rarely the only relevant value in a crisis. So, in order to 
incorporate other values, a modified consequentialist approach may be used. In this 
modified approach, courses of action that elevate lifesaving would first be identified, and 
then other core values or “side constraints” are interrogated as a secondary consideration. 
If a course of action violates any of the critical side constraints, that course of action can 
be discarded.103 
Like the OODA loop model/Sensemaking Framework and recognition-primed 
decision model, the Medical Decision Model in Urgent Settings highlights a cyclical 
decision process. In this process, much like Sensemaking in complex or chaotic 
situations, a decision maker starts by acting with an initial intervention, then proceeds to 
gather additional data and consult with others, and loops back to further intervention 
 





based on more-complex data, ultimately to identify a definitive management course.104 
Medical decision making is primarily focused on individual patient care and is largely not 
applicable to population-level decisions. However, the process itself is similar. As part of 
this process, as with population-level decision making, Koerner et al. emphasize that 
having a decision maker and subject matter experts co-located helps with situational 
awareness including both informal and formal exchanges of information and opinions.   
The core processes in public health emergency decision making, as described by 
Parker, et al. in a RAND Corporation report on measuring effective decision making, are 
also part of a continuous loop from establishing situational awareness, action planning to 
mitigate health effects, initial execution, and back to situational awareness.2 In gaining 
situational awareness, the authors emphasize the importance of acknowledging unknowns 
and developing “strategies for reducing uncertainty.”2 As with the OODA loop, the 
Sensemaking Framework, and the Medical Decision Model, this public health emergency 
process focuses on consideration of multiple alternative options (if time allows). In 
addition, Parker et al. suggest that alternatives should be explicitly considered in the 
context of their potential consequences, pros, and cons.2  
Leadership Roles and Decision-Making Structure 
In large public health crises, including significant contamination events, it is often 
an elected official (mayor, governor, or department head) who has the responsibility for 
final response decisions. Political leadership is therefore important in the management of 
large-scale crisis, but these leaders are seldom risk or scientific experts and often require 
the participation of experts in the decision-making process.100 Inglesby, et al. note that 
whoever is ultimately responsible in an emergency, has to have the “legal and moral 
 





authority” to make the necessary decisions, especially when the impacts of protective 
actions are potentially large (as they can be with travel restrictions and evacuation or 
shelter-in-place requirements/recommendations).100(p.66)  
There are a few variations on the possible organization and structure of crisis 
decision making: a decision maker decides for him/herself what course of action is best 
without consulting others in the process–an expedient and potentially effective approach 
in an extremely time-sensitive situation; a decision maker gathers information and advice 
from other sources to inform his/her decision; or a decision-maker delegates or spreads 
out decision-making authority among multiple parties. The literature in this area focuses 
mainly on the latter two options, acknowledging that diversity of inputs and perspectives 
is a priority especially for non-expert decision makers in extremely time-pressured 
situations. 
The Incident Command System (ICS) is one structure that is often used to aid in 
emergency response. It provides a hierarchical structure that identifies a single 
commander and defines each actor’s role in the response.105 Its primary strength is that 
ICS provides a top-down approach in which the commander can control the situation, 
communication flows systematically down to responders, responders’ roles are known 
and can be executed according to a pre-set plan and the incident commander is the one 
who makes decisions.106 Under ICS, the commander needs to understand leadership, but 
is not necessarily a subject matter expert, and commanders must rely on subordinate 
individuals to provide the best information to inform decision making.101,105 However, 
while important decisions can involve a team, the decision authority in ICS ultimately 
lies with the commander.97,102 Higgins and Freedman find that defining decision-making 
 





roles clearly at the start of the crisis, as is done under ICS, may be critical to avoiding 
information overload and making effective decisions. Having a crisis management team 
provide options, but ensuring that the decision maker has the ultimate authority and 
responsibility for deciding on a course of action may be particularly important.102 Yet, 
while ICS has established standard roles for response to a crisis, it provides little 
guidance on how decisions should actually be made by the commander in a crisis.2 
According to Van Santen et al., netcentric (command and control) conditions do not often 
exist in a crisis decision-making context. Instead, decisions are often made in a 
bureaucratic political context where there is not one clear decision maker and many 
different agencies/stakeholders have priorities and opinions.107 
Other approaches to top-down decision making have also been researched and 
applied in emergencies. The RAND Corporation, in their report on measuring decision 
making in public health emergencies, highlights the need for process controls or 
deliberative management of the flow of information and resources. This includes 
managing who is needed as part of the decision-making process, understanding 
authorities and legal restrictions, maintaining focus on timeliness and making decisions, 
and ensuring that multiple perspectives are considered.2 Rosqvist suggests that the 
decision maker should provide the initial scoping and problem definition of the situation, 
determine decision rules (acceptable risk), and be ultimately responsible for making the 
decision once options have been evaluated, while advisors, normative and subject matter 
experts, and stakeholders all have a role in conducting risk assessment, formulating risk 
management options and providing feedback into and about the process.108  
 





Many experts agree that in complex public health crises, there is no one single 
person who has all of the technical expertise and real-time data about the situation, 
sufficient to make a decision without additional input or advice. As with ICS, other top-
down approaches to response involve gathering teams in support of a decision-making 
process.94,96 Research shows that “cognitive diversity” or diversity of thought improves 
decision making, often because it helps mitigate errors and biases.93,109 The more diverse 
the viewpoints are, the better those contributions will be, and the more likely that risks 
and advantages of solutions will be identified.93 Different viewpoints to be incorporated 
in the process are scientific, operational, reputational, psychological and legal 
perspectives, among others.88 In addition, Mirandilla emphasizes that a public relations 
expert should be included not only in the decision-implementation phase, but also in the 
decision-making process itself in order to incorporate public views and values that will 
enable a successful response.90 Importantly though, having too many people in the 
decision-making process can tip the balance toward chaos and confusion, resulting in 
decision-making delays as happened in the Three Mile Island nuclear response.96 
Inglesby et al. recommend that the decision support team should be fairly limited in size, 
as large groups of people without specific knowledge to contribute to the decision-
making process can lead to “inefficiency, indecisiveness, and significant delays in 
action.”100(P.66) In summary, the literature on group-informed decision making in a crisis 
generally recommends a small, but diverse decision-advisory group. 
Another approach to crisis decision making is a distributive decision model, 
where multiple people are responsible for making decisions, not one single individual. In 
a contamination event this might mean that within a team responding to the emergency, 
 





each team member performs a specialized function and makes decisions about that 
function, resulting in decision making being distributed across team members.101 
Particularly in a bureaucratic/politicized environment, this type of decision making may 
be required. In these environments, a top-down decision-making approach may be 
inadequate, because decision makers from multiple agencies or organizations have 
decision-making authority. Instead Van Santen suggests that team effectiveness will be 
better if team members have a shared mental model of the response, shared goals, in 
order to better negotiate the elements of the response.107 Creating a shared mental model 
can take different forms including haggling, cost-benefit analysis, competition (game 
playing), partnership and problem-solving/collaboration to solve a problem. 107Dunn 
suggests that the success of distributive decision making requires a high level of 
interaction, without which it will fail.101 “Optimal performance for distributive decision 
making requires both good taskwork and good teamwork.”101(p.720)  
Risk-Based Decision Making 
Literature in this section of the review is focused on how risk assessment 
information and scientific evidence can be incorporated into the decision-making process 
during a contamination emergency. Most of the literature on risk-based/informed 
decision making does not focus on emergencies, so the purpose of this section of the 
literature review is to extract applicable lessons from past contamination emergencies, 
and from non-emergency decision contexts, and apply them to crisis decisions. Literature 
on risk-based/informed decision making is organized in this review into five sections: 
defining the role of risk-based decision making, risk assessment process, acknowledging 
 





and addressing uncertainty, formulating and weighing options, and modeling and 
decision support tools. 
Defining the Role of Risk-Based Decision Making 
Pollard et al. states that in “risk-informed decisions, we seek to understand the 
significance of a risk, decide whether it requires management and what that might cost, 
and then implement the decision effectively, so reducing risk to an acceptable residual 
level; recognizing that zero risk is not achievable.”109 In contamination emergencies that 
threaten the health of the public, potentially more so than with other emergencies, it is 
important to consider risk-based information in decision making, because without 
scientific data on the contaminant, its effects on human health, the type and levels of 
exposure, and other context-specific factors, decisions-makers cannot effectively 
determine protective courses of action. However, as noted in the crisis decision-making 
literature, there are many factors that have to be considered in making a decision, science 
being only one of them. The role of scientific data and how it should best be utilized can 
be debated. 
Rosella et al. propose that there are three different potential ideologies with 
respect to the role of evidence/data in decision making: evidence-based ideology, which 
puts scientific evidence as central to any decision without reinterpretation by policy-
makers; policy-based ideology, which says that evidence should inform and not dictate 
policy; and pragmatist ideology, which says that science should be a primary, but not the 
only, consideration for decision makers.110 Rosella et al. come to the conclusion that the 
pragmatist ideology is probably the most appropriate, but that policy-makers should 
strive to be transparent in their decision-making processes in order to reassure the public 
 





and other stakeholders that evidence has been carefully considered alongside other 
considerations.110 
Risk-Based Decision Process 
The process of risk assessment and risk-based decision making has been studied 
extensively in a variety of contexts, including financial industry, environmental and 
occupational health, and the nuclear power industry. As a result, the literature reflects 
work that has been done to help standardize and systematize this process. However, 
within the risk-based decision-making literature, there are still very few studies or reports 
focused on public health emergencies involving contamination. Literature on the nuclear 
industry and its preparation for potential radiological emergencies has the most relevance 
to this review because it deals with both contamination and emergency response.84,111,112 
However, this literature is also difficult to extrapolate to other emergency situations 
because, unlike for other hazards, the nuclear industry has developed substantial plans, 
models, and decision support tools that are available to guide decisions in an emergency. 
It is unlikely that in a non-nuclear radiological emergency or other types of 
contamination events that the same level of resources will be in place to help decision 
makers. Despite the lack of an exact contextual match, this review analyzes the literature 
on risk-based decision making to extract elements that should be considered in a 
contamination emergency. 
The risk-based decision literature generally focuses on a decision process 
beginning with a clear definition of the problem, then proceeding to defining options 
through a number of quantitative and qualitative approaches, evaluating options, and 
making and implementing a decision, followed by performance monitoring, and modified 
 





actions as needed.113 Mengersen and Wittle, in their article on “Improving Accuracy and 
Intelligibility of Decisions”, emphasize that “data-based risk assessment is underpinned 
by three critical interacting components: the data used to inform the decisions, the 
statistical methods employed to analyze these data, and the inferences and consequent 
decision making that ensue on the basis of these analyses.”114(p.S15) The 2009 National 
Academy of Sciences, Science and Decisions report, which is focused on human health 
risk assessment for (non-emergency) environmental hazards, lists three phases of risk-
based decision making: scoping the problem, planning and risk assessment, and risk 
management.18,115  
The first phase in risk-based decision making of problem formulation and 
scoping, includes identifying the problem, identifying preliminary options for dealing 
with the problem, and identifying the needed technical assessment approach to evaluate 
risk management options.18 Pollard et al. suggest that this step should also seek to define 
what questions can actually be answered by scientific/risk information and which ones 
cannot.109 Problem formulation should identify what the risk is and to whom, and identify 
the level of residual risk that the decision maker can accept.109 A clear definition of the 
problem is critical. This definition should include both life-saving and health-protection 
goals, but also other goals such as economic stability, ethical goals, public acceptance, 
etc. The more specific a decision maker can be about the goals that need to be met, the 
better risk-informed decisions can be.111 
In defining the problem and setting goals for the response, the literature shows 
that it is important to incorporate an understanding of an affected community’s 
perception of the risk and of acceptable levels of risk. Without this understanding or 
 





involvement of community representatives in the process, the problem definition, risk 
perception, and goals of the response may differ between the decision maker and the 
public.116 When this happens, it is difficult to implement risk-based decisions that require 
the cooperation of the community.117 In many situations, risk management fails because 
the risk-based decisions are unsatisfactory to the community affected by the decision. 
The Red River flood of 1997 in Manitoba is one example where risk perception differed 
among the decision maker and the affected population. In this emergency, the decision 
makers had a higher perception of the risk of flooding, and prioritized life-saving through 
evacuation as the primary protective action, while the affected community perceived a 
higher risk to property than to life and thus prioritized protecting their properties. When 
the government forced evacuation, the public was less than happy or helpful, which 
complicated the response, and may have resulted in lost lives.117 In another example, 
Younger et al. recount risk-based decision making during a river contamination response 
in the UK, and report that despite clear evidence that the water was safe to use, the public 
perceived use of the water as risky because of the unusual color, and would not use it 
until further remediation was conducted.118 According to Amandola et al., this problem 
can be ameliorated by incorporating public views and values throughout the risk-based 
decision process, including early in the process before risk assessment is conducted.116  
Another early step in risk-based decision making is to identify how risks will be 
assessed. In an emergency contamination event, because of the time-pressure involved, 
there will likely be little time to create a comprehensive statistical model, and 
deterministic calculations may be all that can be accomplished before initial risk-
informed management decisions are needed.84,108,115,119 Deterministic calculations are 
 





simple, and can be done quickly, but can also be overly simplistic and may lead to either 
under- or overestimation of risk.113 More-complex risk analyses, such as a fully 
quantitative probabilistic approach, might be more rigorous, but would require much 
more time and available data to conduct – time and data that will likely be unavailable in 
a crisis. It will be important to – decide quickly on an approach and acknowledge its 
strengths and limitations before proceeding, making sure it meets the needs of the 
decision maker in the situation at hand. 
Regardless of the complexity of the analysis, there are a number of standard steps 
identified in the Science and Decisions report that decision makers should consider and 
which require corresponding data or judgment: hazard identification, dose-response 
assessment, exposure assessment, and risk characterization.18 Scientific evidence for each 
of these steps will be of varying quality and availability in a crisis, and decision makers 
may need to evaluate multiple competing theories or lines of evidence.109 Pollard et al. in 
their article on Better Environmental Decision Making, advocate for ranking evidence on 
a numerical or qualitative scale to evaluate the strength of the evidence for risk 
assessment.109 In the event where evidence is severely lacking or decisions are needed 
before evidence can be fully evaluated, it may also be necessary to rely more on 
qualitative information and expert judgment than on hard data. Tony Rosqvist, in his 
dissertation On the Use of Expert Judgment in the Qualification of Risk Assessment, 
posits that expert judgment is needed in every phase of risk assessment and can be 
systematically applied.108 For the hazard identification step Rosqvist notes the importance 
of generating multiple scenarios for consideration, and suggests that can be accomplished 
through a group process and generation of a risk matrix.108 To ensure that the right 
 





hazards have been identified, additional stakeholder review could be incorporated if time 
permits.108 Rosqvist also advises that expert judgment can be elicited from multiple 
people to help with estimating various parameters (e.g., for dose-response and exposure 
assessments) for the risk assessment. If estimates differ among experts, discussion should 
focus on the possible reasons for the differences and attempt to achieve consensus on 
values to be used.108 In characterizing the risk, in the lead-up to decision making, 
Rosqvist recommends incorporating an evaluation of stakeholder perspectives and needs, 
and even seeking stakeholder input if time permits, since stakeholders may provide 
unique socioeconomic, political, and other perspectives that might otherwise be 
missing.108 Finally, Rosqvist recommends independent peer review from people without 
vested interest in the risk assessment for completeness, credibility, transparency, and 
fairness, and to ensure that the decision maker’s initial framing criteria and acceptable 
risk definitions are met.108 
Acknowledging and Addressing Uncertainty 
One recurring theme in the literature on risk-based decision making is the need to 
acknowledge and adjust for uncertainty, both in assessing risk and generating options for 
action. Uncertainty exists in many stages of a risk-based decision process. It may stem 
from inherent gaps in knowledge about a contaminant and lack of information about the 
event itself (e.g., how many people were exposed, when, for how long?) (epistemic 
uncertainty), or simple randomness of the event and changes in trajectory (aleatory 
variability).44 Depending on the situation, some of this uncertainty can be reduced 
through additional data collection and some, like natural variability, cannot.120 Amendola 
suggests that, in addition to epistemic and aleatory uncertainty, “operational uncertainty” 
 





or “human factors” in different stages of risk-based decision making – including the 
definition of the problem, measurement approaches, choice of risk assessment methods, 
and biases – also introduce uncertainty into the process. Like other types of uncertainty, 
operational uncertainty cannot be completely eliminated, but it can potentially be reduced 
through including multiple perspectives in the discussions about risk.116 Johansen et al. 
have also identified “ambiguity” as a potential source or type of uncertainty in risk-
informed decision making. Ambiguity is “the existence of multiple interpretations 
concerning the basis, content, and implications of risk information.”121 Ambiguity may 
also exist in many of the steps and stages of risk-informed decision making, but can be 
reduced through discussions aimed at identifying potential sources and types of 
ambiguity in the process and coming to consensus on definitions, assumptions, and risk-
based conclusions.121 
There are a number of approaches to representing and quantifying uncertainty 
from qualitative to fully quantitative, depending on the time and resources available. But, 
regardless of the method, Su and Tung stress the importance of having an explicit 
approach to identifying and evaluating uncertainty.120 Both Mengerson and Whittle, and 
Dubois and Guyonnet, recommend recording where uncertainty in risk assessment values 
exists and making that an explicit consideration when weighing and comparing options 
for risk management.114,122 Even when sufficient time or resources are not available to 
conduct a quantitative risk assessment incorporating measures of uncertainty, it is still 
important to ask questions like “What do I know and not know?” and “How might risk 
change in different populations, geographic areas, and over time?”122 
 
 





Formulating and Weighing Options  
Once risk assessment has been accomplished and risks and uncertainties are 
identified, decision makers will need to formulate and evaluate risk management options 
or protective action recommendations. Introducing some method of weighing options 
against one another can help counter and minimize unhelpful biases and heuristics and 
enable incorporation of relevant information to make a better decision.84,123,124 Su and 
Tung emphasize that when decision makers are evaluating different uncertain courses of 
action, it is important that the projected outcomes of those courses of action correlate 
with the initial problem scoping and definition of acceptable risk by the decision 
maker.120 The literature shows that analysis of different alternatives can be optimized if 
each option is evaluated for how it meets the original objectives.113 If a risk management 
option does not meet original objectives, it may not be a viable option and should be 
considered carefully. 120 Su and Tung specifically point out that in evaluating risk 
management options, the consequences that are expected to follow a decision need to be 
explicitly identified and discussed in order to anticipate different scenarios and optimize 
decisions.120 As part of that consequence evaluation, Dombroski and Fischbeck stress that 
public behaviors and reactions to decisions should be seriously considered. If risk 
management options do not take realities of population density, transit behaviors, etc., 
into account they may result in increased and not decreased risk.125 
One structured approach to comparing risk management options, based on the 
initially identified goals of risk-based decision making in the emergency situation, is 
Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA). MCDA allows decision makers to weigh 
the positive and negative impacts of each potential decision alternative. It also provides a 
 





way to document the decision-making process should there be questions about it in the 
future.84 MCDA is typically conducted using statistical analysis and computer modeling, 
which may be impossible during a crisis, but the principles of listing options/scenarios, 
weighting decision criteria, and comparing among multiple options can still be applied in 
a simplified way during a crisis.111,112,126,127 Part of the MCDA approach is to create a 
value tree listing the key considerations (e.g., lifesaving, economic, ethical, political) and 
goals of the response and then displaying how many values are met by each decision 
option to allow for comparison between options. Such a tree can be constructed and 
modified quickly in an emergency, and provides decision makers with a systematic way 
to compare options.84,111 Another similar approach to option comparison is the 
application of Operational Risk Management (ORM), which is used in the US military. 
Under ORM, a decision maker identifies threats and vulnerabilities and then conducts a 
“criticality assessment” to understand whether a risk management option or course of 
action (COA) meets the threshold of acceptable risk as defined by a commander.128 
Overall, evaluation and comparison of different risk management options is encouraged 
in the literature, whether through a simple mental comparison by a decision maker, using 
checklists, systematic pairwise comparison, decision trees, or more-complex and time-
consuming methods.122,129 
Regardless of how a decision maker determines risk or what response alternatives 
are identified, the literature shows that it is important to take public risk perception into 
account when making decisions for risk management. Slovic and Weber’s research on 
risk perception in extreme events shows that public risk perception will differ depending 
on the familiarity and “dread factor” associated with the hazard. If a hazard is more 
 





unknown and dreaded, the public will expect a stronger response to mitigate the risk. If 
the risk management measures chosen do not match public risk perception, there is a 
danger that the population will not follow recommended actions.98 The Science and 
Decisions framework specifies that stakeholder involvement is essential in each phase,18 
and Hamalainan et al. re-emphasize the importance of taking values and risk perception 
of the public into account when developing risk management options.84 This tenet is also 
promoted by Ken Sexton, who proposes three main benefits to involving the 
public/stakeholders in all phases of risk-based decision making: 1) it promotes 
stakeholder buy in and acceptance of management options; 2) helps incorporate 
stakeholder/public knowledge of the situation; and 3) promotes the social value of 
environmental democracy that treats stakeholders as equal partners in decision making.130  
Modeling and Decision Support Tools 
Much of the literature incorporated in this review was primarily focused on 
development and use of mathematical models and decision-support tools for risk analysis. 
A number of mathematical modeling approaches, when applied appropriately – mainly in 
non-emergency contexts – have been shown to improve decision making, through 
integration and analysis of large amounts of data and statistical analysis to guide decision 
making.89 However, access to modeling tools may not be available or applicable to an 
emergency where a state or local leader will need to make rapid decisions. 83The nuclear 
industry probably has the most extensively developed models for prediction, response, 
and decision-support in an emergency contamination event.112,131 Even so, many of these 
models are intended for use more as planning than response tools and they often 
presuppose the availability of large amounts of data on contaminants, the amount and 
 





concentration released, and levels of human exposure, among other assumptions. In the 
early hours of any type of contamination emergency, it is unlikely that these data will be 
available to the extent where models could be confidently run, and meet the unique 
challenges of an emergency response.112 It has also been shown that the complexity of 
some of these models and decision-support tools creates overconfidence in decision 
makers, which may lead to false assumptions and poor decisions in early emergency 
phases. These tools may not fully convey the imprecision of the data, or communicate the 
uncertainty of the situation.91,112 This is not to say that there will never be tools that can 
be helpful in emergency contamination events. However, for the purposes of this review, 
it was determined that prioritization of decision speed will likely preclude use of complex 
computational models and decision support tools, at least in the early crisis period. 
Conclusions 
This review of the crisis and risk-based decision-making literature serves to bring 
together two separate perspectives on response and decision making: crisis decision 
literature, which is largely focused on making decisions quickly; and risk-based decision 
literature, which prioritizes incorporating evidence and rigor into decision making. 
Through this review it is clear that a body of work focused specifically on contamination 
emergencies, which require both timely and evidence-informed decisions, is largely 
absent. However, findings from this review can be extracted to inform future research in 
this area. 
Findings from the crisis decision literature show that initial intuition, followed by 
rational interrogation of an emergency situation, is a promising two-step approach to 
improving the quality of decisions; that analysis of the situation can help mitigate typical 
 





cognitive biases and traps; that having a primary decision maker supported by a small-
yet-diverse group of advisors can improve decision making while avoiding chaos; that 
many types of information, including scientific, ethical, legal, social, economic, and 
logistical inputs should be considered; and that decision making works best in a cycle that 
involves data collection and analysis, decision, action, and further data collection and 
refinement. 
Findings from the risk-based decision literature show that scientific data are not 
and cannot be the only drivers of decision making; that a process of problem formulation, 
risk analysis, and risk management can be applied, even when time is short; that it is 
important to clearly define the problem at hand, acceptable risk, and goals of the response 
at the outset of the decision process; that a risk assessment approach should be carefully 
chosen to match situation needs; that uncertainty should be acknowledged and accounted 
for in both the risk assessment and options analysis phases; that a systematic approach to 
comparing options for action should be used, even if it is simple and quick; and that 
public risk perception and levels of acceptable risk should be expressly considered 
throughout the decision-making process. 
With these findings in mind, it would be beneficial to future decision makers 
responding to contamination emergencies to have a framework that incorporates the 
important and influential factors from the crisis and risk-based decision-making fields. 
Currently, leaders in the position to make life and death decisions in response to 
contamination emergencies have little guidance or decision support to inform their 
process. Future research should focus on providing tools that can enable leaders to make 
rapid, yet maximally protective, decisions in contamination emergencies. These findings 
 





show that multiple relevant frameworks exist, which could be beneficial to future 
decision makers responding to contamination emergencies. Future research should focus 
on tools that can enable leaders faced with contamination emergencies to make protective 
















Crisis Decision Making in Major Contamination Emergencies: Developing 
Guidance for Mayors and Governors 
  
 






Objective: Guidance for mayors and governors on decision making during the 
acute crisis period of a contamination emergency is not currently available. Without such 
guidance, political leaders responsible for decision making in large contamination 
emergencies may not make decisions that are optimized to protect public health, while 
also being, feasible, ethical, and politically possible. This research is aimed at defining 
the key elements that should be included in decision-making guidance, and proposing a 
framework that can be used to inform creation of such guidance. 
Methods: Semi-structured interviews with subject matter experts in risk and crisis 
decision making, and practitioners, were conducted from September 2016–January 2017. 
Interviews were not for attribution, but were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed for 
common themes and key elements to include in a decision-making framework. 
Findings and Discussion: Interviewees discussed common elements of decision 
making in a public health crisis due to contamination events, including the structures and 
processes that support decision making, key considerations that should be incorporated 
into protective action decisions, and the importance of good communication practices. 
Conclusions: The framework proposed in this research, informed by the literature 
and subject matter expert input, is intended as a first step on a path to developing 
guidance that can be provided to decision makers and used in future emergencies to 










Acute environmental contamination events involving chemical, biological or 
radiological materials occur frequently in the U.S. and around the world. While there is 
no comprehensive accounting of the overall numbers and types of these events globally, 
it is clear that small events such as occupational chemical spills or exposures to 
petroleum products happen nearly every day and are handled routinely by first 
responders, environmental health officials, and public health officials. According to the 
U.S. Department of Transportation, hazardous materials incidents during material 
transport numbered over 10,000 in 2016 alone.132 A majority of these events involve low 
levels of contamination or limited human exposure and are managed quickly and not 
publicized widely. While they can be complex and are sometimes characterized by 
uncertainty, these relatively circumscribed contamination events can generally be 
managed through existing response structures and resources available to guide responders 
at the scene.  
Yet, there are some contamination emergencies that go beyond the authority or 
capability of first responders and local emergency managers to adequately assess, 
contain, and remediate because of the potential for serious and/or widespread public 
health impacts. When these emergencies happen, decisions about protective action are 
often needed very quickly (within hours or a few days) to prevent acute harm as well as 
to reduce long-term impacts on people who are exposed. In such major contamination 
emergencies, decisions are made more complicated by amplified social, ethical, and 
political repercussions. Many times, these responses rise to the executive level of a 
 





jurisdiction, where a mayor or governor becomes involved and takes the lead as decision 
maker. 
While the exact triggering mechanisms of senior political involvement in crisis 
response are not clear-cut, history shows that in major emergencies responsibility for 
protective action decisions moves to the political level. Examples include the 2014 
MCHM chemical spill in West Virginia;133 radiological releases from the Three Mile 
Island nuclear generating station in Pennsylvania in 1979 134 and the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear power facility in Japan in 2011;135 and the 2014 decontamination response to a 
case of Ebola in New York City, and the resulting New Jersey quarantine of an Ebola 
nurse returning from West Africa;136 in addition to other large or high profile chemical, 
radiological and biological contamination emergencies. In these major emergencies, 
mayors and governors have the responsibility to protect the health of their constituents. In 
these emergencies, too, the response is publicized much more widely, resulting in greater 
interest and scrutiny by the public, activist organizations (especially environmental 
groups), and politicians. As a result, a political leader will be “on the hook” if response is 
unsuccessful. Therefore, it follows that if they have responsibility and accountability for 
the outcome of a response, they are more likely to assert their authority as decision 
maker. 
Some might argue that there is an abundance of resources to support response to 
contamination emergencies. For example, the widely-implemented incident command 
system (ICS), along with National Incident Management System (NIMS) training 
modules and tools, provides a well-defined, scalable, and flexible scaffold on which to 
organize response to these incidents. But, what is not addressed by ICS, NIMS, or other 
 





similar resources is how to approach the actual decision-making process during these 
events. NIMS focuses on facilitating “command, operations, planning, logistics, 
intelligence and investigations, and finance and administration,”137 but not decision 
making. 
The absence of decision-making guidance for contamination emergencies is 
generally reflective of the absence of research in this area. Separate bodies of literature 
exist on crisis decision making, and on human health risk assessment and risk-based 
decision making in non-emergency periods, but there has been little focus on where the 
two meet: crisis decision making specifically in contamination emergencies. One 
exception to this is the literature on emergency response to nuclear accidents like Three 
Mile Island. These accidents galvanized a major focus on building decision support and 
modeling tools to enable rapid characterization of a radiological hazard and support 
tradeoff analysis between options for action.134 Yet, lessons from these events have not 
been broadly applied to development of decision-making guidance outside of the very 
specific context of the nuclear power industry.  
There are a number of other disparate areas of study and topics in the literature 
that together can be applied to crisis decision making in major contamination 
emergencies. Literature on decision science that focuses on the cognitive factors affecting 
decision making is one key area that can inform this work. Daniel Kahneman, in his work 
with Amos Tversky, described the intuitive and analytical systems that comprise human 
judgment, defining the fundamental ways that we as people make decisions and the 
biases and heuristics that govern our reasoning.46 Other scholars like Paul Slovic have 
contributed significantly to this work, applying it to crisis decision making and 
 





suggesting ways to both harness our natural intuitive processes, and also mitigate the 
impacts of bias and heuristics.92 Findings from this research suggest that harnessing 
intuition, followed by analysis of that intuition, along with input from a diverse set of 
viewpoints can limit error in decision making and counter biases and heuristics, making 
judgment more accurate. 
John Boyd’s work in developing the OODA loop model (Observation, 
Orientation, Decision, Action, looping back to Observation),53 and similar frameworks, 
such as the Medical Management Model described by Koerner et al. in the context of 
radiological emergencies,104 provide the theoretical structure for a process of decision 
making that can be applied to contamination emergencies. Moving through the phases 
described in these models, even briefly, can enable clearer thinking and consideration of 
the situation and available options. 
In the area of risk assessment, the Science and Decisions report from the National 
Academy of Sciences outlines the key phases of risk assessment including scoping the 
problem, planning and risk assessment, and risk management, as well as the specific steps 
in carrying out human health risk assessment and approaches to acknowledging and 
addressing uncertainty.18 This framework can be incorporated in an abbreviated way into 
contamination emergency response, to improve the fidelity of the risk information 
guiding decisions. 
Finally, the risk-based decision literature focuses largely on developing options 
for action based on risk information. While much of this literature is intended for non-
emergency periods, the fundamental concepts of defining goals and objectives, 
developing action options, and comparing between options to find the one that enables 
 





the most desirable outcome, can be incorporated into emergency contamination decision 
guidance.84,111 This process also serves to enable more careful deliberation to mitigate 
decision errors. 
In summary, guidance for mayors and governors on decision making for 
contamination events is not currently available, and does not have a directly applicable 
basis in the literature. However, there are findings from the literature that can be tied 
together to inform development of guidance for mayors and governors faced with 
uncertain decisions in these emergency circumstances.  
Guidance developed by Kayman and Logar, which provides considerations for 
public health officials responding to health emergencies more broadly, is an important 
place from which to start.94 Their framework provides a theoretical basis and begins to 
outline the concrete steps that a public health official should take to make decisions in an 
emergency. While not perfectly applicable to contamination events, this framework can 
be adapted and expanded to include contamination emergency-specific elements, account 
for the risk assessment and data needs of these emergencies, be applied directly to 
mayors and governors, and be made to be user friendly in a crisis environment. 
Given the above elements of the crisis and risk assessment literature, and the 
guidance developed by Kayman and Logar,94 we sought to build on this existing body of 
knowledge by obtaining additional information and opinions from experts regarding the 
key considerations, processes, and structures that are needed to support decision making 
in contamination emergencies. This study presents findings from and analysis of 
interviews conducted with experts both in the theory of decision and risk assessment 
science, as well as practitioners who have been involved in responses to major 
 





contamination emergencies. Themes from these interviews are summarized in the 
Findings section of this paper and are then distilled into a proposed preliminary 
framework, which can inform future development of guidance aimed at mayors and 
governors for use in response to major contamination emergencies. 
Methods 
Interview Guide Development 
We first developed a semi-structured interview guide, based on findings from an 
integrative literature review, which identified major themes and decision elements that 
are important for contamination emergency decision making. Key domains for the 
interview guide included structures supporting decision making, decision-making 
process, and key considerations for decisions. 
The interview guide was reviewed by multiple risk assessment, emergency 
management, and public health preparedness and response experts prior to its fielding, 
and was revised based on expert feedback. The guide was then piloted with an emergency 
management official with experience in contamination emergency response, and was 
subsequently revised based on feedback from that pilot interview. 
Selection and Recruitment of Interview Participants 
Interview subjects were identified first from an integrative literature review, 
which led to both researchers who are prominent thinkers in the areas of crisis and risk-
based decision making, and practitioners with significant experience with public health 
emergency and contamination emergency responses. Additional interviewees were 
identified through snowball sampling via suggestions from other interview participants. 
 





In particular, interviewees were sought who had relevant expertise or experience with 
decision making by political leaders in major contamination emergencies. Potential 
interviewees were excluded if they had no expertise or experience with decision making 
in crises, or no knowledge or experience that could be applied to contamination 
emergencies.  
Data Collection and Analysis 
Semi-structured interviews with selected participants were conducted over the 
phone and via Skype from September 2016–January 2017. Interviews were recorded with 
permission of participants and were transcribed verbatim to ensure maximal accuracy. 
Interviews were not for attribution. During the interviews, key observations and points 
were recorded to capture immediate impressions and important points.  
Themes were derived from the interviews using a combination of inductive and 
deductive approaches. A priori themes were identified first from the previously 
conducted integrative literature review, and based on the interview guide. Further themes 
were identified and added as the transcripts were coded (Table 10). Interview transcripts 
were coded based on identified themes using QSR NVivo for Mac v10.3.2. 62 Peer 
debriefing with an impartial party who had expertise in the topic was conducted during 
the data analysis phase to aid in identifying themes, analyzing coded findings, and 
developing the draft framework.63 
A Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Institutional Review Board 
determined this study was not human subjects research and was therefore exempt 
(Appendix 2). 
 







Of the 32 individuals contacted for this study, 20 responded, and 16 were 
interviewed, with one exclusion and three individuals unable to schedule an interview 
during the study timeline – resulting in a response rate of 50%. Interviews were 
conducted with researchers (n=5), practitioners (n=5), and individuals who classified 
themselves as both researchers and practitioners (n=6). Affiliations represented included 
academic institutions (n=4), national laboratories (n=2), federal government (n=5), and 
state/local government (n=5). Expertise and focus of interviewees included toxicology 
(n=2), decision science (n=3), environmental health (n=2), emergency management 
(n=2), and public health preparedness and response (n=7) (Tables 11 and 12). 
Interviewees answered questions about decision-making structure, key 
considerations in decision making, and the decision making process during contamination 
emergencies to inform development of a framework that can guide decision making in 
future emergencies. Interviews focused on the key considerations that are important for 
political-level decision makers in a contamination event that is highly uncertain and time 
pressured. 
Structure Supporting Decision Making 
Organizational Structure for Response 
All 16 interviewees discussed the organizational structure needed to support the 
decision maker in a contamination emergency, most noting that having a reliable 
structure is important to supporting quality decisions. The Incident Command System 
 





(ICS) was the structure mentioned most often during these discussions. Merits of ICS 
mentioned by interviewees included that it is an established and well-exercised 
hierarchical approach to response; provides clear protocols and roles for the response 
team; establishes a chain of command with an incident commander in charge; and is 
flexible enough to scale for many types and sizes of emergencies. 
 
“I grew up with ICS in the fire service obviously, so we have always used that 
structure, which is, you know there is very clear cut language and documentation 
on how you set that up, and we do that every time.” – Interviewee #16 
 
Some interviewees felt that ICS was sufficient to support decision making in and 
of itself, while other interviewees felt that ICS was important but not sufficient to guide 
the decision-making process during a major contamination emergency. Interviewees with 
this view expressed that a highly uncertain and rapidly unfolding contamination 
emergency requires a greater degree of expert/advisory input directly to the decision 
maker very early in the unfolding response.  
 
“I think there has to be some kind of way that it's easy for incident commanders to 
be able to solicit and get good feedback…In truth, from the local perspective 
there's just this massive confusion of different voices that are coming at them in 
the moment, and there's a tendency (an understandable one) to feel like ‘oh my 
God, I'm in charge, what am I going to do?’ and just kind of wing it in the best 
way that they can.” - Interviewee #14 
 
Decision Responsibility 
In the interviews, 11 of the 16 participants discussed the issue of responsibility for 
making early protective action decisions in a contamination emergency that rises to the 
political level. Many interviewees discussed group decision making as an important 
approach, particularly because “most elected officials don't come to the position with that 
 





kind of [decision making] experience,” and “when you get to the decision maker at the 
political level…that decision maker doesn't necessarily have the technical knowledge to 
make sound technical decisions.” – Interviewee #5 
Yet, as the interviews unfolded, even the participants who suggested group 
decision making tended to clarify their position in favor of a single decision maker 
supported by a group of trusted and knowledgeable advisors. All interviewees who 
discussed the topic of decision responsibility expressed the desire to have “those with 
expert knowledge drive the decisions (Interviewee #12),” and many suggested that a 
small group of individuals with expertise should advise the mayor or governor (or other 
decision maker), but noted that ultimately it comes down to a single individual to make 
protective action decisions and be responsible for them. 
 
“I think societally we have evolved in working together and trying to make 
decisions together. But, ultimately it still comes down to who is the responsible 
person who is going to make the call? And, sometimes that's the most difficult 
thing.” – Interviewee #4 
 
“There needs to be a recognition that there is a pecking order, that there is a 
hierarchy, and that ultimately somebody is in charge.” – Interviewee #2 
 
Overall, participants suggested that, particularly early in the decision making 
cycle, a small group of advisors, gathered quickly, is needed to support a political leader 
in making quality decisions. 
 
“I think you've just got to find good folks to inform your decision. You have to have 
reached out to enough folks to have the buy in and create others that will support 
your decision publicly. So, you're not standing alone in it.” – Interviewee #7 
 
 





Then, the decision maker is responsible for “listening to a large number of people 
and getting as much as you can. But, ultimately having to make a call (Interviewee #3)”  
Advisors to the Decision Maker 
There was a general consensus among interviewees that a group of advisors 
should be quickly formed to aid in decision making – 15 of 16 interviewees discussed the 
composition of this advisory body. 
Interviewees discussed both the need to have trusted advisors who are familiar and 
close to the decision maker, as well as the need to have outside subject matter experts and 
advisors with differing viewpoints who may not be familiar or have not yet built trust 
with the decision maker. Most interviewees who discussed this point felt that both 
familiarity and expertise are important as attributes of an advisor. A number of 
interviewees suggested that decision makers first look to their existing trusted advisors, 
whom they rely on regularly to provide input, but then also look to outside experts who 
can fill knowledge gaps. 
 
“I would pretty quickly turn to my agency expertise in terms of epidemiology 
office, environmental health office. Then I would also turn to partner expertise.” 
– Interviewee #7 
 
“So, you've got your pools of experts doing their work internally, as well as 
talking to other pools of experts that have a slightly different focus.” – 
Interviewee #6 
 
“[K]nowing your team is so critically important…not just the obvious things that 









Interviewees noted the variety of experts that should be included in this early 
advisory body. First and foremost, there was a general feeling that decision makers 
needed, maybe more in contamination emergencies than in other public health 
emergencies, subject matter expert input to the decision process. One interviewee was 
emphatic about this point, saying, “…[decision makers] are pretty much guaranteed to 
make the wrong decision unless you have an expert panel (Interviewee #11).”  
Many interviewees explicitly addressed the federal role in advising decision 
makers in contamination emergencies. One interviewee noted that “Federal expertise 
was always really welcomed and appreciated,” and in the real world events discussed 
during the interviews, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Agency 
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) Emergency Response Teams was 
cited as a significant asset particularly in the early decision making and response phases 
of an emergency. ATSDR and other federal partners were discussed as providing trusted 
scientific and risk assessment expertise that could be counted upon by decision makers 
and should be utilized to the extent possible during early protective action decision 
making.  
In addition to scientific expertise, interviewees noted that other advisory roles are 
also key to the response.  
 
“I think what's important is, you have to understand the political aspects of things 
and who you're dealing with, but you also need the science, you need the law and 
who has regulatory authority in order to formulate a response, and then you also 
need the boots on the ground capacity to get out there and do things. It seems to 
be universal, whether it's Ebola waste in Manhattan or Texas, or whether it's 
Flint, or Gold King Mine, or a pesticide spill.” – Interviewee #4 
 
 





One specific advisory role mentioned by a number of interviewees was that of a 
public advocate or representative, which is needed both for the purpose of gaining 
situational awareness and for engaging with the public to ensure a successful response to 
protective action decisions. Most interviewees felt that it would be “hard to bring the 
public in in the midst of a crisis situation (Interviewee #2)” but that, decision makers 
“need the community to buy into what [they] are saying, and if they don't do that, things 
can be much more complicated then they have to be. So, making sure that [they] have 
community engagement (Interviewee #3)” is important. 
One point that was made in a number of interviews was that the decision maker 
needs to be aware of the incentives and motivations of the people included as advisors in 
the initial decision-making process. Interviewees mentioned, when discussing a number 
of different contamination emergencies, that often the company or entity responsible for 
(or the cause of) a contamination event has the most data about the contaminant itself, 
and is therefore relied upon in early decision making to supply data and risk assessment 
information. Interviewees cautioned that this expertise could come with competing 
incentives to protect a company’s interests above that of the health of the public, and 
should thus be taken and used with caution and awareness of potential conflicts of 
interest.  
Overall, interviewees felt that “it's all about the right combination of people, with 
an understanding of the components that go into these decisions (Interviewee #4),” as 
well as the quality and perspectives of those advisors.  
 
“The most important thing is to have qualified people at every level responding 
and understanding.” – Interviewee #4 
 






“The unique characteristics that I've seen first for good advisors is they also have 
a breadth of knowledge and a breadth of experience.” – Interviewee #6 
 
Key Considerations in Decision Making 
Related to the composition of the advisory body for decision makers are the key 
considerations or types of information that should be incorporated into early protective 
action decision making. Interviewees recognized a number of factors that will need to be 
considered. 
 
“[T]here are a lot of different aspects of that decision making that need to be 
taken into account. Whether it's jurisdiction or whether it's the question of the risk 
management options that are available, the kinds of issues that decision makers 
have to have or have to make, are going to be including that science, but not 
necessarily driven by it.” – Interviewee #15 
 
Cognitive Factors in Decision Making 
Both practitioners and policy makers who interviewed for this study, but 
particularly experts in decision science, emphasized the importance of cognitive factors 
in time-pressured crisis decision making. Interviewees discussed a number of cognitive 
biases and heuristics in human decision making that could affect the quality of decisions 
in an emergency situation and ways to combat them. 
Interviewees characterized the decision environment in a contamination 
emergency as chaotic, saying that as a decision maker, “you're stressed, you're amped up 
a little bit, a little scared, you are kind of in the dark, you don't understand the whole 
incident yet (Interviewee #16).”  
 





One expert noted that, “in none of the emergency response literature do people 
talk about feelings (Interviewee #13).” However, “most of the time we as decision 
makers are reacting to risk through our gut feelings (Interviewee #10),” especially in 
such uncertain situations. However, without extensive prior experience to inform those 
feelings, they might be inaccurate.  
Interviewees felt that “really any of the classic cognitive biases that exist might 
limit the effectiveness of a decision maker's role (Interviewee #2).” But they also 
suggested that, “in the moment of instant decision making…there's probably only a 
handful that [decision makers] need to be fully conscious of and concerned [about] 
(Interviewee #12),” including confirmation bias, relationship bias, the escalating 
commitment heuristic, and the prominence effect: 
 
“I think confirmation bias is a big issue…I think if a decision maker gets very 
comfortable seeking out say one expert's opinion, any flaws that are in that 
particular expert, or maybe even a small subgroup of experts around that 
decision maker, it's going to trickle down.” – Interviewee #2 
 
“Relationship bias. I tend to listen to and believe people that I know well, and 
tend not to listen to and dismiss information from people given to me that I don't 
know well.” – Interviewee #12 
 
Escalating commitment: “You'll always be in the mode of assessment and never to 
the point of a triggered decision, because ‘I just need a little bit more information, 
a little bit more information,’ and then you get to the point where you have 
this…’analysis paralysis’.” – Interviewee #12 
 
Prominence effect: “there's often a bias toward actions that will be more 
politically defensible.” Those actions may violate basic values such as life-saving, 
but decision makers “may not even be aware of how much they're being 
influenced by the defensibility of the decision, as opposed to the intrinsic values at 
stake.” – Interviewee #10 
 
 





Interviewees suggested, the best way “to overcome a bias is to realize ‘I 
potentially have this bias’ (Interviewee #12),” then take actions to interrogate intuition 
and feelings in order to counter potential biases and unhelpful heuristics. Broadly, 
interviewees suggested that having a process in place that incorporates a variety of 
opinions and viewpoints and enables careful analysis of the situation and options for 
action could help mitigate these cognitive factors that may derail decision making. The 
extent to which this is possible will depend on the nature of the emergency, but can still 
be implemented to some degree even in time-pressured situations.  
Time Pressure and Need to Act 
Interviewees discussed a number of acute contamination emergencies in which 
there was “considerable time pressure through the whole situation (Interviewee #1).” As 
a result, interviewees noted that one of the first considerations by decision makers should 
be to get a rapid understanding of the urgency to act, “to assess how long can I put off 
making this decision so that I can gather more information in the meantime? What's the 
critical time when it has to be made (Interviewee #5)?”  
One part of that consideration should be for a decision maker to ask him/herself, 
"do I have time to consult with other experts to find out [more] (Interviewee #10)?" If 
there is time–and interviewees suggested that in many large-scale contamination events 
there is at least some time to gather more information–then, consultation still needs to 
“happen relatively fluidly and relatively informally,” without too much delay waiting “to 
form the committee of sages in order to get to some of these early decisions (Interviewee 
#6).” 
 





Interviewees cautioned that waiting for perfect information or perfect council can 
lead to “analysis paralysis” where decision makers seek better and better information and 
are unable to make a decision. One interviewee noted that “whatever data that policy 
makers are getting is outdated, almost invariably. Until you get to the incident 
stabilization, where things are not changing, generally the information is outdated 
(Interviewee #8).” Two interviewees noted explicitly that delaying a decision in search of 
more information and fidelity constitutes “a decision in and of itself, and that decision 
will have consequences (Interviewee #6).” 
Interviewees generally agreed that information will never be perfect in an 
emergency response and that a decision maker needs to make an explicit judgment about 
what level of information completeness they are willing to act upon. Interviewees 
suggested that might be at 30% of desired information (in very time-pressured situations 
with high levels of risk), up to 80% of information desired (in emergencies with lower 
acute risks and thus less time pressure to act), but that it will never be 100%. 
Scientific Data and Risk Assessment Findings 
Interviewees all agreed that data on the contaminant and risk assessment 
information were critical to decision making in a contamination emergency. Interviewees 
noted that gathering information about the hazard and the extent and level of 
contamination (hazard identification and exposure assessment) are some of the first steps 
a leader should take. “First is the science - gathering whatever information we can that 
we have available, but recognizing that's often not sufficient nor perfect, but doing 
everything we can to canvas what do we know (Interviewee #7).” This is followed by an 
 





assessment of what those data mean for public health, understanding the dose response 
relationship in humans and characterizing the health risks. 
 
“One of the first and foremost factors needs to be obviously the risk involved. 
How much risk are we talking about? Who's potentially exposed? Really getting a 
very quick assessment…just a realistic assessment of how much risk there is, and 
are we talking about life or death, or are we talking about injuries as opposed to 
mortality? And also of course, the extent of that.” – Interviewee #2 
  
“You'll need best estimates of expected harm, and associated uncertainty. That's 
the key focus that I would say is required in order to make meaningful triage 
decisions.” – Interviewee #11 
 
Interviewees discussed the need to gather as much data as possible, while still 
balancing the need to act quickly. “I think you have to act fast, but you have to gather as 
much information as you can to be able to do that…but you don't want to act too hastily 
that you miss something big (Interviewee #1).” In addition, multiple interviewees 
stressed that while acute health effects may be the primary drivers of decision making, 
long term health effects caused by low levels of exposure should also be considered and 
weighed. 
 
“You have to consider the range of [health effects] whether they're acute or 
chronic…The more chronic effects are not going to be as prominent in your 
concern at the initial stages, but they might be at later stages.” – Interviewee #3 
 
Uncertainty 
Seven of the 16 interviewees addressed the need to consider uncertainty explicitly 
in any decisions that are made during a contamination emergency. Uncertainty will be 
present in many aspects of the decision-making process, including in the data about the 
contaminant and levels of exposure, in the data about human health effects, in the 
 





demographic data about who’s impacted and to what level, in the information about how 
the public responds, etc. 
Interviewees stressed that acknowledging and addressing these uncertainties is 
critical for a successful response, but they also noted that it is not an easy thing to do. 
 
“I will tell you that in public health this has been a particular challenge because, 
normally in our day to day operations…we don't [put out any guidance] until we 
are really certain, until we've conducted studies or have access to other people's 
studies where their data have been gathered and analyzed, [and] the results show 
a degree of statistical certainty above the 0.05 confidence level. Now you get into 
an emergent situation and you're telling people to stand that paradigm on its head 
and make decisions based on incomplete information. It's really hard for folks, 
because we're telling them to do something that goes against the grain that we 
have engrained in them.” – Interviewee #5 
 
“It really takes a special person to be able to execute with so much unknown and 
oftentimes with so much potential consequence that can result from the unknown 
parts of that decision process.” – Interviewee #12 
 
Decision makers will need to “do the best [they] can with what [they] have 
(Interviewee #9), and be clear about "what we do know…what we can know and…what 
we cannot know, (Interviewee #6)" and then work to reduce uncertainty where possible in 
the time allowed. 
Information about the Affected Population 
Knowledge of the demographics, needs, population dynamics, attitudes, and trust 
of the people affected by a contamination emergency is critical to the success of 
protective actions.  
 
“I think once [risk] is kind of understood, or at least a little bit of knowledge is 
built up around that, then you have to start looking at the actual affected 
population. You've got to start paying attention to the factors involved in that 
 





particular population of people that might be acutely affected by this.” – 
Interviewee #2 
 
It is important for a decision maker to consider how the public might implement 
any decisions. One factor to consider is “simply understanding where the affected 
population is…and how that might end up impacting their compliance with a particular 
decision or a particular order.” Once a protective action order is given, “how is the 
public going to process it and how are they going to execute it?” For example, “If you 
want people to evacuate, but you are dealing with a population that can't necessarily 
evacuate that easily, then you've got to be able to provide those services or an alternative 
that will be successful (Interviewee #2).” This might differ among communities in an 
affected population. 
Interviewees also discussed public risk perception and levels of acceptable risk, 
which will also differ among communities. In particular, communities that have existing 
experience with disasters or have felt the impact of “environmental abuses” in the past 
may have different perceptions of the risk than other communities when an emergency 
occurs. Populations with lower trust in government may also respond differently to 
protective action recommendations. These factors, if not considered early in decision 
making, can result in a failure to protect significant parts of the population at risk. 
Relatedly, interviewees discussed the need to consider vulnerable populations at 
the very beginning of a decision making process. Multiple interviewees noted that 
decision makers have often failed to take vulnerable populations into consideration in the 
early response to contamination emergencies. 
 






“We have to make sure that they consider sensitive populations. Time and time 
again, you find that people don't consider things like pregnant women or nursing 
mothers.” – Interviewee #3 
 
“What about our access and functional needs group? I think about all of those 
folks and that's how I try to make my decisions.” – Interviewee #16 
 
One interviewee suggested that public health services, social services, and mental 
health issues need to be better integrated into the decision-making process, “build[ing] 
that in as early in the process as possible (Interviewee #14).” 
 
Ethics and Values 
Some interviewees raised the issue of ethical considerations in decision making 
during a contamination emergency. One interviewee noted that “there's ethics in virtually 
every aspect of [response],” but that “we need people more trained in ethics” involved in 
decision making (Interviewee #4). 
While some interviewees felt that there was not time to consult ethicists or fully 
consider ethical principles in a time-pressured emergency context, two interviewees 
noted that this consideration could be made quickly, but explicitly, as part of a decision-
maker’s initial process. 
 
“We sat down, and before we made any decisions, just outlined collectively what 
our ethical principles were. What were the core principles that we wanted to hold 
true to as much as we could?” – Interviewee #7 
 
“[I]f I think about the people we are trying to take care of, what's best for them, 
not what's best for me or my team, then generally that's the right decision. It 
makes decision making, as complex as it can be…a lot easier. It gives you some 
sense of stability going into the thing.” – Interviewee #16 
 






Legal and Regulatory Environment 
Two of the 16 interviewees mentioned legal and regulatory considerations as 
important in an emergency response. One interviewee noted that decisions oftentimes are 
ultimately shaped and limited by these considerations and are thus very important to 
discuss in decision making. 
 
“There's so many things to balance out, and usually we have to be guided by what 
does the law say?” – Interviewee #4 
 
“Regulatory and administrative barriers” were also mentioned as potentially 
limiting and burdensome in a response. One interviewee suggested that a decision maker 
could facilitate a response greatly by removing or reducing these barriers as appropriate 
to enable easier implementation of protective action decisions. 
Politics 
A number of interviewees stated that politics is often a component of decision 
making, with one interviewee stating that political considerations “come into play every 
time” during an emergency response as a “huge component (Interviewee #6)” of the 
decision-making process. Some interviewees felt that politics was inherently bad for 
decision making, and should be avoided, but others felt that politics are unavoidable and 
are simply a consideration that should be addressed explicitly in the decision making 
process.  
 
“There are going to be political dimensions to any problem…Those are just sort 
of natural forces in some ways. And I think with the right kind of front work, those 
can be mitigated.” – Interviewee #14 
 
 





Optimistically, multiple interviewees, who had been part of the decision-making 
process in contamination emergencies, felt that in an emergency political considerations 
do not usually drive decisions and that political decision makers usually have the public’s 
interest at heart.  
 
“Well, I have to tell you, and it's been amazing in my career and my experience, 
how in a true emergency, there's very little politics in the early decision making. 
It's not about politics. In fact, I think most political appointees and politicians 
understand that appropriate management of the emergency is really important to 
the levers in political power. So, it's usually not an issue in an emergency 
situation.” – Interviewee #4 
 
Decision Making Process 
With the structure supporting decision making in place and key factors to be 
considered articulated, interviewees discussed the decision-making process itself, which 
included discussion of different approaches to formulating decision options, the types of 
decisions that are needed, and ways to improve the success and acceptance of decisions. 
Types of Decisions Needed 
Interviewees discussed a variety of decisions that are necessary in the early hours 
of a major contamination emergency. Specific decisions will be highly dependent on the 
situation, but interviewees discussed decisions about  
 the makeup of an advisory body;  
 the amount of information needed before protective actions can be determined; 
 the amount of time you have to choose protective actions;  
 the methods and rigor of a quick turn risk assessment;  
 the number of options for protective action that should be considered;  
 





 the protective action(s) that best protect public health, uphold core values, and 
meet identified objectives;  
 approaches to implementing chosen protective actions; and  
 approaches to communicating decisions to the public. 
Interviewees focused much of their discussion on how to obtain situational 
awareness and make initial determinations about risk and what that meant for response. 
“Our big focus initially was, if water samples were going to be taken and tested, 
at what levels was the water safe, that kind of thing. That was the big focus, and 
we consulted with CDC, ATSDR on that. So, that's how it all began. It was kind of 
crazy and hectic that very first few days there. And, it didn't get a whole lot 
better.” – Interviewee #9 
 
“We had to make an assumption that there was some degree of toxicity that we 
needed to be concerned about, we just didn't know to what level, and then we had 
to start thinking about what that meant.” – Interviewee #16 
 
“[T]ypically without first getting monitoring information and things like that, 
there's a general discussion about what might we expect to be out there. I think 
that was one of the first questions that would always come up. In the absence of 
information that would say exactly what people were exposed to, what do we 
think?” Interviewee #15 
 
Approaches to Decision Making 
Interviewees discussed three phases of the decision-making process, once an 
emergency has been recognized and a decision maker engages advisors and gathers 
information to inform decisions: 1) setting goals and values for the response; 2) 
identifying decision alternatives; and 3) anticipating outcomes and comparing options to 
come to a decision. 
 





Some interviewees stressed that a decision maker should first conduct their own 
assessment of the situation, the values that are important to preserve, and the goals and 
objectives of the response itself. 
 
“I do think that [setting goals for a response] could be effective. The one caveat is 
that time of course is of the essence.” – Interviewee #2 
 
 “I think it's a combination of what your objectives are, and what principles you 
want to stay true to. I think both are important.” – Interviewee #7 
 
“I think there is both a science and an art to this. And in the science I think you 
have to approach the incident and think broadly about what are the issues that 
are at play here?” – Interviewee #5 
 
 Once the decision maker defines goals, objectives, and values for him/herself, 
then a group discussion among key advisors about those definitions is helpful to refine 
and correct any problems.  
 
“I would say in a perfect world you would walk in there with a defined goal, but 
that you would expect that the group might, in a group discussion, that goal might 
be reframed.” – Interviewee #5 
 
Once these strategic decisions are made, interviewees suggested that decision 
makers could propose a limited number of potential options for action to reduce public 
health risk, based on the available information – options initially generated by the 
decision maker, but then evaluated, adjusted, and expanded upon by advisors. 
“Getting all the important actors/important players at the table and just walking 
through the different options, sharing information, and making sure that 
everybody is on the same page and that everybody understands the risk that's 
involved, the uncertainties that are involved, and the best pathways going 
forward.” – Interviewee #2 
 
 





Decision makers often “have an incomplete set of action alternatives.” So, a 
decision maker and advisory group need to ask themselves, “do I have the full set of 
action alternatives, is there anything I'm missing (Interviewee #10)?” Once those action 
options are identified, interviewees suggested that decision makers “identify a series of 
choices, and then come up with a kind of weighting system that leads [them] to decide 
which of the available choices comes out on top (Interviewee #5).”  
One approach is to lay all of the options out together “in a deliberate but quasi-
academic fashion (Interviewee #6),” and then think about “the objectives that are met, or 
are not met by different actions (Interviewee #10).”  
 
“Basically, the problem is you can't have it all. You can address one need, but 
you may be then weaker on another important objective. So, how do you make 
that trade off? Those are not easy judgments.” – Interviewee #10 
 
A number of interviewees suggested that “playing options out (Interviewee 2)” 
and predicting the possible outcomes, to see how “each of these actions meet or fail to 
meet objectives (Interviewee #10)” is an important step to identifying potential pitfalls 
and make favorable tradeoffs. 
 
“[P]utting aside your certain biases that you might have, and just thinking 
through ‘how is the public going to respond if we tell them to evacuate? Where 
are they? Is it daytime? Are they at work? At home?’ Let's play this through and 
put ourselves in their shoes, and think about how they would respond to this 
message, knowing what you know about the affected population, and playing that 
out before you necessarily issue that order.” – Interviewee #2 
 
Documenting Decision Making 
Many of the people interviewed for this study discussed the problem of outside 
criticism, “Monday morning quarterbacking,” and hindsight, which can derail a political-
 





level decision maker who is trying to anticipate and mitigate criticism that will come later 
(i.e., the prominence effect discussed earlier).    
“The people that criticized us the hardest weren't here that evening, and they 
didn't understand the fact that we had little information and little time to make 
decisions.” –Interviewee #16 
 
Interviewees discussed how to mitigate the impact of hindsight and the 
prominence effect on a decision-maker’s process. One option discussed was the 
possibility of documenting the actual decision-making process as it occurs, capturing the 
uncertainty of the situation, and the process and reasoning behind decisions.  
 
“I think you have to at least have some justification for [decisions] because 
they're going to get challenged, and you've got to communicate them. You've got 
to be able to tell people why…we know that these kinds of decisions will be 
criticized harshly in hindsight. And, we've studied hindsight and we know that 
hindsight is a real phenomenon. The problems that seem apparent after we know 
how the outcome turned out were not necessarily apparent in advance. But, 
hindsight is real in the sense that it will appear that we should have known that it 
would go bad in this way. When in fact it was very uncertain. Again that suggests 
that for political protection, the deliberations should be documented, the state of 
uncertainty in advance should be documented in some way to try to protect 
against the fact that ‘you should have known.’ When in fact you couldn't have 
known.” – Interviewee #10 
 
A number of interviewees discussed the fact that they already produce after-action 
reports in the days and weeks following an emergency response and perhaps that was 
enough, and that documenting decisions in the midst of an emergency would be too 
difficult. But, other interviewees, particularly decision scientists, disagreed and advocated 
for setting up a process that focuses specifically on the information available and how 
decisions were made in the midst of the crisis. 
 






“[T]he question is how do you set up structures within the decision process that 
will try to reduce that kind of post-event criticism in order to free up the decision 
maker to make what is not just the most defensible decision, but actually the best 
decision given the values at stake? How do you do that? Maybe part of that is to 
have multiple people involved and have a record of the careful deliberations that 
were made at the time.” – Interviewee #10 
 
Communication 
Communication is a fundamental component of the decision-making process in 
response to contamination emergencies. Many interviewees discussed communication, 
and particularly the need to communicate with the public throughout crisis response. 
While this study focuses on decision making and not risk communication with the public 
– a topic that has been a major focus of other research and operational planning in the 
public health preparedness and response field – interviewees emphasized repeatedly and 
in almost every interview, that public risk communication is essential for the success of a 
response.  
 
“I'll tell you, good communication and good communication skills can make or 
break a response. And, it either engages partners and the public or you get 
discord and distrust.” – Interviewee #7 
 
One interviewee noted that “most of what people think is panic is not panic, it's 
anger at information being withheld (Interviewee #8),” highlighting the need for risk 
communicators to be honest and forthcoming with the public. As protective action 
decisions are made, these decisions must be communicated to the public a way that 
“helps people process the information, have a role in making their own decisions, and 
making (what you hope is) the right decision (Interviewee #7).”  
 





In addition, interviewees discussed the need to communicate uncertainty to the 
affected population with “messages that say, ‘here's what we know, here's what our plan 
is and what we're doing now, here's what we recommend you do, here's what we are 
doing to continue learning about this, and don't be surprised if we change 
recommendations coming forward (Interviewee #7).’”  
Some interviewees also discussed the internal process of communication for 
response, including, and especially between, decision makers and their advisors. 
Interviewees emphasized the need for advisors “to communicate rapidly to help inform 
decisions (Interviewee #4),” and to enable a decision maker to assimilate the best 
information available. Multiple interviewees noted that integrating information from 
many sources can be difficult in a crisis, and can become overwhelming to a decision 
maker if communication is not structured and information triaged and gated.  
Communication structures will need to enable important information to reach the 
decision maker, while limiting other information not relevant to the decisions at hand. 
Interviewees cautioned against having too many layers between a decision maker and 
people with the knowledge and information to inform decisions, and instead having 
experts with knowledge of and access to information in the group advising the decision 
maker directly. Within this group, interviewees noted, communication and information 
flow can be governed through good meeting management. 
Discussion: Proposed Framework  
Decision making is often a neglected aspect of the contamination emergency 
response research, analysis, and guidance development process. In contrast to operational 
aspects of emergency response, which are generally well defined and organized, 
 





relatively little attention has been given to how decisions are actually made – the process 
of collecting and vetting information, developing decision options, and choosing the best 
response option(s) to protect public health – and how they can be made better.  
 
This is particularly true for mayors and governors in large contamination 
emergencies. Decision making at that level and for this type of emergency will always be 
multifaceted and complex. Review of the literature and discussion with interviewees for 
this study show that decision-making guidance does not currently exist to help political 
leaders make these complex decisions in very time-pressured and uncertain situations. 
The findings presented above, from interviews with subject matter experts and 
practitioners steeped in the details of decision making and response to contamination 
emergencies, highlight important structures, processes, and key considerations to 
incorporate in any future guidance developed for political level decision makers.  
These findings informed the development of an initial framework that can serve 
as the basis for future research and development of guidance for mayors and governors in 
this context. This research is aimed at helping leaders to arrive at the best possible 
decisions for public health, given uncertainty and multiple competing influences (Figure 
7).  
This proposed framework is informed by the literature, particularly the work of 
Kayman and Logar,94 Kahneman,46 Slovic,92 and John Boyd,53 and shaped by the 
interviews conducted in this study. The framework is intended to provide a structure for 
decision makers that will make them aware of key decision steps, help them to evaluate 
 





the evidence, and weigh decisions. It is also aimed at helping decision makers incorporate 
a broader range of information and options, which will mitigate bias and enable more 
accurate analysis and ultimately better decisions. Finally, the steps identified through this 
analysis can be used to increase preparedness before a crisis occurs. Information gathered 
for the framework could prompt pre-identification of a core decision advisory body, or 
inform development of training courses for mayors and governors on crisis and risk-
based decision making, for example.    
Conclusions 
Major contamination emergencies present unique challenges to decision makers 
charged with response. These decision makers, who are often political leaders, are 
insufficiently equipped and supported to make decisions that optimally reduce health 
impacts resulting from these events. 
The framework proposed here is intended as a first step on a path to developing 
guidance that can be provided to decision makers and used in future emergencies to 
improve crisis decision making. This is only an initial step, and further work will be 
needed to develop this proposed framework, create a usable decision guide, and pilot and 
revise that guide with decision makers.  
  
 





DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Summary 
When major contamination emergencies involving chemical, biological, and 
radiological hazards occur, decisions about actions to protect public health are often 
needed very quickly. However, there is very little guidance for leaders about how to 
make these decisions, which may be very consequential. The goal of this research is to 
learn from disparate disciplines that deal with crisis decision making and risk-based 
decision making in order to understand the elements that are important for successful 
decision making in contamination emergencies, and translate those findings into a 
framework that can help guide risk assessors and decision makers through the process in 
future contamination emergencies. 
 This research was conducted in three parts. First, a case study on biological threat 
characterization was conducted using a modified Delphi approach to gather subject-
matter expert opinion on the process of characterizing contaminants and conducting 
human-health risk assessment prior to an emergency. Second, an integrative literature 
review was conducted to bring together relevant findings from different types of literature 
from the fields of risk-based and crisis decision making. Finally, building on the findings 
of the literature review, semi-structured interviews with subject matter experts were held 
to discuss the important elements, information needs, and processes that can support a 
political-level decision maker such as a mayor or governor, who may be in the position of 
making these difficult decisions. 
 





Findings from the Aim 1 Delphi case study revealed the importance of 
characterizing potential hazards before an emergency occurs, so that data about a 
contaminant and information about risk to human health can be used to make more-
accurate decisions to protect the public’s health. This Delphi study is important because it 
is the first time that questions about Biological Threat Characterization (BTC) research 
have been posed systematically to a collective of biodefense experts. Most importantly, 
this research indicates that experts view BTC research as a necessary USG function and 
that despite the risks inherent in this kind of research it should go forward under the 
leadership of the Department of Homeland Security. Findings from this Delphi study can 
be extrapolated to other security-related threat characterization programs, and similar 
efforts should be applied more broadly to other federal programs that are working to 
prioritize research for CBR agents prior to the next contamination emergency 
The Aim 2 literature review uncovered a number of key findings from the risk-
based and crisis decision literature, and from reports of past contamination events, which 
can improve the quality of decision making in a contamination emergency. Findings from 
the crisis decision literature show that initial intuition, followed by rational interrogation 
of an emergency situation is a promising approach to improving the quality of decisions; 
that analysis of the situation can help mitigate typical cognitive biases and traps; that 
having a primary decision-maker supported by a small-yet-diverse group of advisors can 
improve decision making while avoiding chaos; that many types of information, 
including scientific, ethical, legal, social, economic, and logistical inputs should be 
considered; and that decision making works best in a cycle that involves data collection 
and analysis, decision, action, and further data collection and refinement. Findings from 
 





the risk-based decision literature show that scientific data are not and cannot be the only 
driver of decision making; that a process of problem formulation, risk analysis, and risk 
management can be applied, even when time is short; that it is important to clearly define 
the problem at hand, acceptable risk, and goals of the response at the outset of the 
decision process; that a risk assessment approach should be carefully chosen to match 
situation needs; that uncertainty should be acknowledged and accounted for in both the 
risk assessment and options analysis phases; that a systematic approach to comparing 
options for action should be used, even if it is simple and quick; and that public risk 
perception and levels of acceptable risk should be expressly considered throughout the 
decision-making process. 
Interviews with subject matter experts in Aim 3 helped to further explore and 
validate the themes above, derived from the literature review, which were then condensed 
into a decision-making framework. Findings from interviews with subject matter experts 
and practitioners steeped in the details of decision making and response to contamination 
emergencies, highlight the important structures, processes, and key considerations to 
incorporate in any future guidance developed for political level decision makers. These 
findings informed the development of an initial framework that can serve as the basis for 
future research and development of guidance for mayors and governors in this context. 
This framework is intended to inform future development of guidance for mayors and 
governors (Figure 7). 
Strengths and Limitations 
This research has a number of strengths and offers unique findings not reflected 
elsewhere in the literature. Aim 1 represents the first time that experts in the biosecurity 
 





field have been formally surveyed to understand priorities for research to characterize 
intentional biological threat agents and the risks they pose to public health if used as 
weapons. This case study was conducted using a modified Delphi method, which is a 
rigorous survey methodology that gathers expert opinion and provides opportunity for 
consensus building, while avoiding group-think. Preliminary results from this study were 
published in Science, 80 and the manuscript included here was published in Risk Analysis. 
138 Findings from this study aim, while focused on this specific case study, also reinforce 
the larger need to gather data and conduct risk assessment for other types of hazardous 
materials prior to an emergency.  
 Aim 2 of this research provides a theoretical and practical basis for future work to 
improve risk-based decision making in contamination emergencies. Prior to this review, 
there was no body of literature that specifically addressed decision making in this 
context. Through the use of a rigorous integrative literature review method of applicable 
peer reviewed and grey literature, and reports from actual contamination events were 
brought together from a variety of fields of study. The results of this review can inform 
development of new conceptual frameworks addressing this problem. 
 Aim 3 of this research builds upon the unique findings of Aim 2; further exploring 
the elements of successful decision making in contamination emergencies through 
interviews with experts. Strengths of this aim are that interviews incorporated expertise 
both from the research and practitioner community to gain validation by both theorists 
and individuals who have been involved in emergency response and decision making. 
The findings from this Aim, along with the findings from Aim 2 informed development 
of a framework for decision making in contamination emergencies, which is the first such 
 





framework to be proposed. Through further research this framework can be developed 
into guidance, which can be further validated, and eventually disseminated to decision 
makers for use in crises. 
Limitations of Aim 1 of this analysis include those that are inherent in the Delphi 
process. Although groupthink is minimized through the Delphi approach, there is still the 
problem of expert bias at an individual level. Experts brought their own knowledge and 
experiences to the study, but participants were also asked to answer every question 
regardless of topic, and not all participants had expertise to bring to bear on all questions. 
In cases where a participant did not feel knowledgeable enough to answer the question 
with high fidelity, they were required to make their best educated guess. This may affect 
some of the results and contribute to the wide distributions found in responses. Another 
limitation is the different possible interpretations of question meanings by different 
participants. In fact, one question was removed from the survey after round two because 
of problems with interpretation and understanding among participants. In theory, both the 
issue of varied knowledge and varied interpretation should have been mitigated 
somewhat through the second survey round, when participants were asked to read others’ 
responses and alter their responses accordingly if they felt compelled to do so. 
Another potential limitation to this research was the approach used to recruit 
expert participation. The snowball sampling methodology is limited in that participants 
are not recruited in a random and unbiased way. However, because of the topic, it was 
necessary that participants have very specific expertise in biological science, biodefense, 
and national security. So, a snowball sampling approach was used in order to gather 
experts in this limited field at the nexus of biology and security. An effort was made to 
 





gather experts from a wide range of disciplines, with a range of years of experience, and 
representing demographic diversity, so that a variety of perspectives would be included in 
the study. Finally, Delphi studies generally have problems with attrition, which can be 
severe in some instances. In this study, the authors were able to limit attrition to three 
participants in the second round. Because the study was terminated after two rounds, 
further attrition was avoided. For this study, attrition was minimal with limited effects on 
the final results of the study. 
In addition to these specific limitations, Aim 1 is only one case study example 
addressing how information should be collected to inform preparedness efforts for and 
decision making in one type of contamination emergency – a bioterrorism event. Other 
efforts are needed to characterize and conduct human health risk assessments for other 
categories of contaminants. These efforts are spread throughout government and the 
private sector and will be difficult to standardize. 
Aim 2 has several limitations. Although a systematic search of the literature was 
conducted, because of the diversity subjects included in this analysis there may be 
sources and topics that were not available within the chosen databases, and which may 
have then not appeared in the returned results. Moreover, this methodology necessitates 
some subjective judgment about whether a piece of literature meets inclusion or 
exclusion criteria, which may have resulted in articles/pieces of literature that were 
excluded when they should have been included in the review. Another potential 
limitation is the temporal cutoff for the literature included. This cutoff was necessary due 
to the large volume of literature from many sources. However, there may be research or 
accounts of disasters that could have added substantively to the analysis had they been 
 





included and it should have been applied initially rather than in a second round of review. 
Finally, the inclusion of non-peer reviewed literature, while adding important dimensions 
to the analysis not found in traditional sources, must also be considered carefully because 
of the lack of peer review. 
The research for Aim 3 was conducted with the goal of informing the 
development of a novel framework, and involved a variety of types of interview 
participants, who had different perspectives on the topic. While these different 
perspectives enriched the research, the study could have also benefitted from repeated 
exposure to similar points of view to verify or corroborate findings. A second limitation 
was that the practitioners interviewed for this study, while they may have been exposed 
to or involved in political-level decision making in contamination emergencies, were 
primarily in the decision advisory role as opposed to being the person responsible for 
making the decisions. Future research would benefit from discussion and piloting with 
mayors, governors or other decision makers to ensure the applicability of the tools 
developed. As discussed above, the framework developed from this research is 
preliminary and should undergo further development, scrutiny and testing before it can be 
applied or disseminated to decision makers (Figure 7).  
Policy Implications 
 The recommendations below represent major, overarching themes derived from 
this research. Additional and more detailed policy implications and recommendations are 
presented in the three manuscripts of this dissertation. 
 
 





Acting Prior to a Contamination Emergency to Improve Decision Making 
 This research highlights the need to plan, prepare, and gather information prior to 
a contamination emergency in order to enable better crisis decision making. Each 
research Aim reinforced that anything that can be done in the non-emergency period to 
improve situational awareness and reduce uncertainty in an emergency should be done. 
This can be accomplished in a number of ways:  
Recommendation 1.1: Federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency, 
the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of 
Health and Human Services (in particular the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention) should prioritize characterization of chemical, biological, and radiological 
contaminants, conduct of human health risk assessment during the pre-emergency period, 
and make that information widely and easily available to stakeholders who will need it to 
inform decision making in an emergency. 
 The absence of basic information for CBR hazards, including information on 
dose-response and potential adverse health outcomes (both acute and chronic), as well as 
more comprehensive human health risk assessment data, makes decisions in a crisis much 
more difficult and subject to errors, which could have serious implications for public 
health. There are programs in place at the federal level to gather data and conduct human 
health risk assessments for these contaminants, including the DHS CBRN terrorism risk 
assessment program, the EPA Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS), and the EPA 
Radiation Protection Division’s radiological risk assessments. However, these and other 
similar programs are largely under resourced, leaving thousands of potential hazardous 
materials uncharacterized and with little or no human health risk data. While federal 
 





dollars are certainly limited, having human health risk assessment data on more potential 
contaminants can help prevent or mitigate the impacts of a major contamination 
emergency and avoid much greater expenditures in the response and recovery period of 
such an event. These programs should dedicate a portion of their focus and budget to 
characterize those contaminants that could have a high impact on public health if they 
were involved in a major contamination event. Finally, risk assessment results and other 
data should be made available, easily accessible, and known to public health officials and 
other experts at the state and local levels who will be in a position to advise a decision 
maker during a contamination emergency. 
Recommendation 1.2: Federal agencies with technical reach back capabilities and 
expertise in risk assessment, public health emergency response, toxicology, and 
environmental contamination response should continue to ensure that state and local 
governments, public health agencies, and emergency management agencies are aware of 
and can easily access their knowledge and technical support in a crisis. 
 This research demonstrates that having access to expertise in risk assessment, 
toxicology, and other related technical areas is critical to making quality decisions in a 
contamination emergency. Often the specific expertise needed is not available at the state 
or local level, but instead resides within the federal government. For example, the 
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) at the CDC has emergency 
response teams of scientists with expertise in chemicals and toxicology, who are 
available to assist during contamination emergencies. Similarly, the EPA and the 
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) at HHS have scientists who 
can provide rapid guidance and assistance when needed by state and local decision 
 





makers. These resources are called upon in some, but not all emergencies of this type, 
and it is not always clear to state and local decision makers which of these agencies to 
call when an emergency happens. The federal agencies, including, but not limited to 
those mentioned above, should coordinate more extensively and provide clear guidance 
to mayors, governors, public health officials, and first responders about who they should 
call within the federal government and how they can best access experts when they are 
needed. 
Recommendation 1.3: Mayors, governors, and public health officials should be trained in 
crisis decision making. 
 Crisis decision making is not typically a focus of either public health or 
emergency management training, and it is even rarer for public officials like mayors or 
governors to have any exposure to or training in this area. Yet, findings from this 
research show that there are standard steps individuals can take to reduce biases, obtain 
and interpret information, enumerate options, and make tradeoff decisions. Moreover, 
research shows that repeated experience with crisis decision making improves an 
individual’s ability to make quality decisions. This training could be valuable in a number 
of emergency situations, including contamination emergencies. Leaders would benefit 
from training developed for this purpose. 
Recommendation 1.4: Mayors and governors should identify a team of advisors, who 
represent the important perspectives outlined in this research, and can be called upon to 
aid in decision making during a crisis. 
 





 As discussed in Aims 2 and 3 of this research, it is important for decision makers 
to have a team of advisors who can be assembled quickly and can provide guidance to a 
decision maker during a contamination emergency crisis period. Advisors should 
represent a variety of perspectives and expertise, including scientific, risk assessment, 
and technical expertise; political, ethical, legal, and operational expertise; and a 
community perspective. Some of this expertise can be provided from outside sources as 
discussed above, but they should all be willing and able to participate in discussions 
about goals for the response, analysis of available evidence and non-scientific 
considerations, development of protective action options, and weighing options to find 
the best possible solution. Having diversity of expertise and input to decisions will be 
critical to optimized decisions, and having a group that can be called upon quickly in the 
immediate crisis before more formal systems and command structures are fully 
operational, will enable the rapid decision making needed in the early hours of a major 
contamination emergency. Pre-designating advisors, or at least identifying where advice 
can be found in an emergency, will help to speed up the process, and bolster the 
confidence of a decision maker in the advice they receive. 
Improving Crisis Decision Making during Contamination Emergencies  
In addition to the recommendations above, which include efforts to gather 
information and prepare in advance of an emergency, the recommendations below focus 
on development of resources that can be used during a crisis to improve decisions and 
reduce harm to public health. 
 





Recommendation 2.1: Guidance for mayors and governors should be developed to enable 
rapid decision making with increased fidelity, which can reduce morbidity and mortality 
following major contamination events. 
 The decision-making framework proposed in this research is just a first step in 
creating guidance that decision makers, particularly mayors and governors, can use to 
improve the quality of their decisions during the very time-pressured and uncertain crisis 
period of major contamination events. This framework will need to be translated into 
more detailed, but operationally useful stepwise guidance, piloted with decision makers 
to ensure that it is helpful, and revised to reflect findings from pilot testing.  
Ultimately, if guidance is produced, it will also need to be made available to 
mayors and governors, so that they can review it in advance of an emergency and have it 
on hand to use when a crisis occurs. Finally, this guidance could be even more relevant 
and useful if it is exercised in emergency drills with political leaders. Potential routes of 
dissemination for this guidance could be through federal preparedness grant programs to 
states and localities or through the National Governors Association or the US Conference 
of Mayors. 
Recommendation 2.2: Other decision support tools should be developed, which can be 
used during the crisis period of a contamination emergency. 
 Many models have been developed to aid and optimize decision making for non-
emergent decisions about environmental contamination, for very specific contamination 
emergencies like nuclear power plant accidents, or in other contexts like for doctors and 
nurses the healthcare setting. However, tools that are specific to decision making about 
 





environmental contamination, including plume models and multi-attribute utility models, 
are often too complicated or not flexible enough to conform to different kinds of events, 
or require more data than will be available in the first hours of a contamination 
emergency.  
Little investment has been made in simple models or tools for this specific 
context. Tools are needed, which may not be highly detailed, but can help decision 
makers and their expert advisors to analyze available scientific data, conduct quick turn 
risk analysis, develop protective action options, and quickly and simply compare options 
and understand how well they meet the objectives of the response. Simple automated 
tools that enable even rudimentary systematic analysis of the situation could aid decision 
makers in avoiding unhelpful biases and heuristics, and provide structure to help in 
identifying and comparing options for action. These tools, if developed or adapted from 
other contexts, could be incorporated into existing infrastructure at an Emergency 
Operations Center (EOC), for example, and could be applied to different levels of 
contamination incidents, from smaller hazmat events to major contamination emergencies 
with severe or broad public health impacts. 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTION 
Further research is needed to produce more detailed and user-friendly guidance, 
and to validate, test, and disseminate guidance to be used in a crisis response. The 
findings from Aim 1 can be used to develop research priorities both for other biological 
threat characterization programs in the US government and around the world, and to 
inform characterization and human health risk assessment research for other types of 
 





contaminants. With additional work in this area, there will be more data and risk 
assessment information available, which can be used to inform decisions during a 
contamination emergency. 
Findings from Aims 2 and 3, and the resulting decision-making framework can be 
further developed into stepwise guidance for decision makers to use during 
contamination emergencies. This guidance will need to be developed and piloted by 
decision makers to ensure that it is usable and useful in a crisis setting. The piloted 
guidance tool will then need to be revised and disseminated in a useful format to mayors, 
governors, and other leaders. Support for this next phase of research may be available 
from multiple sources including the CDC, DHS, or national organizations including the 
National Governors Association.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Given historic trends, major contamination emergencies involving chemical, 
radiological, or biological contaminants, will likely continue to occur in the U.S. and 
internationally at somewhat regular intervals. While there is currently little guidance for 
leaders in the position to make initial protective action decisions in such emergencies, 
this research identifies examples of important actions that should be taken prior to these 
events, and considerations that should be incorporated into guidance to aid decision 
making during the early crisis period of contamination emergencies. Findings from this 
research suggest that there are steps that can be taken both before and during a crisis to 
improve the quality of protective action decisions in contamination emergencies.  
 





In advance of a crisis, findings indicate that gathering data on potential 
contaminants and conducting human health risk assessment for both acute and chronic 
exposures, can provide critical information that enables risk-based decisions when a crisis 
does occur. The more that is known about a contaminant, the better predictions will be 
about public health impacts, which can then inform options for preventing or reducing 
exposure through protective actions. In addition, training and identification of resources 
and expertise prior to an emergency can help to improve decisions and outcomes of a 
contamination emergency when it does occur. 
When major contamination emergencies occur, rapid and decisive action is often 
needed to protect the public from exposure to and harm from contaminants. In those 
emergencies, decisions made in the first hours or days of the crisis are critical to 
protecting public health. This research provides a framework for risk-based decision 
making during the early crisis period of a contamination emergency, and elucidates key 
actions and processes, underpinned by theory and operational experiences, to aid decision 
makers. The proposed framework can be used as the basis from which to develop 
guidance and decision-support tools for leaders, including mayors and governors, who 
may be in a position to make these crisis decisions. Support for decision makers is 
necessary to improve the quality of their decisions – which need to be made quickly and 
under great uncertainty – and make them optimally protective.  
  
 









Table 1 – Delphi Participant Demographic Information  
Category Sub 
Category 
Answer Number of 
participants     
(% participants) 
Gender 
  Male  41 (69.5%) 




Millennial Generation (ages 21-33) 5 (8.5%) 
Generation X (ages 34-49) 26 (44.1%) 
Earlier 
Generations 
Baby Boomer Generation (ages 50-69) 26 (44.1%) 







Scientists  Biological Science 32 (54.2%) 
Chemistry 2 (3.4%) 
Physical Science 2 (3.4%) 
Veterinary Medicine 2 (3.4%) 
Public Health 3 (5.1%) 
Medicine 7 (11.9%) 
Non-
Scientists 
Political Science 2 (3.4%) 
Foreign Policy/International Affairs 1 (1.7%) 
National Security 3 (5.1%) 




Nongovernmental Organization 14 (23.7%) 
Academia 7 (11.9%) 




Government 23 (39.0%) 
Former Government (Retired) 3 (5.1%) 
 





Table 2 – Question 8: Sub-Questions Ranked by Decreasing Mean 
 
  
Question 8: Reasons to explain/justify the need for biological threat 
characterization programs in the US Government 





Sub Question: For the 6 sub questions, rank order preference by 
decreasing mean  
1 7.4 Question 8_2: To prioritize funding for medical countermeasures 
2 7.4 Question 8_6: To provide useful information to help in detection of 
and response to an attack. 
3 7.2 Question 8_1: To enhance our understanding of the biological 
weapons threat by addressing technical gaps in the information 
provided by the intelligence community 
4 6.1 Question 8_5: To acquire information that could help attribute an 
attack. 
5 5.8 Question 8_4: To prepare for biological weapons that are a strategic 
possibility based upon the current trajectories in scientific research 
6 5.3 Question 8_3: To inform the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA) 
 





Table 3 – Question 10: Sub-Questions Ranked by Decreasing Mean 
Question 10: What, in your opinion, are the biggest dangers or shortcomings that 
might result from a US government program directing laboratory characterization 
of biological threats? 
Rank     
(by 
mean) 
Mean Sub Question: For the 7 sub questions, rank order preference by 
decreasing mean  
1 6.0 Question 10_2: It may increase the potential for insider threats, as 
more people would have access to select agent pathogens and 
technical skills to manipulate them. 
2 5.8 Question 10_1: It may be destabilizing to international regimes such 
as the Biological Weapons Convention, as other nations may believe 
that the US has an offensive biological weapons program. 
3 5.6 Question 10_6: If the results of the laboratory experiments were 
unexpectedly released, it could help an adversary. 
4, 5 5.5 Question 10_3: It may increase the probability of an accidental release 
of a select agent from a laboratory. 
4, 5 5.5 Question 10_7: If the results of the laboratory experiments were 
unexpectedly released, it would result in public controversy. 
6 4.1 Question 10_5: Money spent on laboratory threat characterization 
could be used more effectively in other areas of biodefense 
7 3.9 Question 10_4: Laboratory threat characterization work will not 









Table 4 – Question 12: Sub-Questions Ranked by Decreasing Mean 
 
  
Question 12:  In your opinion, what rules of guidelines for threat characterization 
should be in place to ensure that these programs are safe and effective? 
Rank       
(by 
mean) 
Mean Sub Question: For the 7 sub questions, rank order preference by 
decreasing mean  
1 8.3 Question 12_1: The USG should not conduct an experiment if it 
violates the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). 
2 6.6 Question 12_4: The USG should not conduct an experiment based on 
intelligence information unless the threat is determined to be 
scientifically plausible. 
3 5.9 Question 12_5: The USG should not conduct an experiment unless the 
result of the experiment has the potential to affect policy, funding, or 
prioritization of biological threats. 
4 4.5 Question 12_3: The USG should not conduct any experiment unless 
there is some intelligence information about a particular biological 
threat that supports the need for that experiment. 
5 4.4 Question 12_2: The USG should not conduct an experiment in which a 
pathogen is changed/mutated/altered unless the 
change/mutation/alteration has already occurred in nature (for example, 
antibiotic resistant anthrax has been seen in nature, so it would be 
acceptable to characterize it for biodefense purposes. 
6 4.3 Question 12_6: The USG should not conduct an experiment to assess a 
threat unless there is something that can be done to combat or respond 
to the threat (e.g., there is reason to believe that a countermeasure to the 
threat is scientifically plausible or is likely to be funded). 
7 3.4 Question 12_7: The USG should not conduct an experiment unless 
there is reason to believe that the experiment has been done before 
(e.g., in published scientific research, in classified studies, previous 
offensive work, or in a clandestine laboratory that there is intelligence 
about). 
 





Table 5 – Question 13: Sub-Questions Ranked by Decreasing Mean 
Question 13: What do you think are the most important components of an effective 
review process for this kind of threat characterization research, which is often dual-
use research of concern and highly sensitive? 
Rank      
(by 
Mean) 
Mean Sub Question: For the 13 sub questions, rank order preference by 
decreasing mean  
1 8.8 Question 13_2: Research protocols are reviewed by technical experts 
inside government for scientific soundness. 
2 8.7 Question 13_7: Decisions about why an experiment was undertaken are 
documented (for example, intelligence, strategic possibility, gaps in the 
BTRA, countermeasures development, maintenance of capabilities). 
3 8.7 Question 13_8: The risks in not doing the experiment are identified and 
documented (e.g., lack of preparedness). 
4 8.6 Question 13_1: Projects are reviewed to ensure compliance with 
applicable laws and treaties, such as the Biological Weapons Convention 
(BWC). 
5, 6 8.5 Question 13_6: Decisions about why and how threats were prioritized 
are documented for the program. 
5, 6 8.5 Question 13_9: The potential national security benefits to performing the 
experiment are identified and documented. 
7 8.5 Question 13_10: The consequences of a laboratory accident during the 
course of performing the project are considered and documented. 
8 8.4 Question 13_3: Research protocols are reviewed by technical experts 
outside of government for scientific soundness. 
9 8.2 Question 13_13: Alternatives to an experiment, such as the use of 
simulants or computer models, are considered and documented. 
10 8.1 Question 13_4: A technical advisory committee/group helps with the 
strategic prioritization of work with limited resources. 
11 8.0 Question 13_11: The consequences of a data breach in the course of this 
project are considered and documented. 
12 7.8 Question 13_5: A technical advisory committee/group reviews and is 
able to vouch for the compliance of the work in the event of a data 
breach. 
13 7.8 Question 13_12: A process is undertaken to determine how technically 
difficult this experiment is, and what it indicates about a potential 
adversary. 
 





Table 6 – Question 14: Sub-Questions Ranked by Decreasing Mean 
Question 14:  In your opinion, when is a biological threat “adequately 
characterized?” In other words, when can you stop doing laboratory research on 
a biological agent and move on to other important, pressing problems when 
resources are constrained? 
Rank      
(by 
Mean)  
Mean Sub Question: For the 7 sub questions, rank order preference by 
decreasing mean  
1 6.9 Question 14_1: When we have successfully created a medical 
countermeasure to combat an agent. 
2 6.7 Question 14_2: When we know how an agent behaves in the 
environment, including how long it persists and the risks to public 
health posed by environmental contamination. 
3 6.2 Question 14_5: When we know the basic characteristics of an agent 
and can estimate a range of possible consequences. 
4 6.1 Question 14_4: When we understand how an agent could be 
manipulated to defeat our defenses (e.g., antibiotic resistance) 
5 5.7 Question 14_3: When we can estimate the dose response relationship 
in humans for an agent. 
6 5.1 Question 14_7: Characterization of agents should continue 
indefinitely because there is always more we can know that will help 
us prepare for and respond to an attack. 
7 2.7 Question 14_6: Biological agents have already been characterized 










Table 7 – Key Words/Phrases Used for the Literature Search 
Category Key Words/Phrase 
Crisis Decision Making crisis decision making 
emergency decision making 
decision making AND biological AND emergency 
decision making AND radiological AND emergency 
decision making AND chemical AND emergency 
emergency AND environmental contamination 
contamination AND emergency response 
Risk-Based Decision 
Making 
risk based decision making 
risk informed decision making 
public health emergency AND decision 
evidence based decision making AND public health and 
emergency 
 





Table 8 – Crisis Decision-Making Concept Matrix 
First 
Author Title Type 
Conceptual 
Framework(s) 
Used Major Finding(s) 
Strengths/ 























Public health officials should use 
Incident Command System (ICS) 
for response to public health 
emergencies 
Focused on ICS, but 
not much on how to 
make decisions X     
Harwood 
CA 












In assessing a possible hazmat 
situation the incident commander 
should first take immediate 
action to limit further exposures 
Mostly not applicable 
except for the 
immediate actions to 
prevent further 



















In response to a large bio-event, 
leadership will be critical and can 
be supported by a well-organized 
EOC. In addition, separating the 
population in to different 
categories of exposure is helpful 
in prioritizing resources 
The article talks briefly 
about leadership, but 
mostly in leading to a 
triage approach to 
managing the clinical 
needs of the population X X   
 







Public Health and 
Medical 
Preparedness for a 
Nuclear Detonation: 







For radiological incidents, HHS 
has developed a robust set of 
resources that can be used by 
decision makers to gain 
situational awareness and to 
inform crisis decision making. 
The article talks about 
the availability of 
resources, but not 
directly about decision-




















Communication among decision 
makers as part of a team 
distributive decision-making 
approach, is important. 
Communication among the team 
has both benefits and costs 
during a crisis. This research 
found that periodic exchange 
strategy is most effective, 
because it does not require 
constant communication, which 
can be a drain on resources. It 
also can be moderated to adapt to 
the pace of a response with 
shorter periods of non-
communication as needed. 
This study provides 
important information 
about how to optimize 
communication among 
a decision making 
group X X X 
Ergu D 
Estimating the 
missing values for 
the incomplete 











This is a mathematical approach 
to imputing missing information 
for a decision matrix in order to 
support decision making 
The authors 
acknowledge that this 
has yet to be applied to 
a real-time crisis event. 
It can also only be used 
when pairwise 
comparisons of 
decisions are being 
used to collect expert 
judgments   X   
 













There are a number of important 
tools to support decision making 
in a radiological or nuclear 
emergency. 
This is a good analysis 
of radiological 
response, but it does 
not focus on the 
decision making 
process in the crisis 
period to a great extent X X   
Higgins G 
Improving decision 











Decision makers are subject to 
decision-derailers in a crisis. 
There are things that can be done 
to avoid/correct for these, 
including incorporating cognitive 
diversity, keeping options open, 
thinking critically, obtaining 
more information, not delaying 
too long for perfect information, 
and following OODA loop in 
conjunction with Cynefin 
framework to characterize 
uncertainty. 
Very key for 
identifying areas where 
decision making can 
fail and mitigating 
those tendencies. It 
highlights the problem 
of needing more 
information but not 
delaying too long, but 
does not offer a robust 
solution. X X X 
Inglesby T 
Observations from 





Political leadership is critical in 
the crisis decision-making 
process. Having too many people 
weigh in on decisions causes 
confusion and delays.  
This is a good 
description of a large-
scale exercise. It 
discussions some of 
the challenges to 
decision making, but 
does not provide much 
detail about the process X X   
 















The dual process model of 
system 1 vs. system 2 thinking is 
very useful approach to crisis 
decision making. Leaders who 
use system 2 with a group to 
discuss and make decisions will 
help avoid some of the biases and 
heuristics that can derail 
decisions. 
Provides a preliminary 
framework from which 
to approach decision 
making for public 
health emergencies. It 
is lacking detail in 
some areas and does 
not incorporate risk 
based decision making. 
It is also aimed more 
toward public health 
officers than political 
level decision makers X X X 
Koerner J 
The Medical 










Having a decision maker and 
subject matter experts co-located 
helps with situational awareness, 
informal and formal exchanges 
of information and opinions. The 
model highlights the need for 
initial intervention, further data 
gathering, consultation and 
further intervention based on 
more complex data to come to a 
definitive management course. 
This analysis applies 
the medical decision 
model to a 
radiological/nuclear 
response. It fits well 
with the other 
conceptual frameworks 
and demonstrates the 
possible application to 
other emergencies X X   
Lindell 
MK 
An overview of 
protective action 
decision-making for 














recommendations must be made 
in a timely way in order to 
protect the public, but they also 
need to be sufficiently targeted to 
avoid unnecessary secondary 
consequences. Improvements can 
be made by segmenting the 
population and drills to practice 
and socialize protective actions 
 
Very good points on 
protective action 
recommendations but 
not many insights on 
how to avoid errors in 
either waiting too long 
to decide or deciding 
too quickly X X   
 














Thoughtful and timely action are 
important. Command and control 
is necessary. Group input to 
decisions allows for 
identification of a larger range of 
solutions and improves decisions. 
Duplicative to the 
OODA model, but not 
as detailed as the 
Higgins manuscript. X X X 
Mirandilla 
KA 
Decision making in 
the crisis cycle: The 









Crisis decision-making processes 
are not well understood or well 
described in the literature.  
Preliminary study, 
which points out some 
good questions to ask 
to interviewees. X X X 
Mirandilla 
KA 









It is important to consider the 
makeup of the key decision 
making body that will advise and 
iterate with the decision maker in 
a crisis. One person who should 
be integrated into this group and 
into decision making is a public 
relations exert. This expert is 
often integral to implementation 
of decisions, but not often 
involved in decision making  
This is a good 
recommendation about 
one participant in the 
decision making group X X   
Parker AM 
Measuring Crisis 
Decision Making for 
Public Health 
Emergencies White Paper 
Core processes 




The core processes in public 
health emergency decision 
making are proposed in a 
continuous loop from 
establishing situational 
awareness, action planning for 
sets of actions to mitigate health 
effects, and initial execution. 
Throughout this period, there is 
also process control of the flows 
of information and resources. 
This is one of the few 
resources that brings 
together crisis decision 
making and public 
health emergencies. 
This document 
provides an approach 
to measuring 
emergency decision 
making in public 
health emergencies, but 
not specific guidance 
for decision makers. X X   
 

















st approach to 
ethical decision 
making 
Traditional approaches to 
weighing ethical principles and 
values are likely too complex and 
time consuming. Thus, a 
consequentialist approach, 
comparing consequences of 
courses of action and choosing 
the one that saves the most lives, 
and that doesn't violate other core 
values or rights, is promising. 
This manuscript puts 
ethical decision 
making into an 
emergency 
contamination event 
context and combines 
it with the dual process 
model. The 
consequentialist 
approach is reasonable 
in a crisis.   X X 
Sniezek JA 









With severe time pressure and 
high degree of uncertainty, crisis 
decision making can be difficult. 
Crises vary a great deal, so trying 
to learn from real events is 
difficult. Structured training 
programs in crisis decision 
making is therefore beneficial. 
This article points to 
the importance of 
training in crisis 
decision-making before 
a crisis. However, it 
does not go into the 
actual process of 















Netcentric (command and 
control) conditions do not often 
exist in a crisis decision-making 
context. Instead, decisions are 
often made in a bureaucratic 
political context where there is 
not one clear decision-maker and 
many different agencies have 
priorities and opinions. For this 
reason a negotiation approach 
where team members share a 
mental model of the response is 
needed. 
Creation of a shared 
mental model through 
the proposed 
approaches is useful 
and fits well with some 
of the other conceptual 
frameworks of decision 
making. X X X 
 
















This article, focused on decision-
making by firefighters discusses 
the major heuristics and biases 
that drive decision making in a 
fire emergency. In particular, the 
loss aversion, discounting and 
status quo heuristics and bias 
were observed. 
This article discusses 
potential heuristics and 
biases, but does 
provide detail on how 
to avoid them.     X 
Slovic P 







Affective responses to risk occur 
automatically and quickly as part 
of "risk as feelings." The affect 
heuristic is a mental shortcut that 
associates positive or negative 
emotion with risk perception. 
The authors talk about affect as 
an important component of risk-
based decision-making that 
cannot be eliminated, but can be 
incorporated, if not relied upon in 
decision-making 
The authors discuss 




suggestions about how 
to frame decisions to 
work with the affect 
heuristic. However, the 
larger public health 
decision context is not 
discussed specifically.     X 
Slovic P 
Perception of Risk 







Both the intuitive and rational 
models to decision making are 
important to consider. Good 
decision making will harness the 
positive aspects of both and 
minimize the negatives. The 
authors also discuss the need to 
consider public perception of risk 
in risk-based decision-making in 
response to events. If there is a 
disconnect between public risk 
perception and risk management 
response, the recommended 
actions may be ignored 
This analysis provides 
important information 
about the cognitive 
processes in risk 
perception and risk 
assessment. It does not 
provide specific 
information to guide 
decision makers, but 
provides the theoretical 
underpinning for risk-
based response     X 
 












In this book, Kahneman 
discusses many different aspects 
of thinking and decision making. 
He focuses on System 1 vs. 
System 2 thinking/intuitive vs. 
rational systems. He outlines the 
cognitive processes and the 
major biases and heuristics that 
contribute to thinking and 
decision-making 
While this book does 
not specifically focus 
on decision-making in 
the context of 
contamination 
emergencies, it does 
pinpoint the major 
cognitive processes, 
biases, and heuristics 
that affect decision-















For fire ground commanders, 
intuitive decision-making, 
influenced by years of experience 
with similar situations, is the 
most valuable and practical 
approach to decisions. Because 
decisions often need to be made 
in seconds or minutes in a fire 
situation, the incident 
commander does not have the 
time for a rational decision-
process, and if they tried to 
impose it, it would likely delay 
decisions and result in poor 
outcomes 
This is valuable insight 
into the role of 
intuition in decision-
making. However, this 
applies mainly to very 
experienced, well 
trained leaders who 
have been exposed to 
these situations many 
times in the past. In a 
contamination event, 
with an inexpert 
decision-maker, 
intuition may not be as 









Table 9 – Risk-Based Decision-Making Concept Matrix 
First Author Title Type 
Conceptual 
Framework(s
) Used Major Finding(s) 























Protective action decisions are 
often needed as the first phase 
of a public health crisis. For 
chemicals, these decisions are 
often whether to shelter in 
place or evacuate. These 
decisions are complex and can 
sometimes be aided by tools 
like checklists or decision 
trees.  
This article focuses 
specifically on chemical 
releases where shelter in 
place and evacuation are 
the only options for early 
protective actions. There 
may be other options in 
other situations. However, 
the discussion of this early 
phase of decision making is 














This NRC report provides an 
important foundation for risk-
based decision-making. It 
includes 3 phases: formulating 
and scoping the problem, 
planning and risk assessing, 
and risk management. It also 
emphasizes the need for 
stakeholder involvement in 
each phase. 
This is foundational 
framework for human 
health risk assessment. 
While it applies to 
emergencies, it is not 
specific to emergencies, 
and so may need to be 
simplified in crisis 
situations.  X X X 
 




















making involves not only 
empirical data and scientific 
analysis, but also a democratic 
process among the decision-
team. It also requires that 
decision makers weigh options 
using some mechanism like a 
value tree, and that they follow 
up on their risk management 
decisions and evaluate residual 
risk. 
This article builds on the 
Silver Book's approach to 
good risk assessment 
practice, and also discusses 
possible approaches to 
evaluating risk 


















In any decision-making 
process, there is a chance of 
making the wrong choice. 
Traditional quantitative risk 
assessment can facilitate 
discussion among the decision 
team, quantify uncertainty, and 
facilitate development of 
alternative risk management 
choices. In addition, expected 
opportunity loss analysis can 
also help understand how 
much better one alternative is 
than another, and how feasible 
it is to implement in reality 
The EOL approach is a 
very quantitative method, 
which requires knowledge 
of probability distributions 
and quantification of 
outcomes. This is difficult 
in the immediacy of an 
emergency, and is probably 
not feasible to implement in 
a crisis. However, the 
principles of this type of 
analysis are important to 














This dissertation evaluates how 
rapid risk-risk informed 
decision making can be applied 
to management of hydropower 
facilities in emergency/high 
flow events. The author 
discusses creation of a risk-
informed decision framework 
This dissertation focuses on 
building a MCDA model. 
The authors recognize that 
in a true emergency it may 
be unrealistic to build a 
model like the one 
discussed here because of 
limited time and X   X 
 












using MCDA. Multiple criteria 
are analyzed and options are 
optimized by matching options 
back to original goals of the 
response 
information. Yet, the 
principles of multiple 
criteria analysis and 
decision optimization can 
be applied to risk-based 











This analysis emphasizes the 
need for greater 
acknowledgement and 
consideration of uncertainty in 
risk-based decision-making. 
This article focuses on 
Baysian analysis as a 
statistical method for 
conducting risk assessment 
and considering 
uncertainty. While this is a 
robust approach, this article 
does not focus on 
emergency risk-based 
decision making. It is 
unlikely that a Baysian 
analysis could be conducted 
in a crisis. However, the 
principle of uncertainty 
acknowledgement is still 












This analysis emphasizes the 
need to acknowledge and 
account for both aleatory 
uncertainty and epistemic 
uncertainty in decision making. 
If there is some uncertainty in 
the value being assessed, then 
that uncertainty should be 
considered when comparing 
possible choices in a pairwise 
comparison.  
This article does not focus 
specifically on decision-
making in a crisis. It 
presupposes time and 
resources available to 
model and consider risk 
and uncertainty in a 
detailed and mathematical 
way. However, the 
principles of considering 
both uncertainty in 
knowledge of a crisis event X X X 
 





and variability in things 
like population 
vulnerability and changing 
contamination levels over 
time are important in order 
to make better decisions in 





















This analysis discusses the 
application of a largely 
qualitative method for 
systematizing risk-based 
decision making in military 
combat situations. The 
Operational Risk Management 
approach provides a 
framework for a decision 
maker to consider the 
likelihood and consequences of 
a course of action, and 
vulnerabilities in the system, 
and to compare coursed of 
action to a commander's 
acceptable level of risk and to 
other courses of action 
This approach is better 
suited than other more 
quantitative approaches to 
the tight timeframe and 
limited data available in a 
crisis. This description of 
the application of 
operational risk 
management is mostly 
applicable to a military 
combat situation and not a 
civilian contamination 
emergency, but the 
approach can be modified 
to fit other scenarios fairly 
easily. X   X 
 






On the use of 
expert 
judgment in the 
qualification of 
risk assessment Dissertation 
No specific 
framework 
This analysis addresses how 
expert judgment can be best 
considered and utilized during 
risk assessment and risk-based 
decision-making. The author 
identifies where expert 
judgment applies in each step 
of the risk assessment process. 
This is a useful analysis in 
that it acknowledges the 
role of expert judgment and 
provides applications in all 
phases of risk assessment. 
Because decision-making 
in a crisis will likely be 
more qualitative and based 
on judgment than in routine 
situations where risk can be 
more quantitatively 
assessed, this is very 













This article identifies "human 
factors" as an additional source 
of uncertainty in risk 
assessment, one which is not 
often considered. This 
"operational uncertainty" can 
be somewhat ameliorated 
through inclusion of multiple 
perspectives throughout the 
risk-based decision process, 
including a participatory 
approach that involves the 
community and considers 
contextual factors during the 
process. 
This article highlights 
another important source of 
uncertainty, which should 
be reduced as much as 
possible and accounted for 
in decision making. 
However, in the context of 
a crisis, the ability for a 
decision maker to make the 
process participatory may 
be limited due to time 
constraints. X X X 
 














This article discusses the need 
for decision-makers to take 
better account of sources of 
uncertainty in risk assessment, 
particularly for large chemical 
environmental exposures. The 
authors emphasize that current 
Acute Exposure Guideline 
Levels (AEGL) for chemicals 
incorporate uncertainty factors, 
which make judging true 
uncertainty in an emergency 
response difficult. The authors 
argue for in some cases 
providing AEGLs without 
uncertainty factors so that 
uncertainty can be accounted 
for more scientifically in the 
risk assessment process in 
other ways. 
This article is good in that 
it focuses specifically on 
emergencies and large-
scale exposure events. 
However, the authors 
presuppose access to large 
amounts of reliable data 
and modeling tools and the 
time to conduct analysis. In 
the context of this research 
it is likely that information 
and resources will be 
limited and accounting for 
uncertainty will be done 












This article echoes the author's 
previous article on 
environmental health triage, 
but emphasizes that role that 
probabilistic risk analysis can 
play in assessing exposures, 
quantifying uncertainty, and 
enabling tradeoff decisions in 
an emergency. 
This is a useful perspective 
on probabilistic exposure 
analysis in chemical risk 
characterization, but it 
likely will not be useful in 
the initial response to a 
contamination emergency 
due to the lack of data and 
time. X X X 
 



























The authors identify value tree 
analysis as a way to facilitate 
decision tradeoff analysis, and 
to incorporate consideration of 
multiple and diverse sets of 
factors (e.g. health protection, 
economic, ethical, political 
considerations) and help 
ensure that decisions meet the 
original goals of the decision-
maker with regards to the 
response. 
This is a useful tool and can 
be scaled up or down in 
complexity based on the 
time and resources 



















This article focuses on the 
need to model public 
behavioral responses in 
contamination emergencies, 
specifically radiological 
dispersal device (RDD) attacks 
The complexities of the 
proposed modeling 
approach are more suited to 
planning and scenario 
generation than to 
emergency response. 
However, the idea that 
public reactions and 
behaviors need to be 
considered in assessing 
risks and deciding on risk 
management options in an 












The authors evaluate risk 
management approaches to 
determine how they address 
applicable ethical theories. 
They determine that there is no 
specific method based solely 
on ethical principles. However, 
they emphasize the need for 
consideration of ethics in risk-
based decision making.  
This is useful to show that 
ethical principles are built 
into many risk-based 
decision approaches. It 
does not provide specific 
guidance of how ethics 
should be incorporated, into 
crisis decision-making. But, 
the principle that it should 
be considered is important. X     
 


















This article discusses the use 
of multiple criteria decision 
analysis (MCDA) in a nuclear 
emergency situation. The 
authors highlight the use of a 
value tree to identify all 
attributes for consideration 
during the risk analysis; the 
use of a neutral facilitator in 
the decision process; and the 
use of tradeoff analysis when 
deciding upon alternative 
actions.  
This is a good example of 
application of MCDA in an 
emergency setting when 
there may not be time or 
data enough to conduct 
extensive modeling of risk 
or decision alternatives. 
The authors propose a 
general value tree that can 
be modified for other 
scenarios. The authors do 
not explicitly address 
uncertainty other than 
through the general MCDA 














Article Decision Tree 
The authors use a decision tree 
to show and quantify the 
desirability of different options 
under different risk levels. The 
authors show that different 
response options can be 
quantified, but they also 
discuss the need to understand 
community views and values 
when choosing a response 
option and to communicate 
choices effectively in order to 
make the option viable. 
This is a good illustration 
of risk-informed decision-
making. It is not intended 
to be used as a tool in a 
response, but can inform 
deliberation in planning for 
a future response. A 
decision tree, used to 
visualize (and possibly 
quantify) different response 
options is useful for an 
emergency situation, as is 
taking community views 
and values into account to 
ensure that residual risk is 
acceptable and accepted 
once a decision has been 
made.     X 
 




















This article examines the 
response to the Red River 
Valley flood in Manitoba, 
Canada in 1997. Findings 
include that the community 
should be more engaged in the 
decision-making process when 
choosing risk management 
options; that risk perception 
may differ between the 
community and emergency 
response decision-makers; and 
that acceptable risk may also 
differ. If decision makers do 
not account for these 
differences, response will be 
less effective 
This article only discusses 
the decision-making 
process briefly, and does 
not go into detail about how 






















MCDA can be applied to 
different degrees, including 
both simple additive weighting 
of decision criteria, which 
accounts for importance of 
criteria; ordered weighted 
average, which accounts for 
weight given to criteria, but not 
importance; and induced 
ordered weighted average, 
which accounts for both.  
This process is too 
complicated for an 
emergency, little data are 
available and decisions 
need to be made quickly. 
But, the process of quickly 
comparing scenarios based 
on simple weights may be 
possible.     X 
 




















The authors emphasize that 
risk information should be 
collected and integrated into an 
ICS-based decision process 
before a chemical release 
occurs. One source of 
information for chemical 
incidents is MSDS's. However, 
they are limited. So, more 
effort needs to be made to 
gather data and plan for 
incidents before they occur. 
This article discusses the 
collection of data and 
planning under an all 
hazards system, but does 
not specifically address 
what can be done when an 
emergency occurs and the 
needed data are not fully 









The authors identify 
"ambiguity" as an under-
attended to part of the risk-
informed decision-making 
process. They define ambiguity 
and possible sources of it in 
this process, and identify a 
step-wise method for a 
decision-maker to address it. 
The authors emphasize the 
need for incorporating 
discussion of sources of 
ambiguity into the discussions 
that occur between decision 
makers and stakeholders 
during a response. 
The article has some 
important points about 
ambiguity that have not 
been addressed thoroughly 
elsewhere. However, this 
article focuses on risk 
assessment more broadly 
and not just in an 
emergency. The process 
outlined here may be too 
time consuming for a crisis. 
However, in a simplified 
way it could be applicable. X X   
MacGillivray 
BH 
What can water 













The authors outline the risk-
based decision-making steps 
and propose a categorization 
process for identifying the 
maturity of decision-making 
process  
The article is very specific 
to water utilities and doesn't 
apply specifically to 
emergency situations X X X 
 






















The authors discuss how in 
radiation emergencies such as 
radiological terrorism, 
traditional risk assessment 
approaches that look at 
stochastic effects, and 
conservative thresholds may 
need to be disregarded in order 
to protect against more acute 
effects. 
This is a good point about 
modifying risk-based 
decision-making to fit the 
timelines of an emergency 




Canada and the 
use of evidence 
in developing 
public health 






The authors conducted a study 
of the decision making 
processes during the H1N1 
pandemic in Canada in 2009. 
They discuss the different 
ideologies regarding evidence-
based decision-making, and 
note that a pragmatic ideology 
that supports prioritizing 
evidence in decision making, 
but also incorporating other 
socioeconomic, ethical, and 
political considerations among 
others. The authors emphasize 
the need for greater 
transparency and 
communication of decision-
making processes which can be 
less transparent when not 
entirely evidence-based.  
This article highlights 
different viewpoints 
regarding how to approach 
decision making in an 
evidence-poor 
environment. The study 
itself focuses more on 
longer-term decision-
making, but offers some 
good recommendations 
about process that can be 
applied in a contamination 
emergency. X     
 













health risks: a 
brief history of 
developments 






This article details the 
evolution of the risk 
assessment and risk 
management paradigms to 
include the public/stakeholders 
as integral part of each phase 
of the decision making 
process. The author identifies 
the benefits of including 
stakeholders throughout the 
process, including that it will 
improve buy-in from the 
community, it will tap into 
unique local knowledge, and it 
will promote a sense of 
environmental democracy 
where stakeholders are viewed 
as equal partners. 
This analysis emphasizes 
the importance of 
public/stakeholder 
participation in risk-based 
decision-making, but does 
not address time pressures 
in this process, particularly 




























The authors describe the 
decision making process for 
remediation of river 
contamination and mitigation 
of acidic mine waters at a tin 
mine in the UK. The authors 
relay the experience to show 
that while there was extensive 
science and data supporting 
specific mitigation measures, 
decision-making was highly 
influenced by public 
perception of the color of the 
water, and response measures 
were chosen that were 
unsupported or not fully 
supported by data. 
This illustrates the 
importance of other factors 
in the decision-making 
process and that decision 
making cannot be entirely 
scientifically driven. The 
bulk of this article focuses 
on long-term environmental 
remediation, which is not 
specifically applicable to 
this analysis, but 
observations about the 
decision making process 
are useful X   X 
 


















This thesis details the need for 
and one possible approach to 
modeling risk in the early 
phases of a radiological 
emergency (specifically a 
radiological release from a 
nuclear facility). The author 
acknowledges that in early 
emergency response, 
complicated models will not be 
useful and that there will be 
minimal data with which to 
make decisions. She highlights 
the importance of 
understanding and 
communicating uncertainty to 
decision makers and providing 
a simple tool to support risk 
assessment 
This thesis is very specific 
to radiological emergencies 
stemming from nuclear 
facilities, and the tool 
would not apply to other 
situations. However, the 
author's general approach to 
simplifying risk calculation, 
communicating uncertainty, 
and recommending options 
for response is helpful.  X X X 
 





Table 10 – Thematic Codes 
 
  
Coding Themes Interviews (n) Total References (n) 
Decision Making Processes 16 141 
  Approaches to Decision Making 12 67 
  Cognitive Mechanisms 8 28 
  Risk Assessment Process 8 25 
  Types of Decisions Needed 7 14 
  Documenting decision process 5 6 
Decision Making Structures 16 100 
  Types of People to Include 15 48 
  Decision Responsibility 11 27 
  Organizational Structure 11 25 
Types of Considerations 16 96 
  Scientific Data and Risk 
Information 
9 27 
  Timing 9 14 
  Demographic Data 6 14 
  Uncertainty 7 12 
  Public Behavior and Risk 
Perception 
5 9 
  Political Issues 4 9 
  Ethical Principles 4 4 
  Legal and Regulatory 
Considerations 
2 2 
  Feasibility 2 2 
Communication 12 41 
 
















Interviewee Response Categories Interviewees (n)  
Total Contacted 32 
No Response 12 
Excluded 1 
Included 19 
    
Total Recruited 19 
Willing, but Unable to Schedule 3 
Total Interviewed 16 
    
Response Rate 50% 
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Table 13 – Summary of Policy Recommendations 
Acting Prior to a Contamination Emergency to Improve Decision Making 
Recommendation 1.1 Federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the Department of Energy, the Department of 
Homeland Security, and the Department of Health and Human 
Services (in particular the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention) should prioritize characterization of chemical, 
biological, and radiological contaminants, and conduct of 
human health risk assessment during the pre-emergency period, 
and make that information widely and easily available to 
stakeholders who will need it to inform decision making in an 
emergency. 
Recommendation 1.2 Federal agencies with technical reach back capabilities and 
expertise in risk assessment, public health emergency response, 
toxicology, and environmental contamination response should 
continue to ensure that state and local governments, public 
health agencies, and emergency management agencies are 
aware of and can easily access their knowledge and technical 
support in a crisis. 
Recommendation 1.3 Mayors, governors, and public health officials should be trained 
in crisis decision making. 
Recommendation 1.4 Mayors and governors should identify a team of advisors, who 
represent the important perspectives outlined in this research, 
and can be called upon to aid in decision making during a 
crisis. 
Improving Crisis Decision Making during Contamination Emergencies 
Recommendation 2.1 Guidance for mayors and governors should be developed to 
enable rapid decision making with increased fidelity, which can 
reduce morbidity and mortality following major contamination 
events. 
Recommendation 2.2 Other decision support tools should be developed, which can be 
used during the crisis period of a contamination emergency. 
 






Figure 1 – Conceptual Framework 
 
 





Figure 2 – Question 8: Sub-question Box Plots 
 























































Figure 4 – Question 12: Sub-question Box Plots 
 




























































































Figure 7 – Initial Framework for Mayors and Governors: Decision Making in a 
Contamination Emergency 
 
Context: The time spent in each step will depend upon the urgency of the crisis, 
with more rapid cycling through the steps given greater urgency. 
Step 1: Initial Assessment of the Situation - Make an initial determination about 
how quickly action is needed to ensure that the public is protected. 
 Is action needed immediately? If so, proceed rapidly through the steps.  
 Can action be delayed? If so for how long? Proceed through the steps and 
delve more deeply into analysis. 
 
Step 2: Identify Advisors - The purpose of an advisory group is to broaden the 
decision maker’s view of the situation, provide greater access to more evidence to 
support decision making, and provide feedback that will improve the quality of 
decisions and reduce the impact of cognitive biases and heuristics inherent in 
human judgment. 
 Include a combination of individuals that are trusted advisors, and outside 
experts to fill gaps in knowledge.  
 An advisory body should represent a diversity of viewpoints and expertise 
including: 
o Scientific and risk assessment expertise 
o Ethics 
o Logistical and financial realities 
o Political realities 
o Social and demographic makeup of the affected population 
o Community perspectives 
 The advisory body should be tasked to gather data and information in their 
respective areas of expertise and present that information in a concise way 
for consideration in decision making 
 Identify someone to document the decision making process as it occurs 
 
Step 3: Refine Assessment and Identify Goals and Objectives – When time 
pressure is great, relying first on intuition and then conducting a rapid analysis of 
that intuition and of available information can help orient the decision making 
process. The more time available, the more in depth the analysis can be. 
 Using intuition and the limited data available, develop an initial view of the 
situation 
o Broadly, what is the problem? How big is it? Who is affected? How 
urgent is the situation? 
o Ask advisors to react to that initial view and provide information to 
shape your understanding 
 Set goals for your response to the emergency.  











o What values are the most important to guide decisions? 
 Discuss goals with advisors and make sure that all response elements are 
working toward achieving the same agreed upon goals, values, and 
outcomes. 
 
Step 4: Conduct a Risk Assessment: In order to understand the problem more 
fully, an assessment of the public health risks is needed. The rigor of this 
assessment varies with the level of urgency. 
 With expert input, decide on an approach to assessing the risks to public 
health.  
o How will the contaminant be identified, dose-response and exposures 
be assessed, and risk characterized?  
o Is there time to do sampling or is a rough assessment all that is 
possible? 
 Explicitly address uncertainty. Discuss with experts how uncertain risk 
estimates are, and who is most at risk in the population. 
 
Step 5: Evaluate Scientific Evidence – With advisors, evaluate the risk 
assessment results and other information. If there is great urgency to act, quickly 
move to development of options for action (Step 6) 
 Who is at risk and in what ways? 
o How certain are the results? Identify and make explicit uncertain 
assumptions. 
o Discuss the risks to vulnerable populations. Are they greater than those 
for non-vulnerable populations? Who is vulnerable?  
 Decide on levels of acceptable risk 
o Assess the community’s threshold for acceptable risk by consulting 
with a community advocate or representative. 
o Make a determination about what levels of contamination are 
acceptable and unacceptable. 
 
Step 6: Develop Options for Action – Based on the initial assessment of the 
situation, risk assessment results, and consultation with advisors, propose options 
for action to mitigate the risks to public health. If great urgency exists, limit the 
number of options and move to deliberation. 
 Propose options for action based on initial assessment of the situation and 
risk assessment results 
 Discuss proposed options with the advisory group. 
o Are there other options to add? 
 
Step 7: Vet Options and Analyze Tradeoffs – Given the options proposed in 











 If time is very short, conduct a rapid comparison between options to 
evaluate: 
o How an option helps meet the originally defined goals, values, and 
preferred outcomes for the response 
o Whether options uphold identified ethical principles, are logistically, 
legally and financially feasible; will be accepted by the community, and 
will be politically viable 
o Compare set of options to decide which is the best approach. 
 If there is additional time for deliberation, consider adding 
o A more formal comparison of options for action using pairwise 
comparison 
o Greater analysis of second order impacts of a decision – play out how 
the decision will work when implemented to identify any pitfalls 
o Greater analysis of key considerations, including ethical, legal, 
financial, social, political, and logistical feasibility of each option 
 Does the option violate any key ethical principles that were defined 
as important? If so, is that acceptable or unacceptable? 
 Does the option violate any laws or regulations? If so, can and 
should the option still be considered? 
 Is the option financially feasible? If funds are not available now, can 
they be made available? 
 How will the community respond to the option? Will it reduce risks 
to acceptable levels for the community? What barriers may make 
community members unable or unwilling to comply with a 
protective action? 
 Are there political issues that will make this option impossible to 
implement? 
 
Step 8: Decide – Based on the options and tradeoff analysis, decide which option 
should be implemented.  
 
Step 9: Implement Decision: Following this decision, work within incident 
command and with communications experts to implement your chosen option(s). 
 
Step 10: Re-Assess and Re-Evaluate – The decision process is a loop. As more 














Appendix 1 – Aim 1 Institutional Notice of Determination 
 
 













Appendix 2 – Aim 3 Institutional Notice of Determination 
  
 





Appendix 3 – Template Interview Recruitment Email 
October ___, 2016 
Dear ____, 
My name is Crystal Boddie and I am a Doctorate of Public Health (DrPH) candidate at 
the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. I am conducting a research 
project as part of my dissertation entitled Risk-Based Decision Making during Public 
Health Emergencies Involving Environmental Contamination. 
I am contacting you because of your research in the field of public health crisis decision-
making, and to ask if you would be willing to be interviewed for this project. The purpose 
of the project is to understand how leaders make decisions during the early hours of 
public health emergencies involving environmental contamination, when protective 
action decisions are needed to mitigate the impact on the health of the public. 
This research will involve a series of interviews with individuals who have either been 
involved in response to a contamination emergency, or who have conducted research on 
decision making in crises. The goal of this interview process will be to gather insights to 
inform a draft decision guide or checklist that leaders might use to help guide their 
decision making process in future emergencies. 
Your participation in this interview is completely voluntary. The interview will last 
approximately one hour, and with your permission it will be audio recorded. The 
interview will be scheduled at a time that is convenient for you. You may skip any 
questions or stop the interview at any time. Quotes will not be attributed to you or your 
organization in the written results. Rather, quotes will be attributed to your type of 
experience related to this topic (e.g., decision maker, scientist, researcher, responder, 
etc.). 
If you are willing to participate or have questions about this project, please contact me by 
email at cboddie@jhu.edu or by phone at 410-935-4524. I will then follow up with 
additional information about the interview questions and logistical information. I have 
attached my CV for your information as well. Thank you for your time and any insight 
you provide for my project. I look forward to hearing from you. 
 
Sincerely, 
Crystal Boddie, MPH 
DrPH Candidate 











Appendix 4 – Recruitment Flyer 
Risk-Based Decision Making during Public Health Emergencies Involving 
Environmental Contamination 
Semi-Structured Interviews with Practitioners and Decision Makers 
Overview 
As a doctoral candidate at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, I am 
currently recruiting interview participants for my dissertation research project focused on 
assessing the early decision making process in response to public health emergencies 
involving environmental contamination (e.g., chemical spills, radiological accidents, or 
biological attack/accidental release). The project is particularly focused on large events 
that are serious enough that they rise to the political level, where a mayor or governor 
may be the ultimate decision-maker. 
 
When a contamination emergency occurs and protective action decisions are needed 
quickly (likely within hours) to protect public health, decision makers are not always 
equipped to make evidence-based decisions that also incorporate other ethical, political, 
social, logistical, and economic considerations. While structures for response like the 
Incident Command System (ICS) exist and are extremely important, there is very little in 
the way of guidance for leaders on the actual decision-making process – how to weigh 
the evidence and make good protective decisions under extreme time pressure and 
considerable uncertainty. 
 
Approach and Purpose 
This research will involve a series of interviews with individuals who have either been 
involved in response to a contamination emergency, or who have conducted research on 
decision making in crises. The goal of this interview process will be to gather insights to 
inform a draft decision guide or checklist that leaders might use to help guide their 
decision making process in future emergencies. 
 
Logistics 
Participation in this research study is entirely voluntary. Interviews will last 45 minutes to 
1 hour, and with permission, will be audio recorded for note-taking purposes. Interviews 
will be scheduled at a time that is convenient for you. The study is not-for-attribution, 
and any information or quotes used in the final report will not be attributable to any 
interviewee. 
 
If you are interested in the study and are and willing to participate, or have any questions, 
please contact me, Crystal Boddie (cboddie@jhu.edu, 410-935-4524). You may also 
contact Dr. Mary Fox, who is overseeing the research at (mfox9@jhu.edu) if you have 
any questions or concerns.  
 





Appendix 5 – Interview Guide for Researchers 
Risk-Based Decision Making during Public Health Emergencies Involving 
Environmental Contamination 
Semi-Structured Interview Protocol for Researchers 
Introduction 
This interview is part of a broader exploratory study of the early protective action 
decision making process for response to public health emergencies involving 
environmental contamination (e.g., chemical spills, radiological accidents, a biological 
attack), particularly focused on events that are serious enough that they rise to the 
political level where a mayor or governor may be the ultimate decision-maker. The 
interview portion of this project aims to understand perspectives of key stakeholders 
regarding how initial protective action decisions are made in the early hours and days of 
such an emergency response. The ultimate goal of this interview process will be to 
inform a draft decision guide or checklist that decision-makers might use to help guide 
protective action decisions in future emergencies. 
You have been identified as someone who has conducted research on crisis or risk-based 
decision making or has thought extensively about response to public health emergencies. 
This interview is designed to last less than an hour. You may stop the interview at any 
time. I will be taking notes and referring to this guide to ensure that I cover the points 
outlined here. I will also be recording the interview for note-taking purposes only. 
Nothing you say in the interview will be attributed to you directly. When this project is 
completed, I would be happy to provide you with the final abstract and/or a full copy or 
the report. 
Do you have any questions or concerns before we begin? 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. Do you conduct research on decision-making, or are you a leader or public health 
practitioner who has been in a decision-making role during a contamination 
emergency or public health crisis? 
 
2. If you are a researcher focused on decision science or public health emergency 
response, what would you say are the most important elements for a decision-
maker to consider during a public health crisis? 
 How should a decision-maker balance intuition and analytical processes? 
 What are the most important cognitive biases and heuristics that apply to 
crisis decision-making? 
o What are they? 
o How can they be avoided/mitigated? 
 





 What do you feel are the most successful structures to aid in crisis 
decision-making? 
o Is having one person responsible for decision-making in a time-
pressured situation most appropriate? 
o Should a decision maker receive support from experts and advisors 
but ultimately make the decision him/herself? 
 What types of people should be involved in providing 
support? 
o Is group decision-making likely to succeed in a crisis? 
 Who/what type of people should be involved? 
 How can decision makers balance time pressure and need to act with 
deliberation and careful consideration of evidence? 
 What evidence is most important to consider? Please discuss how you 
think different types of evidence should be considered (examples below). 
o Intuition 
o Scientific evidence about risk to human health 
o Ethical principles 
o Socioeconomic, geographic, and demographic information 
o Political sensitivities 
o Financial information 
o Logistical feasibility of implementing a decision 
o Legal/regulatory authority 
 How can decision-makers move ahead with decisions in an environment 
of great uncertainty, where data is largely lacking? 
 What decision-making processes do you think are most successful in a 
time-pressured crisis situation (examples below)? 
o Intuition-driven decisions 
o Intuition, then interrogated and analyzed 
o A formal analytical process comparing options? 
o Other? 
 How should stakeholders be involved in a decision-making process? How 
should the public specifically be engaged/involved? 
 What advice do you have for future decision-makers in contamination 
emergencies? 
 Would a framework or short guidance document that laid out points to 
consider in decision-making help leaders to make decisions? 
 If so, what would you want to see in a decision framework?  
 






3. Is there anyone else I should speak with who has thought a lot about crisis 
decision-making or risk-based decision-making in an emergency? 
 
4. Do you have any final questions for me before we conclude the interview? 
 
5. Would it be alright if I contact you again if I have any follow-up questions or 
need clarification on something we’ve discussed today? 
  
Thank you very much for your time today. 
  
 





Appendix 6 – Interview Guide for Practitioners 
Risk-Based Decision Making during Public Health Emergencies Involving 
Environmental Contamination 
Semi-Structured Interview Protocol for Practitioners and Decision Makers 
Introduction 
This interview is part of a broader exploratory study of the early protective action 
decision making process for response to public health emergencies involving 
environmental contamination (e.g., chemical spills, radiological accidents, a biological 
attack), particularly focused on events that are serious enough that they rise to the 
political level where a mayor or governor may be the ultimate decision-maker. The 
interview portion of this project aims to understand perspectives of key stakeholders 
regarding how initial protective action decisions are made in the early hours and days of 
such an emergency response. The ultimate goal of this interview process will be to 
inform a draft decision guide or checklist that decision-makers might use to help guide 
protective action decisions in future emergencies. 
You have been identified as someone who was responsible for or was a key stakeholder 
significantly involved in decision-making during such a public health emergency. 
This interview is designed to last less than an hour. You may stop the interview at any 
time. I will be taking notes and referring to this guide to ensure that I cover the points 
outlined here. I will also be recording the interview for note-taking purposes only. 
Nothing you say in the interview will be attributed to you directly. When this project is 
completed, I would be happy to provide you with the final abstract and/or a full copy or 
the report. 
Do you have any questions or concerns before we begin? 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. Do you conduct research on decision-making, or are you a leader or public health 
practitioner who has been in a decision-making role during a contamination 
emergency or public health crisis? 
 
2. If you have been responsible for decision-making, what contamination event(s) 
were you involved in (Limit to most impactful or most recent events if involved in 
multiple events)?  
 What was your title/role during those events?  
 What were your overall impressions of the protective action decision-
making process? 
 What did you find most challenging as a decision maker? 
 What, if anything, facilitated your decision making process? 
  
 





 How would you describe the decision-making structure you used? 
o Did you make the decisions alone with relatively little input from 
others? 
o Supporting information from experts and advisors, but you were 
ultimately responsible for the decision 
 How many people and what type of people did you rely 
upon? 
o Group decision-making, where a group of people deliberated and 
decided together on a course of action 
 Who/what type of people were involved? Did they all 
contribute equally? 
o Someone else made the decision, but you communicated it? 
 What type of early decisions did you have to make? 
o How much time pressure did you feel in making an initial protective 
action decision? 
 What information did you rely upon/incorporate into your decisions? 
Please discuss how you considered different types of evidence and 
information (examples below). 
o Intuition 
o Scientific evidence about risk to human health 
o Ethical principles 
o Socioeconomic, geographic, and demographic information 
o Political sensitivities 
o Financial information 
o Logistical feasibility of implementing a decision 
o Legal/regulatory authority 
 Did you incorporate scientific data about risk into your decisions? 
o What types of data did you have? 
o Did you wish you had more data to inform your decisions? What 
data? 
o Did a lack of data delay your decisions, and if so for how long? 
 What process did you use to make initial decisions? 
o Did you conduct a formal risk assessment? 
 If so, what methods did you use? 
o Did you go with your initial intuition? 
o Did you weigh options against one another? How did you weigh 
them/what factors did you consider? 
 Did you involve other stakeholders in your decision process?  
o Did they include the public? 
 





 What were the outcomes of your decision-making process (e.g., what 
decisions did you make and how were they received by the public and 
implemented)? 
o What were the positive outcomes? 
o What were the negative outcomes? 
o Would you have approached your decision-process differently if you 
could go back? 
 What advice do you have for future decision-makers in a similar situation? 
 Would a framework or short guidance document that laid out points to 
consider in decision-making have helped you to make decisions? 
 If so, what would you want from a decision framework if you were the 
decision maker? 
 
3. Is there anyone else I should speak with who has been in similar decision-making 
role during public health emergencies involving contamination? 
 
4. Do you have any final questions for me before we conclude the interview? 
 
5. Would it be alright if I contact you again if I have any follow-up questions or 
need clarification on something we’ve discussed today? 
  










Appendix 7 – Email Informed Consent Script 
Investigator Name: Crystal Boddie, MPH, DrPH Candidate 
Institution: Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health 




I am a doctoral candidate at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public 
Health, and I would like to invite you to take part in a research project with the purpose 
of understanding the key elements of risk-based decision making in public health 
emergencies involving chemical, biological, or radiological contaminants. You have been 
selected to participate based on your expertise, knowledge, or experience in this area. 
You will be asked questions related to your professional experiences and opinions about 
the decision making or risk analysis processes. 
This interview will last approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour. With your 
permission, I will audio record this interview so that it can be transcribed and referred to 
later when I analyze the interview results. 
There are no foreseeable costs or risks to you from participating in this project, 
but you will be asked to provide your time and expertise. There is no direct benefit to you 
and you will not receive payment. However, your contributions to this work could help 
lead to development of a decision framework that will assist leaders in making decisions 
during future contamination emergencies.  
The results of this project will be shared with you upon completion and 
publication. Participants will be kept anonymous and your responses will not be 
identifiable in any way. Interview notes will be kept confidential and will be held in a 
password protected electronic file. Your participation is voluntary and you can change 
your mind at any time or decline to answer any question.  
This work is being conducted by me, Crystal Boddie at the Johns Hopkins 
Bloomberg School of Public Health. I can be reached by phone at 410-935-4524 or by 
email at cboddie@jhu.edu. You may also contact my academic advisor, Dr. Mary Fox 
(mfox9@jhu.edu) if you have any questions or complaints about this project. If you have 
any questions about your rights as a research participant, or if you think you have not 
been treated fairly, you may contact the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at 410-955-3193, or 1-888-262-3242, or 
JHSPH.irboffice@jhu.edu.  
Do you have any questions? Is it ok to proceed with the interview, and are you ok 
with me recording the interview? 
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Department of Homeland Security – Washington, DC 
Principal Responsibilities: 
 Program Manager and Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) for the 
Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment Program. Budgeting and financial 
management for a $2.0 million program budget 
 Updated the ITRA according to Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-
18 requirements and stakeholder input 
 
February 2010  
 
Science Advisor  
U.S. Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction  
Proliferation and Terrorism 
 
Principal Responsibilities:  
 Contracted to research and produce a policy assessment of federal progress and 
remaining gaps in preparedness for a remediation of a large bioterrorism attack 
 Supported the WMD Commission’s assessment of the current state of the US 
biosecurity enterprise 
 
  August 2010 – 
September 2013  
 
Associate  
UPMC Center for Health Security 
August 2007 – 
July 2010  
Senior Analyst and Analyst Team Supervisor 
UPMC Center for Health Security 
September 2004 – 
July 2007  
Analyst  
UPMC Center for Health Security 
 






Program or Project Development 
 Developed expertise through dissertation research and professional work on crisis 
and risk-based decision-making in public health emergencies, particularly those 
involving environmental contamination 
 Director for the ELBI fellowship program, with over 100 fellows and alumni, 
workshops and meetings in the US and internationally, and other biosecurity 
networking events 
 Expert working to improve federal approaches to risk assessment for CBRN agents. 
PI for multiple projects on risk assessment and biosecurity strategy for the 
Department of Homeland Security, and was first author on an article in Science 
resulting from DHS work 
 Research to support biological weapons non-proliferation and the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) - its implementation and continuation for 
future generations 
 National expert on the funding and organization of biodefense and health security 
programs in the U.S. Federal Government. Author of annual report series in Health 
Security 
 Led an update of the DHS CBRN Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) 
according to Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)–18 requirements 
 Project manager and researcher assessing the progress of the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) Federal Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP), and 
defining future US healthcare preparedness goals and metrics.  
 Conducted research concerning, and authored a number of papers on, the threat of 
dengue re-emergence in the United States. 
 Collaborated with the University of Iowa on researching and running and infectious 
disease prediction market focused on Dengue emergence in the Americas 
 
Participation on Advisory Boards and Working Groups 
 Member of the Private Sector Economic Resiliency and Restoration Working 
Group. Contributed to a recovery framework for Denver, CO as part of the DHS 
Wide Area Recovery and Resiliency Program 
 Working Group on Community Engagement in Health Emergency Planning – 2007 
 
EDITORIAL ACTIVITIES 
 Associate Editor, Health Security Journal: provide editorial review and guide 
articles through the peer-review and editorial process 
 





 Review Applications and Paper Competition submissions for Emerging Leader in 
Biosecurity Initiative (ELBI) applicants and Fellows 
 Reviewer, article in PLoSOne on Acceptance of genetic modification. January 
2017. 
 Special Feature Editor: Remediation. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism. 2011;9(3)  
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PRACTICE ACTIVITIES 
 Wrote and published two memos to the Trump Administration on “Funding and 
Organization of US Federal Health Security Programs” and “Risk Assessment and 
Health Security,” Published in Health Security Issue 1 of 2017  
 Advocated for the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) to members of Senate 
Committees with jurisdiction over Global Health Security, December 16, 2016 
 Member of the 2016 Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) Joint External 
Evaluation (JEE) of Taiwan’s compliance with the International Health Regulations 
(IHR) 
 Statement and presentation at the Meeting of the States Parties to the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention, Geneva, Switzerland – December 16, 2015 
 





 Developed innovative approach to understanding emerging infectious disease burden 
and cost through creation of a publicly available, and rigorously developed, 
Infectious Disease Cost Calculator (IDCC). www.idcostcalc.org  
 NGO Lead for the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) meeting of Next 
Generation Leaders in Global Health Security – September 2014 
 Provided first time ever CBRN risk-based input to the US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) decision process 
 Produced an ITRA-based assessment of the CBRNE risks to the DHS mail stream 
and the DHS Consolidated Remote Delivery Site (CRDS) 
 Organized and led a Congressional Seminar Series on biological and nuclear security 
in coordination with the Senate Caucus on WMD Terrorism. 
 Panel member for a session on Healthcare Coalitions at the Integrated Medical, 
Public Health, Preparedness and Response Training Summit – June 2010 
 Helped prepare briefings for presidential candidates on biosecurity for the 2008 
presidential election. 
 Contributed to the Atlantic Storm project–a transatlantic bioterrorism tabletop 
exercise that highlighted a series of international biosecurity challenges concerning 
serious international epidemics. Assisted in developing the scenario, script, and 
building briefing materials for controllers and participants of the exercise. 
 Contributed to Atlantic Storm–Wye River, a bioterrorism tabletop exercise adapted 
from Atlantic Storm for the members of the House Homeland Security Committee.  
  
 












February 21, 2017 
 
Guest Lecturer, Health Security Preparedness, Spring 2017 
George Mason University School of Policy, Government, and 





Teaching Assistant, Risk Certificate Courses 
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Health Policy 
and Management. Instructor: Tom Burke, PhD and Mary Fox, PhD 
 Prepared lecture materials and course activities for Risk Policy and Risk Methods 
courses  
 Graded assignments and led laboratory sessions for the students 




Teaching Assistant, Current Issues in Public Health (CIPH) 
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Masters in 
Public Health Program. Instructor: Edyth Schoenrich, MD, MPH 
 Prepared lecture materials and course activities for CIPH course each term  
 Identified and invited guest lecturers to join the course 
 Graded assignments and interacted with students 
 Led live talks with Dr. Edyth Schoenrich and guest lecturers in a radio-interview 
style  
 
March 2016 Guest Lecturer, Risk Policy Course  
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Health Policy 
and Management. Instructor: Mary Fox, PhD 
 Lectured live to the class on CBRN Risk assessment 










 Presentation on National Risk Assessment and Public Health Preparedness to the 
National Symposium for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, Doha, Qatar – 
March 31, 2016  
 Expert Views on Biological Threat Characterization for the US Government: A 
Delphi Study, poster presentation as the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public 
Health 2016 Delta Omega Poster Competition 
 Panelist on Comparing Resilience to Natural Hazards and CBRNE Hazards, at the 
Annual Natural Hazards Conference in Colorado – June 2014 
 Moderator for International Risk Assessment Meeting in Stockholm, Sweden – 
December 2013 
 Panelist at the AniBio Threat Results Dissemination Conference in Brussels, 
Belgium –  September 2013 
 Presentation at the International Meeting on Emerging Infectious Diseases (IMED) 
on Using Electronic Health Markets to Predict the Spread of Dengue – February 
2011 
 Poster presentation on Using a Prediction Market to Forecast Dengue Fever 
Activity. International Society for Disease Surveillance Conference, Salt Lake City, 
UT –  
December 1–2, 2010 
 Panel member for a session on Pandemic and What it Means for the Hazards and 




The main focus of my work is to conduct research that improves our understanding of 
how response to large-scale public health emergencies can better mitigate the impacts and 
enable resilience in the face of disaster. Within that main focus area, I work on 
understanding and building public health and healthcare systems to improve 
preparedness; characterizing threats, hazards, and public health risks before an event 
occurs; understanding how to make better decisions in a crisis; and improving 
implementation of protective actions and communication and engagement with the public 
in an emergency response.    
 
Keywords: Public Health Preparedness, Human Health Risk Assessment, Crisis and 
Risk-Informed Decision-Making, Bioterrorism, Biodefense, Emerging Infectious 
Diseases, Risk Communication  
 
 
